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ABSTRACT 
The origins of intelligence and its developmental construction are the subject of on-going 
debate in evolutionary biology. Humans have remarkable cognitive abilities, as illustrated by our 
general intelligence, which goes hand in hand with an unmatched brain size relative to body size. But it 
is not just humans that are special in that sense: primates in general have evolved remarkably large 
relative brain size. This raises questions about the selective advantages of increased brain size, 
especially since large brains are not only energetically costly, but their cognitive development requires 
precious time and practice for maturation. The costs of maintaining a large brain and higher cognitive 
processes could be a driving factor in cognitive evolution. Whether there is a possible evolutionary 
continuity of intelligence among primates is still in debate. In order to improve our understanding of 
the evolution of primate cognition we must disentangle the factors shaping the development of 
cognitive abilities, including identifying the influences shaping problem-solving mechanisms, in 
humans and other primates. Especially studies in great apes, our closest living relatives, might lead to 
novel insights into the factors shaping the development of intelligence and the selective pressures 
driving the evolution of cognition, and so explain the adaptive significance of intelligence during 
primate evolution.  
 
With this PhD thesis, I aimed to investigate the determinants of orangutans’ cognitive 
performance and the possible presence of domain-general cognition in the genus Pongo. The first 
empirical chapter investigates the influences of variation in experience during development as a result 
of variation in rearing background and human contact on the outcome of exploration and cognitive 
performance in orangutans. With my colleague Dr. Sofia Forss, I compared the influences of 
developmental conditions and the duration of human exposure between individuals housed in 
rehabilitation stations and zoological gardens. The data reveals that orangutans experiencing contact 
with humans during infancy have a different orientation towards humans and express fundamental 
psychological changes in their problem-solving approach and abilities. This change specifically 
increases their motivation to explore as well as the duration and variety of their exploration and 
consequently affects their cognitive understanding of the physical problem-solving task. This finding 
suggests that in comparison to wild conditions, where individuals show high neophobia, early 
exposure to humans and our artifacts in captivity produces a broader range of opportunities for 
learning and exploration, resulting in increased interest and innovativeness. Therefore human-related 
histories should always be taken into account in standardized cognition tests across primates. 
 
In the next chapter, I expanded the investigation of how an individual orangutan’s interest in 
the social and physical environment affects the developmental construction of its problem-solving 
ability. I examined an individual’s response-and-exploration style, as well as its effects on cognitive 
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abilities, by measuring its responses to novelty and exploration, and related it to its orientation 
towards humans. The results revealed curiosity (of which the human orientation in the previous 
chapter is one element) as the main explanatory factor for the outcome of cognitive performance on 
five different physical cognitive problem-solving tasks. This striking effect of curiosity was quite 
unexpected because the genus Pongo is known to be very conservative in the wild: individuals avoid 
novelty and their exploration is almost exclusively socially induced. However, human contact early in 
life, with the safe and stable living conditions this provides, can unleash orangutan curiosity, which 
presumably changes an individual’s approach to its surroundings and therefore leads to different 
experiences. What is impossible to imagine for wild orangutans becomes prominent in captivity: a 
curious life style strongly enhances problem-solving performance and shapes cognitive abilities and 
understanding. Our ability to unleash this innate potential of curiosity in orangutans provides insight 
in the factors driving the construction of intelligence, especially the role of experience in this process. 
These results not only explain why captive primates appear to be so much more intelligent than their 
wild counterparts (the captivity effect), but may also have important implications for how we explain 
the dramatic increase of intelligence in our own lineage. When curiosity was added to the mix of 
factors affecting innovativeness, it may have given a major, so far unappreciated boost to our 
ancestors’ material culture that cannot be explained by changes in brain size and demography. The 
birth of curiosity may therefore have strongly contributed to making humans behaviorally modern 
well after we became so morphologically. 
 
The final chapter deals with the question whether orangutans possess domain-general 
cognitive abilities; in other words it examines the degree to which performance on different cognitive 
tasks are inter-correlated. There is extensive evidence for a general factor g in humans, measured via 
psychometric analysis and often interpreted as an expression of general intelligence. In order to 
investigate if there is evolutionary continuity in general intelligence among primates, I thoroughly 
investigated the presence of g in a sample of 53 orangutans, analogous to the psychometric evidence of 
g in humans. Principal component analysis of performance in various carefully selected physical 
cognitive tasks (each designed to represent different cognitive domains, such as reversal learning and 
causal reasoning) yielded a first component explaining about a third of the overall variance in the data. 
This result constitutes the first empirical evidence consistent with g in orangutans and comparable to 
the one found in humans. I found no support for the possibility that this conclusion could be due to 
confounding effects. I also looked for influences of experiential effects, such as curiosity, and found 
that there was a strong positive link between curiosity and g. Therefore, the factor of curiosity and the 
effect of individual’s experiences during lifetime play a crucial role in the development of stronger 
cognitive abilities, including domain-general cognitive abilities. By providing solid evidence for the 
presence of g in orangutans, I suggest evolutionary continuity of domain-general cognitive abilities 
between humans and great apes. This finding thus supports the idea that among primates general 
intelligence is a phylogenetically old phenomenon.  
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
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Overall, my PhD thesis identified important developmental determinants about what makes an 
orangutan intelligent and shows how these influences might have molded the evolution of intelligence 
in primates. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Intelligenz sind Gegenstand des aktuellen Diskurses in 
der Evolutionsbiologie. Der Mensch hat bemerkenswerte kognitive Fähigkeiten, wie durch unsere 
allgemeine Intelligenz veranschaulicht wird. Diese geht Hand in Hand mit einer im Verhältnis zur 
Körpergröße unvergleichlichen enormen Hirngröße. Aber es sind nicht nur Menschen, die in diesem 
Sinne besonders sind: Primaten haben im Allgemeinen eine erstaunlich relativ große Hirngröße 
entwickelt. Dies wirft Fragen zu den selektiven Vorteilen der Gehirngröße auf, zumal große Gehirne 
zum einen nicht nur energetisch kostspielig sind, sondern ihr kognitiver Reifungsprozess auch 
kostbare Zeit und aufwendiges Training erfordert. Die Kosten für die Aufrechterhaltung eines großen 
Gehirns mit höheren kognitiven Prozessen könnten ein treibender Faktor für die kognitive Evolution 
sein. Es stellt sich auch die Frage, ob die Intelligenz unter Primaten möglicherweise evolutionär 
kontinuierlich ist. Um die kognitive Evolution unter Primaten zu verstehen, müssen wir jene Faktoren 
erkennen, welche die Entwicklung der kognitiven Fähigkeiten beeinflussen. Das schließt die 
Identifizierung von möglichen Einflüssen auf Problemlösungsmechanismen bei Menschen und 
anderen Primaten ein. Insbesondere Studien an großen Menschenaffen, unseren nächsten lebenden 
Verwandten, können zu neuen Erkenntnissen hinsichtlich solcher Faktoren führen, die die 
Entwicklung der Intelligenz und den selektiven Druck zur Evolution der Kognition beeinflussen. Auf 
diese Weise lässt sich die adaptive Bedeutsamkeit von Intelligenz während der Primatenentwicklung 
untersuchen. 
 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit bestand in der Untersuchung der 
Bestimmungsfaktoren, die die kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Orang-Utans formen und in der Erforschung 
eines möglichen Vorkommens bereichsübergreifender Kognition (domain-general cognition) in der 
Gattung Pongo. Im ersten empirischen Kapitel werden die Einflüsse verschiedener Erfahrungen in der 
Entwicklungsphase der Orang-Utans auf die Auswirkung des Explorationsverhaltens und die 
kognitiven Fähigkeiten untersucht, die durch die individuellen Hintergründe des Aufwachsens wie 
zum Beispiel dem Kontakt zu Menschen unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sind. Gemeinsam mit meiner 
Kollegin Dr. Sofia Forss habe ich die Einflüsse von Bedingungen während der Entwicklung und die 
Dauer der menschlichen Einwirkung zwischen den in Auswilderungsstationen lebenden Individuen 
und weiteren Individuen aus zoologischen Einrichtungen verglichen. Die Resultate legen dar, dass 
Orang-Utans, die während ihrer Kindheitsphase Kontakt zu Menschen hatten, eine andere Ausrichtung 
auf den Menschen zeigen. Die Orang-Utans weisen zudem einen fundamentalen psychologischen 
Wandel in ihren Problemlösungsstrategien und -fähigkeiten auf. Insbesondere bewirkt dieser Wandel 
einen Anstieg ihrer Explorationsmotivation sowie der Dauer und Variation ihrer Exploration, so dass 
ihr kognitives Verständnis für physische Problemlösungsaufgaben beeinflusst wird. Hieraus kann 
geschlossen werden, dass völlig gegensätzlich zur stark ausgeprägten Neophobie von in freier 
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Wildbahn lebenden Individuen, in Gefangenschaft lebende Orang-Utans eine frühe Einwirkung von 
Menschen und unseren Artefakten erfahren, die eine große Auswahl an Gelegenheiten zum Lernen 
und Explorieren bieten. Dies kann ein erhöhtes Interesse und größere Innovationsfreude bei den 
Individuen hervorrufen. Diese kulturellen Einflüsse sind für das Verständnis des zugrundeliegenden 
evolutiven Mechanismus sehr bedeutsam und daher sollten die auf Menschen bezogenen 
Hintergründe bei standardisierten Kognitionstests mit Primaten stets berücksichtigt werden. 
 
Im anschließenden Kapitel richte ich den Fokus meiner Forschungsarbeit auf die Frage, wie 
sich das individuelle Interesse eines Orang-Utans an seinem sozialen und physischen Umfeld auf seine 
Entwicklung von Problemlösungsfähigkeiten auswirkt. Von jedem Individuum untersuchte ich den 
persönlichen Reaktions- und Explorationsstil sowie deren Auswirkungen auf die individuellen 
kognitiven Fähigkeiten. Dies erfolgte mit Hilfe von Messungen ihrer Reaktionen und ihre Art der 
Exploration mit unbekannten Objekten, welche in Verbindung mit ihrer individuellen Ausrichtung auf 
den Menschen gebracht werden konnte. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Neugierde (als ein Bestandteil der 
im vorherigen Kapitel beschriebene Ausrichtung auf Menschen) der wichtigste Erklärungsfaktor für 
das Ergebnis der kognitiven Leistung in fünf verschiedenen physischen kognitiven 
Problemlösungsaufgaben ist. Diese bemerkenswerte Wirkung der Neugierde ist ziemlich unerwartet, 
da die Gattung Pongo dafür bekannt ist, sich sehr konservativ in der Wildnis zu verhalten: Individuen 
vermeiden Neuheiten und die Erforschung von Neuem ist fast ausschließlich sozial bedingt. Früher 
menschlicher Kontakt, durch den sichere und stabile Lebensbedingungen geschaffen werden, kann die 
Neugierde in Orang-Utans zur Entfaltung bringen, so dass sich dadurch vermutlich die 
Herangehensweise/Einstellung eines Individuums zu seiner Umgebung verändert, dies führt 
wiederum zu  unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen. In Gefangenschaft bildet sich heraus, was für wilde 
Orang-Utans nicht vorstellbar ist: Ein neugieriger Lebensstil verbessert die 
Problemlösungsfähigkeiten und prägt sowohl die allgemeinen kognitiven Fähigkeiten als auch das 
Problemverständnis. Unser Vermögen das angeborene Potential der Neugierde in Orang-Utans zu 
entfalten, gibt Einblick in die treibenden Faktoren für den Erwerb und die Entwicklung von Intelligenz, 
vor allem darüber welche Rolle gesammelte Erfahrungen in diesem Prozess spielt. Diese Ergebnisse 
erklären nicht nur, warum gefangene Primaten so viel intelligenter zu sein scheinen als ihre wilden 
Pendants (der captivity-effect), sondern sie könnten auch wichtige Implikationen dafür liefern, wie wir 
den dramatischen Anstieg an Intelligenz in unserer eigenen Stammeslinie erklären. Neugierde könnte 
zu einer Mischung aus Faktoren hinzugekommen sein, die Innovationsfähigkeit beeinflussen. Dies 
könnte zu dem erheblichen und bisher nicht gebührend gewürdigten Schub in der materiellen Kultur 
unserer Vorfahren geführt haben, der nicht allein durch Hirngröße und Demographie erklärt werden 
kann. Die Entstehung der Neugierde könnte daher maßgeblich dazu beigetragen haben, dass der 
Mensch verhältnismäßig modern wurde, lange nachdem wir morphologisch zu Menschen wurden. 
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Im abschließenden Kapitel geht es um die Frage, ob Orang-Utans bereichsübergreifende 
(domain-general) kognitive Fähigkeiten besitzen; es wird - mit anderen Worten - untersucht, 
inwieweit die Leistungen verschiedener kognitiver Aufgaben interkorrelieren. Innerhalb der 
Menschen gibt es umfangreiche Belege für einen Generalfaktor der Intelligenz g, der über 
psychometrische Analysen gemessen wird und oft als Ausdruck der allgemeinen Intelligenz 
interpretiert wird. Um zu untersuchen, ob es eine evolutionäre Kontinuität in der allgemeinen 
Intelligenz unter Primaten gibt, untersuchte ich das Vorhandensein von g in einer Stichprobe von 53 
Orang-Utans, analog zur Anwendung des psychometrischen Nachweises von g beim Menschen. Die 
Hauptkomponentenanalyse der Leistungen von verschiedenen, sorgfältig ausgewählten physischen 
kognitiven Aufgaben (die jeweils unterschiedliche kognitive Bereiche repräsentieren, wie 
Umkehrlernen und kausales Schlussfolgern) ergab eine erste Komponente, die ein Drittel der 
Gesamtstreuung der Daten erklärte. Dieses Ergebnis stellt den ersten empirischen Hinweis für g in 
Orang-Utans dar, das vergleichbar ist mit dem beim Menschen gefundenen g. Ferner fand ich keine 
Hinweise für die Möglichkeit, dass die allgemeine kognitive Leistung der Orang-Utans ein Artefakt aus 
Störfaktoren sein könnte. Ich suchte auch nach Anzeichen für die Auswirkung von Erfahrungen, wie 
Neugierde, und konnte einen starken positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Neugierde und g feststellen. 
Daher spielen der Faktor Neugierde und die Auswirkungen der individuellen Erfahrungen während 
der Lebenszeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Entwicklung stärkerer kognitiver Fähigkeiten, 
einschließlich bereichsübergreifender allgemeiner kognitiver Prozesse. Aufgrund der vorliegenden 
starken Anzeichen für die Existenz von g in Orang-Utans schlage ich eine evolutionäre Kontinuität von 
bereichsübergreifenden kognitiven Fähigkeiten zwischen Menschen und großen Menschenaffen vor. 
Dieser Befund stützt die Idee, dass allgemeine Intelligenz ein phylogenetisch altes Phänomen unter 
Primaten ist.  
 
Zusammenfassend beschäftigt sich meine Dissertation mit der Frage Was macht einen Orang-
Utan intelligent?, indentifiziert wichtige Entwicklungsdeterminanten für kognitive Fähigkeiten und 
legt dar, wie diese Einflüsse die Evolution der Intelligenz in Primaten geprägt und geformt haben 
könnten. 
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14  PhD Dissertation, Laura A. Damerius, 2017  
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
How and why do humans differ from other animals and especially from great apes? 
Philosophers, theologians, psychologists and anthropologists have discussed these questions since 
ancient times and produced an array of hypotheses and theories (Kappeler and Silk 2010, van Schaik 
2016). Undoubtedly, the drive to understand our own species’ evolutionary origins as well as the 
presence of striking differences of mind, behaviour and life history compared to other primate species 
and other nonhuman animals has motivated much research, and continues to do so. Numerous 
comparative studies on humans and great apes show similarities between the species that suggest a 
long shared evolutionary continuity of many traits. Still, our unmatched large brains in relation to 
body-size, which go in hand with remarkable cognitive abilities, including general intelligence, are 
subject to on-going studies about their evolutionary origins and comparative investigations in 
primatology research, especially of great apes, our closest living relatives. 
 
Defining Intelligence  
Before reviewing the literature on the evolution of intelligence and important influences that 
possibly shape cognitive processes, it is necessary to define cognitive abilities, domain-specific versus 
domain-general abilities, and intelligence.  
Cognition refers to all mental processes (involving the brain) that include the acquisition, 
processing and storage of information and are therefore involved in producing behavioral actions. A 
more narrow definition includes only those mental processes that involve some form of mental 
representation (Tomasello and Call 1997, van Schaik 2016). These latter cognitive processes are 
especially called for when dealing with novel ecological and social situations (novel problems) (Mayer 
1992, Mayer and Wittrock 2006) and the individual itself has to find a new way (solution) to overcome 
these challenges. Therefore, cognitive abilities are related to problem-solving abilities. It is difficult to 
directly measure cognitive abilities in any given species, but by measuring the problem-solving skills of 
an individual, it is possible to refer from there to the inherent cognitive potential, thus the underlying 
ability (Burkart et al. 2009). 
It is generally assumed that the mind of animals that show higher cognitive abilities are 
adapted to their very specific environment through domain-specific abilities or modules (Duchaine et 
al. 2001). Human cognition also includes such domain-specific components (Cosmides and Tooby 
2013). These specialized cognitive mechanisms or adaptive specializations are genetically based and 
developmentally canalized solutions that evolved to deal with very specific adaptive problems 
(Duchaine et al. 2001, Cosmides and Tooby 2002, Burkart et al. 2017) and cannot be applied in 
different context (i.e. across domains). Therefore the ‘solutions’ to the specific problems are fixed and 
show no flexibility and no effects of experience through learning on performance.  
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
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In contrast to domain-specific abilities, the domain-general abilities, such as learning or 
behavioral flexibility, function across multiple domains and contexts and form the basis of intelligence. 
For humans intelligence can broadly be defined as the abilities of reasoning, problem-solving, abstract 
thinking, planning, comprehension and learning from experience (Gottfredson 1997). It can be 
measured via psychometric, factor-analytical approaches that yield one main factor across different 
tasks and domains, independent of content (Johnson et al. 2004), the general factor g (Spearman 1904, 
1927, Carroll 1993, Jensen and Weng 1994, Jensen 1998, Hunt 2011). This general ability of 
intelligence, as it was first proposed by Spearman (1904), was later subdivided by Cattell into two 
distinct sub-ordered abilities: crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence (Cattell 1963, Horn and 
Cattell 1966, Horn 1968, Geary 2005, Blair 2006, Horn and McArdle 2007). Whereas crystallized 
intelligence refers to the stored knowledge and skills that have been acquired during lifetime via 
learning and experience, fluid intelligence describes the underlying abilities that make it possible to 
acquire knowledge and skills, such as instantly solving novel problems and using inductive reasoning 
(Jensen 2002). Especially the ability to flexibly learn new information during lifetime is associated 
with fluid intelligence (Cattell 1971, Ackerman 1986, 1988).  
For animals, intelligence is not as broadly defined, but it is also clear that intelligence is not 
about biologically constrained learning of very specific solutions, but instead means the acquisition of 
knowledge, behavioral flexibility and problem solving in both familiar and novel environments (Byrne 
1994, Yoerg 2001, Rumbaugh and Washburn and Washburn 2003). 
There are numerous examples showing that the behavioral reactions of animals are not fixed, 
but that they respond to changes in social and ecological situations with new behaviour patterns or 
modifications of their existing behavior patterns (Kummer and Goodall 1985, Lefebvre et al. 1997, 
Reader and Laland 2001, 2003). Thus, just as in humans, the core features of intelligence in nonhuman 
animals are the acquisition of knowledge (learning ability) and problem-solving in novel context 
(Byrne 1994, Yoerg 2001, Rumbaugh and Washburn and Washburn 2003). 
When aiming to test cognitive abilities and intelligence in any species, one has to carefully 
design the test-batteries to avoid confounding measurements.  Importantly, there is no culture-free 
testing, since social-cultural experiences during ontogeny influence the way intelligence is developed 
in all species studied to date (see section Development of Intelligence). 
 
Evolution of Intelligence 
The evolution of intelligence is directly linked to an evolutionary increase in relative brain size 
(encephalization). Higher cognitive processes, such as flexible learning, are related to enlarged brains 
(Byrne and Whiten 1988, Harvey and Krebs 1990, Dunbar 1995, Byrne 1997, Reader and Laland 2002, 
Lefebvre et al. 2004, Deaner et al. 2007, Burkart et al. 2017). Especially the domain-general cognitive 
abilities are thought to require additional brain tissue (Deaner et al. 2007, Reader et al. 2011). Large 
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brains, however, are known to be energetically very costly (Rolfe and Brown 1997, Geary 2005, 
Bauernfeind and Babbitt 2014, Kuzawa et al. 2014). They require a stable energy supply to be 
maintained (Mink et al. 1981, Holliday 1986, Navarrete et al. 2011). In spite of these costs, some 
species, such as primates, have nonetheless evolved large brains and with it advanced cognition and 
general cognitive flexibility (Deaner et al. 2007, Reader et al. 2011), implying that the benefits of 
having a larger brain must have outweighed the costs (Isler and Van Schaik 2014). This raises 
questions about the influence of ecological and social factors driving the evolution of encephalization, 
and how the costs of developing larger brains can be outweighed by the adaptive benefits of higher 
cognitive abilities.  
It is commonly thought that group living, with its social restrictions and challenges, drove the 
evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities (the Social Brain Hypothesis, Byrne and Whiten 1988, Dunbar 
1998). Especially the cognitively demanding dynamics of social bonding and coalitions (Dunbar and 
Shultz 2007) or the improved effectiveness of social transmission (e.g. Whiten and van Schaik 2007, 
Pradhan et al. 2012) were thought to be important for the evolution of intelligence. In addition, 
ecological factors were suggested to have acted as selective pressures driving the evolution of 
enlarged brains. Needing to maximize a stable energy income through the fluctuating year, individuals 
not only have to be behaviorally flexible to prevent experiencing food scarcity (the Cognitive Buffer 
Hypothesis: Allman et al. 1993, Deaner et al. 2003; Sol 2009a,b), but also require special techniques 
and higher levels of cognition for the extraction and processing of difficult to acquire food (the 
Technical Intelligence Hypothesis, Byrne 1997, Parker and Gibson 1977).  
More recent primate research on brain size evolution, which combines the ecological and 
social preconditions, clearly shows that mainly ecological preconditions favored the evolution of large 
brains, not the social ones (Graber et al. in prep). However, lineages that had favorable ecological 
conditions that drove encephalization could also develop enhanced cognitive abilities in the social 
domain. The evidence of correlated evolution of socio-cognitive and eco-cognitive abilities found by 
Graber et al. (in prep.) strongly suggests the presence of domain-general cognitive abilities. Obviously, 
there is also overlap between the ecological and social domains: Once a particular set of social skills, 
such as social learning, has evolved it might indirectly favor the evolution of enlarged brains by 
improving the access and energy intake of important food resources. This hypothesis can be applied to 
the evolution of intelligence, but also be applied developmentally: conditions favoring learning and 
experiences during ontogeny most likely shape an individual’s development of cognitive abilities. 
 
Development of Intelligence  
The importance of learning 
Proficient problem-solving abilities and cognitive understanding of ecological challenges are 
thought to be advantageous for an individual and lead to fitness benefits in demanding environments. 
However, species that show higher cognitive capacities are not born intelligent, but rather train and 
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mature their cognitive abilities during ontogeny via learning through experiences (Wilson 1991, 
Reader and Laland 2002, Whiten and van Schaik 2007, van Schaik and Burkart 2011, Galef 2015). 
There is a genetic foundation for intelligence (for humans:  Neisser et al. 1996, Bouchard 2004, Deary 
et al. 2009, Davies et al. 2011, Nisbett et al. 2012, Bates et al. 2013, Joshi et al. 2015, for chimpanzees: 
Hopkins et al. 2014, for mice: Galsworthy et al. 2005), in particular the ability to learn (Rumbaugh and 
Washburn and Washburn 2003). Although this forms the genetic basis for the construction of 
intelligence, it is subsequently critically dependent on social and environmental inputs during 
development (for humans: reviewed in Neisser et al. 1996, reviewed in Nisbett et al. 2012). 
The importance of learning becomes even clearer when bringing the consequences of 
enhanced learning abilities to mind (Figure 1): Through learning, the individual can gather knowledge 
and increase its set of learned skills important for survival. Natural selection after all acts on the 
individual’s skill sets relevant for survival, i.e. the products of learning, and not learning ability per se. 
In particular, the ability of social learning can be used as a crucial tool. Social learning enables the 
individual to learn from other individuals, which was shown to be faster than individual learning and 
connected to fewer risks; in other words: social learning is simply more efficient than asocial learning 
(van Schaik and Burkart 2011). Additional, through social learning the knowledge of skills of the 
population can be transmitted not only horizontally, but also vertically between generations. 
Depending on the environment and the size of the population’s skill pool, the opportunities for social 
learning may play an important role in determining the content of an individual’s skill set. Especially in 
demanding environments with varying conditions, the socially acquired knowledge of hidden food 
resources and extracting foraging techniques can be a major advantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Genetic, social and environmental impacts on intelligence – the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis. Graphic adapted from van Schaik and Burkart (2011).  
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Influences of the social environment during ontogeny therefore play crucial roles for 
developing cognitive abilities. They define the conditions under which learning takes place, determine 
the scope of individual’s actions and responses towards the situation, and shape the array of skills to 
be learned. The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis describes how influences of the social-cultural 
environment during development shape the cognitive abilities and the set of learned skills of an 
individual (Figure 1) (Tomasello 1999, Herrmann et al. 2007, Whiten and van Schaik 2007, van Schaik 
and Burkart 2011). What was first suggested to explain the development of uniquely human cognitive 
abilities (Tomasello 1999, Herrmann et al. 2007), was later also proposed for nonhuman animals 
(Whiten and van Schaik 2007, van Schaik and Burkart 2011). The cultural intelligence hypothesis 
predicts that in a stimulating social-cultural environment with increased opportunities for social 
learning, individuals will develop lager skill repertoires and minds capable of better cognitive 
performance on a developmental, but also on an evolutionary level (van Schaik and Burkart 2011, van 
Schaik 2016). This idea was recently confirmed for orangutans (Forss et al. 2016). When comparing it 
to Cattell’s model of intelligence, the knowledge and learned skills are referring to crystallized 
intelligence, whereas the underlying current learning ability can be compared to fluid intelligence. 
Under stimulating external conditions, these two forms of intelligence will therefore show a strong 
positive correlation. 
 
The role of experience 
Learning means gaining knowledge and experience, which means that the content depends 
strongly on the environment. The more opportunities the learning environment offers, the greater the 
set of learned skills an individual acquires (through social or asocial learning) and the more 
knowledge of affordances through experience the individual gains (Fig. 1). This affects the current 
learning ability, regardless of how this knowledge was learned (socially or asocially). This experience 
effect is possible because both abilities of social and asocial learning share similar underlying cognitive 
mechanisms (Heyes 1994, Heyes 2012). It is a cumulative process shaping the way individuals 
approach, explore and understand their world, and thus influences the quality and quantity of 
opportunities for learning. Obviously, in this positive-feedback process it matters how an individual 
approaches its environment, deals with novel situations and interacts with social, but also asocial 
opportunities for learning.  
Especially in the absence of a social learning partner, the approach to a stimulus is very 
important for a learning experience – in order to be able to explore, the individual must approach the 
resource (Greenberg and Mettke-Hofmann 2001, Reader and Laland 2003). Therefore, an individual’s 
approach and response style can be of great importance for learning, exploration and developing 
cognitive abilities. It has been shown that reduced neophobia was correlated with better problem-
solving skills in nonhuman animals (Auersperg et al. 2011, Benson-Amram and Holekamp 2012, Sol et 
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al. 2012, Cauchard et al. 2013): Individuals that are more prone to novelty seeking have a different 
attentiveness toward their environment, may more easily recognize learning situations and might 
explore their environment differently. In chimpanzees (Hopper et al. 2014) and capuchin monkeys 
(Morton et al. 2013) an individual’s temperamental openness (to experience) is correlated with 
successful responses towards a novel problem-solving task. It might therefore be possible that 
motivational aspects and curiosity underlie learning and innovation processes (Reader and Laland 
2003). The tendency for exploration may often be intrinsically self-rewarding, because individual 
exploration is sometimes observed in the absence of any direct reward ('intrinsic' exploration: Harlow 
et al. 1950, Thorpe 1956, McFarland 1981, Archer and Birke 1983, Reader and Laland 2003). The mere 
presence of a novel stimulus can sometimes elicit a ‘curious’ response in humans (Berlyne 1950). All of 
these above-mentioned relations have to be investigated more closely to better understand the 
influencing factors and the role of learning and experience for the development of cognitive abilities. 
So far, little is known about the internal motivational factors influencing cognition, their interrelation 
to external conditions and the overall effect on behaviour and problem-solving skills.  
Socio-cultural effects and environmental conditions during development significantly shape 
the behaviour, experiences and eventually cognitive abilities of an individual: Long lasting effects of 
rearing and environmental conditions have been documented for primates, especially in two extreme 
cases, deprivation and enculturation. Captive individuals that grow up in a more stimulating socio-
cultural environment show more rapid behavioral and motor development, increased number of 
learned skills, more sophisticated object manipulation and more skillful tool use (rev. in van Schaik 
and Burkart 2011, rev. in Björklund 2006, rev. in Call and Tomasello 1996, Tomasello and Call 2004, 
Gardner and Gardner 1989, Bard and Gardner 1996, Fredman and Whiten 2008,  Furlong, Boose and 
Boysen 2008). In contrast, studies during which primates are deprived of stimulating environmental 
or social enrichment show the opposite effects. Early maternal separation seems to lead to reduced 
socio-cognitive abilities (Gilmer and McKinney 2003). Individuals deprived of environmental inputs 
show reduced competence in many physical skills, e.g. nest building (Videan 2006), tool use (Menzel Jr 
et al. 1970, Morimura and Mori 2010), and a smaller set of learned skills (rev. in van Schaik and 
Burkart 2011, Ruppenthal et al. 1976). Whilst studies on deprivation and enculturation certainly are of 
great value for our understanding of how intelligence evolved in large brained species, within-species 
variation in cognitive performance exists beyond these two extremes. Moreover, these studies do not 
reveal the processes involved in producing these outcomes.  
Even subtle variation in opportunities for learning and variation in experiences during 
development beyond the species-typical repertoire might lead to changes in behaviour and learning. 
This is most evident when comparing captive versus wild individuals of the same species. In captivity, 
the reduced overall risk, increased free time and increased social interaction, including contact with 
humans, were suggested to underlie the increase in exploration and cognitive abilities, a phenomenon 
commonly known as the captivity effect (Laidre 2008, Benson-Amram et al. 2013, Forss et al. 2015). 
The exposure to humans and their artifacts offer broader exploration opportunities (Russon and 
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Galdikas 1993, Byrne and Russon 1998, Shumaker et al. 2011). According to the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis, these opportunities for learning can change the knowledge and skill repertoire of an 
individual, explaining variation in problem-solving performance. Increased contact with humans can 
additionally change the social understanding of individuals: usually primates perform very poorly at 
locating hidden food using social cues and social-communication from humans. However, individuals 
that grew up with humans perform far better (Anderson et al. 1995, Call et al. 2000, Lyn 2010).  
The developmental construction of intelligence has consequences for how we think about its 
evolution. Little is still known about the interaction between factors influencing the individual’s style 
of approach, response and exploration of previously unexplored features of the environment, leading 
to differences in opportunities for learning, which in turn shape the knowledge and skill repertoire of 
an individual. This provides selection with a great number of variables to act upon. Especially because 
we not only find between-, but also within-species variation in cognitive performance, the study of 
developmental influences might lead to insight in the selective pressures driving the evolution of 
cognition. It is therefore very important to investigate the developmental conditions that favor 
learning abilities, behavioral flexibility, and cognition during development. This is most promising in 
nonhuman primates, our closest relatives.  
 
 
Orangutans as a model species for Intelligence  
Orangutans in the wild and captivity show great cognitive plasticity and are known to be very 
good problem solvers (Lethmate 1977, Lehner et al. 2011). A systematic investigation of individual 
variation in orangutans’ cognitive performance will thus most likely significantly increase the 
understanding of the evolution of primate intelligence. 
First, the genus Pongo with its two subspecies Pongo pygmaeus on the island of Borneo and 
Pongo abelii on Sumatra is one of our closest living relatives, with only chimpanzees, bonobos and 
gorillas being even more closely related to us. The two species shared a common ancestor 
approximately 0.9–1.1 Ma (Greminger 2015). The evolutionary divergence between orangutans and 
humans is estimated to have taken place 9-13 million years ago (Hobolth et al. 2011, Prado-Martinez 
et al. 2013). Although this divergence took lace much earlier than that between hominins and the 
chimpanzee-bonobo ancestor, orangutans and humans share a variety of traits, such as a long life 
history, omnivorous ecology with a strong extractive element, and similar basic cognitive abilities 
(Herrmann, Wobber and Call 2008). 
Second, both orangutan species evolved large brains, with Sumatran orangutans relative brain 
size being slightly larger than that of Borneans (Taylor and van Schaik 2007, van Schaik et al. 2009). 
This difference is also reflected in their innate problem-solving ability (Forss et al. 2016). In general, 
their large brains are good preconditions for having general cognitive abilities (Burkart et al. 2017). If 
we assume evolutionary continuity of general intelligence, orangutans might also possess some level 
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of domain-general abilities (measured in humans through g). In fact, orangutans seem to have all the 
requirements for having g - as suggested for other primate species (Herndon et al. 1997, Banerjee et 
al. 2009, Hopkins et al. 2014, Woodley of Menie et al. 2015). However, given uncertainties in 
interpretation and a clear risk that some results represent false positives (Burkart et al. 2017), there is 
a need for research that assesses the extent of evolutionary continuity of general intelligence, and 
orangutans are an excellent species for this. 
Third, orangutans live in an environment with fluctuating food availability (Marshall et al. 
2009). They are specialized in complex food processing techniques that reflect their complex foraging 
niche (van Schaik et al. 1996, van Schaik et al. 2003, Jaeggi et al. 2010, Schuppli et al. 2012, Schuppli et 
al. 2016a). However, this knowledge has to be acquired via learning. The mother is an especially 
important role model (van Noordwijk et al. 2009, Schuppli et al. 2016b). Therefore, like us humans, 
orangutans are characterized by sophisticated social learning skills (Stoinski and Whiten 2003, Dindo 
et al. 2010) and the presence of role models during ontogeny for knowledge transfer (Jaeggi et al. 
2010, Schuppli et al. 2016b). As a result, behavioral variation between populations qualifies as cultural 
variation (van Schaik et al. 2003, van Schaik et al. 2009, Krützen et al. 2011).  
Fourth, intraspecific variation in behavior, novelty response and cognitive abilities were found 
between wild and captive orangutans (Forss et al. 2015). Still, little is known about the influences of 
socio-cultural- and housing conditions on the cognitive abilities and problem-solving mechanisms 
under non-extreme conditions. Orangutans with their slow development (Wich et al. 2004, Wich et al. 
2009), socially learned skill repertoires and innate learning competence are ideal to investigate the 
internal and external influences on cognitive performance.  
Fifth, wild orangutans are highly neophobic (Forss et al. 2015). It is very hard to conduct 
experimental studies in the wild, and almost impossible to conduct cognition-studies under controlled, 
comparable settings in nature. Consequently, almost all studies investigating orangutans’ cognitive 
abilities and behavioral flexibility were conducted under captive settings, e.g. zoological gardens. 
However, being born and raised in captivity, these individuals might consequently not show the same 
abilities as their wild conspecifics. In order to investigate the full range of influences on cognitive 
performance on a developmental level, individuals with various backgrounds are needed. Therefore, 
studies that determine different social-cultural influence during ontogeny due to e.g. subtle 
background differences are needed to investigate what influences during development shape 
cognition.  With this thesis I address these issues to shed light on the evolution of intelligence. 
 
Aims of this PhD dissertation 
Examination of the determinants of variation in cognitive abilities within primate species has 
great potential to provide insight in the factors driving the evolution of brain size and intelligence. 
With this dissertation, I therefore aim to examine individual variation in cognitive abilities among 
Sumatran (Pongo abelii) and Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus) orangutans housed at rehabilitation stations 
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across Central Kalimantan and Sumatra in Indonesia (Figure 2). By conducting studies with 
orangutans in rehabilitation stations I had the full advantage of testing individuals that ranged from 
behaving naturally (i.e. uninterested in humans or even fearful) to very tame, with backgrounds 
ranging from being wild (with no human influence) to being kept as a human pets for several years. 
Therefore, the variation in the cognitive performance of these rehabilitant orangutans provides an 
ideal opportunity to investigate the role of individual experiences and learning during ontogeny for 
the development of problem-solving abilities and intelligence. This work is important because it 
allows us to assess the developmental influences that might have shaped the evolution of intelligence 
as well as the evolutionary continuity of intelligence in primates.    
 
Figure 2: Map of the western part of Indonesia with the locations of the 
rehabilitation stations on Sumatra (Batu M’Belin and Danau Alo) and Borneo (OCCQ 
and Nyaru Menteng) marked with red circles.  
 
 
This dissertation consists of three research chapters that are all based upon the same dataset 
of up to 61 orangutans living in rehabilitation stations, collected between May 2012 and June 2014. 
The first two chapters investigate the effects of experience and rearing history on the orangutans’ 
problem-solving approach and their cognitive performance. The third chapter investigates 
orangutans’ cognitive abilities across various task domains and the possible presence of domain-
general processes in orangutans. 
 
I. Rearing Background and Human Contact 
In the first chapter, I aimed to investigate the effects of social experiences during ontogeny, e.g. 
contact to humans, on the outcome of orangutan problem-solving abilities. If social learning 
from role models during the early years enhances cognitive capacities, it is to be expected that 
individuals with a background of high social contact with conspecifics, and possibly humans, 
show different and more extensive cognitive abilities than individuals with fewer 
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opportunities for social learning. In order to generate a large sample of individuals with 
varying rearing backgrounds and social experiences, I collaborated with my colleague Dr. Sofia 
Forss; we combined my data on the performance of the rehabilitation station housed 
orangutans to the identical study she performed on orangutans housed at nine different 
European zoos and, thus, produced a large data set of 103 individuals. This allowed us to 
examine the effects of different housing conditions and biographical backgrounds on the 
development of their problem-solving approach and their cognitive abilities. Previously 
published research on rearing effects on cognition concerns the social skills of apes, whereas 
this study was testing a physical cognitive task involving tool-use abilities. In particularly we 
were interested whether and how different exposure to humans influences explorative 
behavior, neophobia and cognitive performance in orangutans. Overall, the first chapter gives 
us an insight in how the social and housing conditions experienced during development, 
including contact to humans, cause different approaches to problem-solving and intellectual 
performance. 
 
II. Experiences and problem-solving style 
The second chapter of this dissertation addresses the question of how cognitive abilities are 
determined by an individual’s style of problem-solving, in particular the role of curiosity. 
Earlier studies suggested higher curiosity going along with enhanced problem-solving abilities 
in captivity. Additionally, my first study of this dissertation (chapter 1) identified an 
individual’s interest in humans to be the major determinant of problem-solving performance 
in orangutans. The purpose of this second study was to gain broader insight into the nature 
and causes of interest in the social and physical environment and to further disentangle the 
effect of curiosity on problem-solving performance. Therefore, in this study, we complemented 
the first study of orangutan interest in humans (chapter 1) with a multi-dimensional approach 
that includes both a greater variety of measures of an individual’s response-and-exploration 
style and tests of a number of physical problem solving tasks. This way I could gain novel 
insights into how curiosity affects an individual’s problem-solving approach and further 
disentangle the various possible contributing factors, e.g. the effects of previous experiences, 
that gave rise to curiosity. 
 
III. General Intelligence 
The purpose of this third chapter was to examine the consistency of orangutans’ cognitive 
performance across different cognitively demanding tasks. There is extensive evidence for 
across-domain correlations of performance in humans, measured via a general factor g, and 
often interpreted as a measurement of general intelligence. Although intraspecific studies in 
24  PhD Dissertation, Laura A. Damerius, 2017  
 
nonhuman animal species also report findings on g, further validation of these results is 
desirable. Therefore, the question of evolutionary continuity in domain-general processes 
shared between human and nonhuman animals remains unresolved and further studies on this 
topic, especially in primates, are needed. With this third study I primarily aimed to reveal the 
presence of possible domain-general cognitive processes in orangutans. Importantly, in 
contrast to most other nonhuman studies on g, we aimed to control for alternative non-
cognitive factors possibly falsely producing g, and to test additional predictions of the presence 
of g, such as pronounced developmental effects and the correlation with social interest. In sum, 
the purpose of this study was to examine the presence of g in orangutans and to link it to 
biological, social and developmental properties. 
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Non-human animals sometimes show marked intraspecific variation in their cognitive abilities that 
may reflect variation in external inputs and experience during the developmental period. We 
examined variation in exploration and cognitive performance on a problem-solving task in a large 
sample of captive orangutans (Pongo abelii & P. pygmaeus, N=103) that had experienced different 
rearing and housing conditions during ontogeny, including human exposure. In addition to measuring 
exploration and cognitive performance, we also conducted a set of assays of the subjects’ psychological 
orientation, including reactions towards an unfamiliar human, summarized in the human orientation 
index (HOI), and towards novel food and objects. Using generalized linear mixed models we found that 
the HOI, rather than rearing background, best predicted both exploration and problem-solving 
success. Our results suggest a cascade of processes: human orientation was accompanied by a change 
in motivation towards problem-solving, expressed in reduced neophobia and increased exploration 
variety, which led to greater experience, and thus eventually to higher performance in the task. We 
propose that different experiences with humans caused individuals to vary in curiosity and 
understanding of the physical problem-solving task. We discuss the implications of these findings for 
comparative studies of cognitive ability. 
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Introduction 
Human intellectual performance is known to be strongly affected by developmental inputs 
(Bouchard et al., 1990; Neisser et al., 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012). However, similar effects in nonhuman 
primates have received far less attention. So far, the possible effect of experience on cognitive abilities 
in nonhuman primates has mainly been studied by examining the two extreme cases of deprivation 
and enculturation. Physical and social deprivation have been reported to cause strong negative 
outcomes on cognitive development in primates; especially maternal separation has been shown to 
result in both short- and long-term socio-cognitive consequences (Davenport, Rogers, & Rumbaugh, 
1973; Freeman & Ross, 2014; Gilmer & McKinney, 2003; Gluck & Harlow, 1971; Gluck, Harlow, & 
Schiltz, 1973; Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959; Kalcher-Sommersguter et al., 2015; Turner, Davenport Jr, 
& Rogers, 1969). The opposite extreme in rearing environment is enculturation. Especially among 
great apes, enriched socio-cultural inputs, in the form of extensive interactions with humans, result in 
enhanced physical cognitive skills (Bard & Gardner, 1996; Furlong, Boose, & Boysen, 2008; Gardner, 
Gardner, & Van Cantfort, 1989; see also Fredman & Whiten, 2008), but particularly in improved socio-
cognitive and communicative abilities (Bjorklund, 2006; Call & Tomasello, 1996; Rumbaugh & 
Washburn, 2003; Tomasello & Call, 2004; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993). Both 
deprivation and enculturation therefore demonstrate that extreme social influences shape the 
cognitive abilities of nonhuman primates.  
Even without being deprived or enculturated, captive primates also show intraspecific 
variability in cognitive abilities (Herrmann & Call, 2012; Herrmann et al., 2010), but the sources of this 
variability remain largely unstudied and it remains unclear whether the same social processes are 
involved. In particular, we don’t know to what extent variable rearing histories affect cognitive 
performance across individuals under non-extreme conditions, and if so whether they do so through 
their effect on psychological variables such as motivation to solve problems, responses to novelty and 
exploration style.  
The aim of the present study was, first, to examine in a sample of more than 100 captive 
orangutans (Pongo abelii and P. pygmaeus) how variation in captive management regimes and 
individual rearing histories affects psychological variables, such as human orientation, motivation and 
exploration style, and second, to examine whether these factors explain variation in cognitive 
performance in a tool-use task. Our sample contained orangutans from a wide range of rearing 
backgrounds: both zoo groups, including mother- and hand-reared individuals, and individuals housed 
in rehabilitation stations who were wild-born but subsequently experienced captivity for variable 
periods of time, some as pets, before entering the rehabilitation station. Importantly, the individuals 
were all currently kept in captivity, allowing similar individual testing conditions. This provided us 
with an excellent opportunity to test the strength of the long-term effects of early rearing conditions 
on exploration styles and cognitive performance.  
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Because our sample included individuals from both zoos and rehabilitation stations, we could 
also test the independent effect of current housing conditions. Zoos and rehabilitation stations differ in 
their purpose of holding captive apes. Zoo apes have lived all their lives in a similar and stable 
environment, mostly together with their mothers and in intense contact with both knowledgeable 
conspecifics and human caretakers, with additional exposure to human strangers on a daily basis. 
Virtually all zoos also offer additional enrichment in the form of various foraging activities. In 
rehabilitation stations the purpose is very different. Some individuals may have experienced traumatic 
events in their past (capture and loss of mother, sometimes accompanied by injury) and thus need to 
recover physically and mentally. The stations’ ultimate aim is to return individuals to the wild. They 
consequently avoid bringing about a too close attachment to humans or exposing them to artificial 
enrichment devices. Moreover, most rehabilitating apes lack the close bond to their mother and are 
instead housed in peer groups.  
Reactions to an unfamiliar human have previously been used to measure temperament in great 
apes (Herrmann et al., 2011) and physiological distress responses in monkeys (Kalin & Shelton, 1989; 
Kalin et al., 1998). In order to estimate the underlying psychological consequences of human-related 
experiences that might explain variation in exploration and cognitive performance, we developed a 
new measure, the human orientation index (henceforth: HOI; see Methods for details). This measure 
was developed because the effect of captivity on cognitive abilities (Benson-Amram, Weldele, & 
Holekamp, 2013; Laidre, 2008) seems to reflect a major psychological change. First, because in 
multiple species, reduced neophobia has been shown to influence problem-solving skills (Auersperg et 
al., 2011; Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Sol, Griffin, & Bartomeus, 2012), 
and because captive orangutans show strongly increased interest in novel items relative to their wild 
counterparts (Forss et al., 2015) (as do other species cf. Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013; 
Visalberghi, Janson, & Agostini, 2003), we assessed the response to novelty across individuals with 
different captive experiences. Second, because the effect of captivity on cognitive performance is 
particularly pronounced in the context of tool use (Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010; Boysen et al., 1999; 
Hihara et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2006; Lehner, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2011; Shumaker, Walkup, & 
Beck, 2011), we assessed cognitive performance using a novel tool-use task including multi-step 
problem-solving with high ecological validity: the honey-tool task. In order to prevent variation in 
human orientation from confounding cognitive performance during the testing, no humans were 
present during the tests, which were video-recorded. 
 
Methods 
Subjects and study facilities 
Our total sample size involved 103 orangutans: 68 Pongo pygmaeus spp and 35 Pongo abelii 
(Supplementary Table S6). Data collection on the zoo-housed sample took place at nine different 
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European zoos between November 2012 and January 2015; all zoo data was collected by SF (Table 1). 
In total the zoo sample consisted of 41 individuals, of whom 31 were mother-reared and 10 whose 
own mother had either died or rejected the infant and were therefore hand-reared. They were cared 
for by human caretakers, within the zoo or partly within a human household, and subsequently 
returned to a group of zoo-living conspecifics (Table 2).  
 
Table 1: Overview of subjects and facilities 
Study Facility N Species Age 
Range 
Social Housing Test Location Time Period 
Zoo 1 6 P. pygmaeus 6-43 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Apr-May 2013 
Zoo 2 8 P. pygmaeus 13-52 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan-Feb 2014 
Zoo 3 4 P. abelii 5-13 Mixed-age group Smaller enclosure Nov 2013 
Zoo 4 4 P. pygmaeus 13-31 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan 2015 
Zoo 5 4 P. abelii 8-23 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Nov-Dec 2012 
Zoo 6 5 P. abelii 9-49 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Mar 2013 
Zoo 7 6 P. abelii 5-25 Mixed-age group Test enclosure Mar 2014 
Zoo 8 2 P. pygmaeus 18-20 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Feb 2015 
Zoo 9 2 P. pygmaeus 14-36 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan-Feb 2013 
Rehab. Station 1 5 P. abelii 3-6 Solitary Home enclosure Apr-Jun 2013 
Rehab. station 2 18 P. pygmaeus 6-17 Solitary Home enclosure May-Jun 2014 
Rehab. station 3 28 P. pygmaeus 8-14.5 Peer group Test enclosure June-Sep 2012 
Rehab. station 4 11 P. abelii 5-25 Solitary Home enclosure Oct 2012-Mar 
2013 
 
Data on 62 rehabilitation orangutans were collected between June 2012 and June 2014 by LD 
and ZK, supported by a trained assistant, Andreas Wendl. In Borneo data collection took place at two 
rehabilitation stations, both situated in Central Kalimantan (Table 1). In Sumatra data collection took 
place at two sites of the same station: the quarantine station and at the release site (Table 1). 
 Depending on available background information the sample collected at the rehabilitation 
stations was further divided into the following groups: Wild, Station, Human and Unknown. 
Individuals were assigned to these four groups depending on the estimated age at arrival at a 
rehabilitation station (based on tooth eruption patterns) and their previous history with humans 
(Table 2). Table 2 shows that infants are usually caught when very young because then they are still 
easy to handle and thus most attractive as pets. 
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Table 2: Categories of subjects and their background histories 
Background 
during early 
development 
N 
Age 
Range 
(years) 
Current 
Housing 
Years in 
Captivity 
Human 
Exposure 
Remark 
Wild 5 10-25 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0-7 Minimal 
Majority of life in natural 
habitat. Arrived at a 
rehabilitation center as 
adolescents or adults, 
eventually to be translocated 
to a new natural habitat. 
Station 8 5-11 
Rehabilitation 
station 
4-10 
Mainly 
human 
raised 
Minimum 80% of life in 
rehabilitation station. Arrived 
at station as dependent 
offspring at the age of 1.5 year 
or younger. 
Human 16 3.5-14 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0-9 
Minimum 6 
months with 
humans 
Arrived at rehabilitation 
station older than 1.5 years of 
age. Background history with 
human contact (minimum 6 
months), e.g. pet  
Unknown 
rehab 
33 3-17 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0.5-14 
Unknown 
before 
arrival at 
station 
No background information. 
Arrived at station between 2 
and 7 years of age and spent 
possibly large part of the 
developmental phase in 
captivity. 
Mother-reared 
Zoo 
31 5-52 Zoo 
Whole 
life 
All life within 
human care 
Nursed by own mother within 
a zoo. All life in captivity with 
exposure to human caretakers 
and visitors. 
Hand-reared 
Zoo 
10 13-43 Zoo 
Whole 
life 
Human hand 
nursing and 
all life within 
human care 
Nursed by human caretakers 
either at the zoo or in human 
households. All life in captivity 
with exposure to human 
caretakers and visitors. 
 
Housing conditions 
In the zoos, individuals were housed in mixed-aged groups of conspecifics ranging from four to 
12 individuals in standard indoor enclosures during the day, and mostly separated individually or in 
pairs into sleeping quarters for the night. Most zoos also provide the orangutans with a larger outdoor 
enclosure.  At each zoo, animal keepers are in daily close contact with the orangutans, providing them 
with food but also with diverse enrichment activities. Zoo visitors were additionally in daily visual 
contact with the orangutans.  
 In the rehabilitation stations the housing situations were more heterogeneous (see Table 1). 
They differed according to the standards and capabilities of each facility and the age, sex and 
background of the individuals. All orangutans in this study were held in solitary enclosures at the time 
of the study, except for one station housing 28 individuals socially in groups of 2-6 individuals. In 
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general contact with humans was reduced to caretakers cleaning and feeding several times a day and 
veterinary care as needed. Each enclosure had simple enrichment devices, such as ropes, and several 
times a week the subjects received extra food-related enrichment or leafy branches. In some facilities, 
small infants lived in a nursery with other orangutan infants and human caretakers serving as 
replacement mothers. These infants had daily extended contact with their foster-mothers and other 
human caretakers. Most individuals had access to forest vegetation at some stage during their time at 
the station.  
 
Human Orientation Index 
To capture any psychological variation caused by time in captivity and human-related 
experiences, we assessed the degree to which each individual reacted toward a novel human. The 
Human Orientation Index (HOI) contained the following components: reactions and proximity to a 
human stranger during two conditions. Each subject was tested individually, except for a few cases 
where the mother was tested with its dependent offspring to avoid inducing stress for both. In the 
zoos the test took place either in the home enclosure or in the sleeping quarters if individuals were 
more easily separated there. In the rehabilitation stations, individuals were either transported to 
single compartments for testing or were directly tested in their home enclosure. The test was 
performed by a local man, unknown to the orangutans and dressed in black.  
The total test lasted for one minute and was composed of two consecutive conditions, each 
lasting 30 seconds. In the first condition the man approached and positioned himself approximately 
one meter in front of the enclosure where the subject was located and remained standing with his 
body oriented laterally (perpendicularly) to the subject. In the second condition the man turned 
around to face the orangutan and tried to establish eye contact. The whole test was video recorded 
and during the entire test no other human was present.  
Reactions and proximity to the man for the first two seconds of first sight were coded from the 
videos. For each condition we scored the proximity to the man in the following way: 0= the orangutan 
positioned itself as far away as possible; 1= the orangutan was more than one meter away from the 
human; 2= the orangutan was within one meter from the human; and 3= the orangutan placed itself as 
close to the human as possible. 
We also scored the very first behavioral reaction of the orangutan for each condition as 
follows: 0= a negative reaction, defined as: retreat, stress vocalization, pilo-erection, nervous swinging 
or turning away from the human; 1= a neutral reaction, defined as resting, moving calmly or play 
behaviour; 2= a positive reaction, if the orangutan approached the human; and 3= an actively positive 
reaction, if the orangutan begged (either by using lips or hands), tried in any other active way to 
contact the human or attempted to trade objects from the enclosure for food. 
Furthermore, since the measurements listed above were based upon the first reaction of each 
condition only, we also scored whether any active contact behaviour occurred during the 30 seconds 
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of each condition. This was to ensure catching the possible substantial interest in humans, when the 
surprise had waned.  
Thus, in total HOI consisted of all the summed behavioral reactions combined with the 
proximity to a human stranger, with the eventual score ranging from zero to 14. In our sample, scores 
ranged from 2 to 14. Furthermore, we also measured the time in seconds a subject spent within one 
meter of the human stranger throughout the whole test and found that this independent time 
measurement of proximity was strongly correlated with the HOI-index (Spearman’s correlation, two-
tailed: rs=0.600, N=96, P<0.001).  Given that an individual can be in close proximity and not move 
throughout the time of the test, but nevertheless not show any active response behaviour, we used the 
summarized index of both behavioral reactions and proximity scores, which also generated more 
resolution to the various responses within our sample, than simply proximity latency data would.  
The logistics in one of the rehabilitation stations allowed us to use a sub-sample of 28 
individuals to test for social interest in unfamiliar conspecifics. In this sub-sample we measured the 
time of close proximity to two other unknown orangutans of equal sex, when these were present in a 
neighboring enclosure to the subject, which allowed us to disentangle social orientation per se to that 
from interest in humans. 
 
Response to novelty  
We performed two separate tests to assess individual variation in novelty response. First, we 
examined how each subject reacted to novel food. In the zoos, the novel food was blue mash potato 
served with black olives on top. Zoo orangutans receive a broad diet with many types of human food, 
but blue items are not common and olives were new to all individuals. In the rehabilitation stations we 
used purple rice or purple mash potato with dried purple sweet potato pieces. Second, we introduced 
a novel toy in the form of a wooden board equipped with six differently colored, rotatable tennis balls. 
For both tasks, we recorded the latency from task begin (when set up was completed and individual 
was in max. 1 m distance to the apparatus) until first touch, as well as exploration duration of the 
novel toy. Maximum test duration was two minutes for both tasks, and each subject was tested 
individually.  
 
Experimental cognitive task – The honey tool-task 
In order to evaluate cognitive performance we used a naturalistic task, which required no pre-
training trials and could therefore easily be applied to all individuals. The honey tool-task allowed us 
to assess physical cognition of tool-use at multiple levels from very basic understanding of the 
apparatus and tools to high innovativeness. The task involved a wooden box measuring 50 cm x 80 cm 
x 5 cm, whose front was covered by a transparent Plexiglas® or Macrolon® plate (Fig. 1). The upper 
part of the box contained a straight channel (30 cm x 5 cm) where a wooden stick (40 cm) with its tip 
dipped in honey had been inserted. Below the straight channel, the box had a L-shaped channel (15 cm 
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
 39 
 
x 10 cm) with its bottom part filled with honey. The honey was visible to the subjects through the 
glass, but both channels were too long to reach the honey with their fingers. Moreover, the wooden 
stick could not be used to reach the honey in the L-shaped channel. In addition, below the test 
apparatus we provided each subject with two more wooden sticks and three pieces of rope. The ropes 
were too short to reach the end of the straight channel but long enough to retrieve the honey at the 
bottom of the L-shaped channel.  
We measured multiple aspects of the orangutans’ responses to the apparatus, which was 
presented to them in the absence of any humans. To estimate cognitive ability, we measured the 
following actions: 1) removing the pre-inserted stick from the straight channel; 2) inserting any of the 
three available sticks into the straight channel during total test time; 3) tool manufacturing, defined as 
an attempt to modify the provided tools and/ or the use of any other item found by the subjects as a 
tool for the honey channels; 4) inserting the rope tool into the L-shaped channel. We coded each action 
separately as yes or no, depending on whether or not a subject performed it (Fig. 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the design, structure and measurements of cognitive performance. The honey tool-task offered 
two problems to solve: an upper channel with a stick solution and lower channel with a rope solution. 
 
 
We also recorded detailed data on any exploration actions during the problem-solving task. 
These were divided into two main categories: relevant and irrelevant. Relevant exploration concerned 
the channels, and thus the actual problem to be solved. Any other explorative acts directed toward the 
test apparatus itself, the board or table was coded as irrelevant exploration. For both categories of 
exploration, we measured the frequency, the duration, and the variety (see Supplementary Table S3 
for definitions). 
 
Experimental procedure 
In all tasks (novelty response tests, the HOI test and the honey tool-task), only those 
individuals participated who could easily be separated without showing any signs of separation-
induced stress. Accordingly, sample size across the different tests varied from 94 to 103. In the honey 
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tool-task each orangutan was tested individually, except for two mothers who were tested with their 
dependent offspring, in which case the offspring did not participate in the task. All subjects were naïve 
to this test apparatus and we performed no training trials. All subjects were tested only once. Zoo 
individuals were tested in their smaller sleeping enclosures where they could be separated from the 
group. Testing in the rehabilitation stations took place in the home enclosures, since most individuals 
were housed alone. For the 28 socially housed individuals, additional testing enclosures were 
available. The individuals were brought to the testing enclosures separately and only stayed there for 
the time of testing. We therefore incorporated the identity of the rehabilitation station as one factor in 
our analyses. The problem-solving task lasted a maximum of 10 minutes.  Because the individuals’ 
experience with humans was so variable, we conducted the problem-solving task without the presence 
of an experimenter to avoid possible effects on the subject’s participation and attention during 
cognitive testing (cf. Schubiger et al., 2015). The task was video recorded with one to two SONY HDR-
CX200 handy cameras, depending on angle of the cameras. None of the orangutans were food-
deprived for the task. In the rehabilitation stations, the honey tool-task was presented to the subjects 
on a large board right outside of their enclosure, and subjects could easily reach out toward the 
problem-solving task. In all but one zoo, the apparatus was also presented outside the enclosure. 
However due to the logistics and narrower mesh size in the zoos, we presented the apparatus closer to 
the mesh with a slight angle but less accessible to the orangutans compared to the rehabilitation 
station setting. In one zoo, we presented the honey box within the test enclosure, with orangutans 
having full access to the apparatus. We therefore incorporated accessibility of the test apparatus as 
one factor in our analyses.   
 
Data extraction and statistical analyses 
All videos were imported into Mangold interact 9.7, in which all detailed behaviors of both 
cognitive performance measurements as well as exploration acts were coded by SF and LD. We used 
IBM SPSS Statistics 20 to perform inter-observer reliability tests on every behavioral measure that 
occurred during the honey-tool task. For the zoo sample, 20% of the videos were coded by both 
observers and yielded a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.842 (Nevents=1020, P<0.001), which is considered very 
good. From the rehabilitation sample, 16% of the videos were coded by both observers and yielded a 
good inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.721, Nevents=1020, P<0.001). Also the behavioral 
responses and the proximity measurements that generated the Human Orientation Index was coded in 
Mangold interact 9.7 by SF and a trained research assistant AS and reached a good inter-observer 
reliability value of 0.853 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses=52, P<0.001). LD and SF reached an inter-observer 
reliability value (IOR) of 0.782 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses=66, P<0.001) in a sample of over 26.6% of the 
zoo-videos. LD and AS reached a substantial agreement within the sample of rehabilitation orangutans 
of 0.701 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses= 185, P <0.001). 
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
 41 
 
Further statistical analyses were performed in R version 3.2.3 (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; 
R Core Team, 2016) using the ‘lme4’ (Bates et al., 2015) and ‘MUMIn’ (Barton, 2016) packages. 
Individual scores on each of the four measures of cognitive performance (exhibit: Yes/No) were 
modeled by a binomial Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM). We incorporated each individual’s 
HOI-score, age, sex, species, accessibility of apparatus, and ontogenetic background (rearing and 
housing condition), along with the measure of cognitive performance (Table 3) as fixed factors, and 
controlled for repeated observations on each individual within its respective facility by specifying this 
as a nested random effect. For categorical predictor variables with more than two levels, we manually 
specified planned contrasts. For accessibility of the test apparatus and the measure of cognitive 
performance (both ordinal predictor variables), we conducted polynomial trend analyses, while for 
ontogenetic background we set orthogonal contrasts to compare: 1) wild subjects against all other 
subjects, 2) subjects from rehabilitation stations against zoo subjects, 3) within rehabilitation stations, 
subjects from unknown provenance against all other subjects, 4) within rehabilitation stations, 
human-reared subjects against station-reared subjects, and finally 5) within zoos, hand-reared 
subjects against mother-reared subjects. To examine each individual’s relationship between the HOI 
scores, novelty response, exploration variables and performance, we used Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models 
(Fig. 3-5).  
 
Ethical statement 
All experiments fully complied with the ethical guidelines of each study facility (zoological 
garden/ rehabilitation station) and were respectively approved by the research manager and/or head 
of each facility. We confirm that according to the Swiss Animal Welfare legislation our animal 
experiments are considered with the severity grade 0 (no harm). The experimental protocols for the 
rehabilitation stations were approved by the Animal Welfare office of the University of Zurich, the 
Scientific Advisory Board of the BOS Foundation (Borneo Orangutan Survival), the research managers 
and head of the stations of Sumatran Orangutan Conservation Program (SOCP) and Orangutan 
Foundation International (OFI), and the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology (RISTEK). 
Moreover, all zoo experiments were supported by research committee of the British and Irish 
association for zoos and aquariums (BIAZA). 
 
Results 
Cognitive performance 
For the honey tool-task, we found large variation in cognitive performance among the 103 
orangutans (Fig. 2). Eleven individuals did not solve a single sub-task. The modal and median score on 
total performance was 1 out of a maximum of 4. The four different cognitive measurements of the 
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honey tool-task varied significantly in difficulty. In order to examine whether the ability to solve the 
different sub-tasks was cumulative, we applied a Guttman scale, which showed a reproducibility 
coefficient of close to one (0.97). This strongly suggests that the ability to solve the more difficult sub-
tasks was nested within the performance of the other sub-tasks: 90% of the 103 individuals 
performing the honey tool-task fitted the applied Guttman scale of the four different sub-tasks (see 
Methods and Fig. 1 for details). As expected, ‘remove stick’ was the easiest, ‘insert the stick in the 
straight channel’ was next, followed by ‘making a tool’, whereas ‘inserting the rope in the curved 
channel’ was most difficult (Fig. 1, Sub-task) for the orangutans in this study. Due to this variation in 
difficulty, we treated the four levels of cognitive performance as an ordinal variable in further 
analyses.  
 
Figure 2: Honey tool-task performance. Frequency of subjects that 
solved zero to all subtasks. 
 
We next tested whether background and housing conditions, species, sex, and age could 
explain the variation in cognitive performance on the honey tool-task. Table 3 shows the results of a 
binomial Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of the honey tool-task performance, with the 
response variable being whether or not a subject solved each sub-task. The GLMM allowed us to 
control for repeated observations in each facility and on each individual. The results revealed that the 
human orientation index (HOI) was a good predictor of the ability to solve the task (B±SE= 
0.227±0.08, Z=2.699, P=0.007; Table 3), as was the latency to touch unfamiliar food (B±SE= -
0.034±0.01, Z=-2.263, P=0.024; Table 3) and a novel object (B±SE= -0.025±0.01, Z=-2.123, P=0.034; 
Table 3). The less neophobic the individuals, the more likely they were to solve the task. When we 
removed the novelty responses from the analysis, the HOI remained the main predictor of 
performance (Table S1, Supplementary material). Because an individual’s age and the time it had 
spent in captivity were strongly correlated, only the factor age was considered for the analysis, but it 
did not influence task performance. Subtle differences between enclosures, which might affect the ease 
of access to the apparatus, were controlled for in the analysis, but again did not contribute to 
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explaining the variation in cognitive performance. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the other possible 
variables (sex, species [Sumatran or Bornean], and the various background and current housing 
conditions of the orangutans) predicted performance; they also had no influence on task performance 
when HOI was excluded from the analyses (Table S2, Supplementary material). 
 
Table 3: Generalized Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the 
task. 
  B SE Z p value 
(Intercept) -2.588 1.33 -1.943 0.052  
Human Orientation Index 0.227 0.08 2.699 0.007 ** 
Novel food: time until touch -0.034 0.01 -2.263 0.024 * 
Novel object: time until touch -0.025 0.01 -2.123 0.034* 
Novel object: exploration duration 0.003 0.01 0.433 0.665 
Age -0.006 0.03 -0.232 0.817 
Sex (male) 0.124 0.51 0.243 0.808 
Species (Sumatra) -0.094 0.59 -0.16 0.873 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.173 0.27 -0.639 0.523 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.402 0.29 -1.395 0.163 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.073 0.20 0.367 0.714 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.479 0.48 -1.008 0.314 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.365 0.51 0.722 0.470 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 0.786 0.76 1.04 0.298 
   Quadratic 0.228 0.89 0.257 0.797 
   Cubic -0.189 0.89 -0.213 0.831 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -4.969 0.74 -6.737 <0.001 *** 
   Quadratic 1.554 0.44 3.559 <0.001 *** 
   Cubic -0.205 0.33 -0.626 0.531 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility and individual. The 
performance in the honey tool-task was binary measured. The Analysis included 88 individuals in 9 
different zoos/rehab stations, totaling 352 observations, χ2= 226.27, P< 0.001, P-values below 0.05 
appear in bold. 
 
 
Exploration behaviour underlying cognitive performance 
The orangutans’ performance on the tool-use task was best accounted for by exploration 
variety, which explained 27% of the variation (Fig. 3b and Fig. 4), whereas exploration duration 
predicted 9% of the variation (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =8.57, R2LMM(m)=0.092, P =0.005, Fig. 3a and 
Fig. 4). However, the HOI only explained 5% of cognitive performance (χ2ML =6.21, P<0.05). 
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Figure 3.  The relationships between exploration behaviour and the overall cognitive performance. (a) Overall 
performance in relation to the exploration duration. Individuals that explored longer were significantly better problem 
solvers (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ
2
ML =08.57, P =0.005). (b) The overall task performance in relation to the total variety of 
exploration actions (Nobs=103, Nlocation=12, χ
2
ML =36.10, P <0.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Graphical illustration of the relationship between the human orientation Index (HOI), the cognitive 
performance and exploration duration and variety, in context to each other. The total variety can be divided into 
relevant and irrelevant variety. The figure also indicates the percentage of variation estimated by the pseudo R
2
 for 
linear mixed effects margins that is explained by each factor. The thickness of the arrows accentuates the strength of 
the influence. 
 
 
The effect of human orientation on exploration 
A Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) analysis of the subjects’ exploration of the apparatus, 
which controlled for repeated measurements in each facility, showed that HOI accounted for 11% of 
the variation of the total exploration variety (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =12.02, R2LMM(m)=0.1113,  P 
<0.001, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5b). In addition, there was a trend showing that individuals with a higher HOI 
explored the apparatus longer than those with a lower HOI (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =3.53, 
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R2LMM(m)=0.025, P =0.06, Fig. 5a), although the HOI explained a mere 2% of the variation in exploration 
duration (Fig. 4). This low proportion is not surprising, because the most successful orangutans, and 
thus the ones with high HOI values, stopped exploring once they found the solution to the problem and 
spent their remaining time extracting honey. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  The relationships between the human orientation index (HOI) and exploration behaviour showed 
significant dependencies in Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models (LMM) that controlled for repeated observations in each 
facility. (a) Exploration duration in relation to HOI-index (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ
2
ML =3.53, R
2
LMM(m)=0.025, P =0.06). (b) 
Total variety of exploration actions in relation to the HOI (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ
2
ML =12.02, R
2
LMM(m)=0.1113,  P <0.001). 
 
 
Random exploration of the apparatus per se does not necessarily raise the chances of finding 
the solution. Individuals who can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parts of the apparatus 
should be more successful (Supplementary Table S3). We therefore also investigated the separate 
effects of exploration variety directed at the relevant or irrelevant areas of the apparatus. We 
calculated marginal pseudo-R2 values to estimate the proportion of variation explained by the fixed 
effects in our model. The HOI explained 13% of the variation of relevant exploration (χ2ML =13.67, 
P<0.001, Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table S4), which subsequently accounted for 36% of the variation 
in cognitive performance. In contrast, HOI explained only 3% of the irrelevant exploration (χ2ML =2.93, 
P=0.087, Fig. 4), which accounted for only 3% of performance in the task. The effect of a higher HOI 
was thus primarily on the amount of exploration and especially on the diversity of exploration on 
relevant parts of the task, with the latter explaining 36% of cognitive performance. Furthermore, 
neither housing- nor background/ rearing history had any effect on the exploration of the apparatus 
(Supplementary Table S4). 
Additionally, using a Linear Mixed-Effect Model (LMM), controlling for each subject’s housing 
location, we compared the exploration style of the most successful individuals, the 10 subjects who 
solved the most difficult problem of ‘inserting the rope in the curved channel’ (‘ropers’), to the other 
non-successful individuals (‘non-ropers’). There was no difference in exploration duration between 
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ropers and non-ropers. However, the ropers differed significantly from non-ropers in their exploration 
variety (P= 0.012).  Ropers not only showed a greater diversity of explorative actions, but also a far 
greater diversity of exploration on relevant parts of the apparatus (p< 0.001; note that solving the 
rope solution is itself not counted as relevant exploration). Moreover, the ropers’ HOI was 29.7% (and 
significantly) higher than that of non-ropers (χ2ML =4.06, P<0.05). 
 
Evaluating the human orientation index  
Given the large effect of the HOI on exploration style, we examined whether the different 
background categories determined an individual’s human orientation index. ‘Wild’ individuals 
strongly diverged from any other category in that they took longer or did not respond at all to the 
novel food and novel object (Supplementary Fig.1) and by showing significantly lower HOI values 
(Kruskal-Wallis test: N=95, P=0.002, Fig. 6). However, pairwise comparisons of each background 
category (controlling for age, sex and species as well as repeated observations from each study 
location and correction of P-values for multiple comparisons using Tukey) revealed no significant 
differences in HOI between the background categories (Supplementary Table: S5).   
 
 
Figure 6: The human orientation index (HOI) in relation to background history. 
Groups of individuals with different background histories differed slightly in their 
human orientation.  
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Table 4: Linear Mixed-Effects model of the Human Orientation Index controlling 
for repeated observations on each facility. 
  Estimate SE df t value p value 
(Intercept) 7.155    1.12 58.15   6.401 <0.001*** 
Novel food 
      Latency touch -0.057    0.06 78.83  -0.977    0.332 
Novel Object  
      Latency touch  0.001    0.02 81.9   0.457    0.649 
      Exploration duration  0.006    0.01 81.99   0.584    0.561 
Note: N observations = 85, N place = 9, X2ML= 3.556, P = 0.314, P-values below 0.05 
appear in bold. 
 
The reaction toward novel humans might also be the result of several other factors, such as a 
response to any novelty or to social beings (human or orangutan). Therefore, we also examined the 
links between HOI and the three novelty response experiments (concerning novel food, novel objects 
and novel conspecifics). Results of a Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) evaluated the relation 
between the HOI and two other novelty response tasks, the novel-object and the novel-food task. The 
HOI was not explained by the latency to touch either the novel food (B±SE= -0.057±1.12, df= 78.83, t= 
6.401, P=0.332; Table 4) or the novel toy (B±SD= 0.008±0.02, df= 81.9, t= 0.457, P=0.649; Table 4), 
whereas the latter two were correlated (Spearman’s rho: r =0.314, N=98, P=0.002, 2-tailed). Neither 
did the exploration duration of the novel toy explain the variation in HOI (B±SE= 0.006±0.01, df= 
81.99, t= 0.584, P=0.561; Table 4). Thus, the HOI did not simply reflect a positive response to novelty 
per se. To test whether the HOI represents a general interest in social beings, and thereby a higher 
social motivation in general or whether it describes the interest in humans specifically, we performed 
an additional social-interest-task with a subset of individuals of one rehabilitation station (N=28, see 
Method section). The HOI did not seem to measure a general social interest, since the duration spent in 
close proximity to a novel human did not correlate with the time spent in close proximity to novel 
conspecifics (Spearman’s rho: r =.198, N=28, P=.312, two-tailed).  
 
Discussion 
 
This study represents one of the largest systematic individual-level comparisons of cognitive 
tool-using abilities in apes, involving 13 different captive groups in both zoos and rehabilitation 
stations in which none of the individuals were deprived or enculturated. As expected, the latency to 
touch novel food or objects, and thus reduced neophobia, was an important independent predictor of 
task performance (Table 3), as has been found in other studies (Auersperg et al., 2011; Benson-Amram 
& Holekamp, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Sol, Griffin, & Bartomeus, 2012). However, we also found 
that variation in problem-solving skills in the honey tool-task was equally predicted by persistent and 
varied explorative behaviour, which in turn was highly influenced by the orangutans’ psychological 
orientation as assessed with the human orientation index, HOI (Table 3). We suggest the following 
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biologically most plausible causal cascade, backed up by a series of analyses: Human orientation 
mainly influenced both the orangutans’ motivation to explore and the nature of their exploration, and 
consequently affected their understanding of the problem-solving task, and thus their success in 
solving it. 
The reaction towards humans could have several dimensions, other than the mere interest in 
humans, and our results allowed us to characterize the nature of the Human orientation Index (HOI) in 
more detail. A high HOI does not simply reflect the expectation of food that is provided regularly by 
humans, because HOI varied extensively and all these orangutans depended on humans for their food. 
The different background categories also showed higher variability in their HOI than in their novelty 
response (Fig. 6 and Supplementary Fig. S1). Moreover, if it were mere food expectation, variation in 
HOI should be associated with caretakers that provide the daily food supply rather than random 
strangers. Finally, the HOI does not reflect general novelty response or general social interest, as it was 
not correlated with the approach latency to novel food nor objects (Table 4), nor with interest in novel 
conspecifics. Therefore the effect was human-specific and increased the motivation to explore, 
expressed as increased duration and variety of exploration (Fig. 5a and 5b).  
The HOI thus captures a fundamental psychological change that is induced by human contact. 
The different background categories overlapped largely in their HOI (Supplementary Table S5), 
implying that each individual’s specific nature and experience of human contact is more influential 
than the human exposure time per se. However, our sample included a few wild individuals who had 
spent their whole immature period in natural habitat and showed very low human orientation 
compared to most other conspecifics housed in zoos and rehabilitation stations, independent of the 
time they had spent at the station (Fig. 6). This indicates that the change caused by humans can only 
happen at an early age, suggesting a sensitive period for social inputs. Since this kind of psychological 
orientation is absent in nature (Forss et al., 2015), we can ask which natural process is being 
mimicked or modified by human contact. The answer is remarkably simple: humans replace the role of 
the mother and other conspecific experts, and the rich variety of artifacts provided by humans 
enriches their physical environment. In their natural niche, orangutans as well as other primates are 
prone to attend to their mother and other expert conspecifics and learn necessary skills socially 
(Humle, Snowdon, & Matsuzawa, 2009; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Lonsdorf, 2006; Schuppli et al., 2016; van de 
Waal et al., 2010; van de Waal, Borgeaud, & Whiten, 2013). Exploration plays a crucial role in skill 
acquisition in the wild, but virtually all exploration is socially facilitated, allowing orangutans to 
overcome intrinsic neophobia (Forss et al., 2015). 
Given the identification of human orientation, rather than rearing conditions, as the key 
determinant of cognitive ability in captive apes, it makes sense to revisit the role of deprivation and 
enculturation.  Because deprivation involves the complete loss of any role models, whereas 
enculturation involves the presence of far richer social inputs by more actively engaged role models 
than under normal conditions, one could argue that the degree of human orientation may largely 
explain the whole spectrum of cognitive performance among great apes. This perspective also explains 
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why enculturated apes outperform others not just in socio-cognitive skills, but also in physical 
cognitive skills (Bard et al., 2014; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003).  
 The social triggering of the engagement with artifacts is highly influential in human child 
development (Bard & Leavens, 2009; Tomasello, 1999). Studies within the field of comparative 
psychology have documented nonhuman primates’ tendency to attend to humans (Call & Tomasello, 
1996; Hirata, Morimura, & Houki, 2009) and acknowledged the improvement in learning cognitive 
tasks due to human contact in captive settings (Harlow, 1949; Rumbaugh & Pate, 2014). Systematic 
species comparisons of primates’ attention structure toward humans are rare. Nonetheless, in 1916, 
Yerkes (Yerkes, 1916) already suggested that the qualitatively better cognitive performance of an 
orangutan compared to monkeys was due to the ape’s social attention to human actions. Our results 
thus support previous suggestions (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Shumaker, 
Walkup, & Beck, 2011) that early exposure to humans and human artifacts presents a broader range of 
opportunities for exploration resulting in increased innovativeness in captive apes. Over time, the 
accumulating experience resulting from attention to humans leads to improved problem-solving 
ability, provided the exposure to humans is early in life. In conclusion, human orientation at least 
partly explains the phenomenon that captive primates that are exposed to both conspecific and human 
role models experience increased opportunities for socially induced exploration and learning (cf. 
Bering, 2004).  
Our detailed analyses revealed that the HOI influenced an individual’s duration and especially 
its variety of exploration (Fig. 5a and 5b), which subsequently explained cognitive performance (Fig. 
3a and 3b, Fig. 4).  Previous studies on hyenas (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012) and birds (Griffin 
& Guez, 2014) have also reported that the diversity of exploration actions influences innovativeness 
and problem-solving skills. However, in our study, individuals with a strong human orientation were 
more successful in the task, not only through their exploration diversity, but also by focusing on the 
relevant parts of the apparatus (Fig. 4), implying that they were better at recognizing the actual 
challenge presented in the honey tool-task. Importantly, these parts were relevant not because they 
directly led to the solution, but rather because exploration of these parts improved the animals’ 
understanding of the physical properties of the problem. For example, individuals that traced the 
honey channel from the outside of the glass obviously understood that there is honey inside, but were 
at that time not searching at the correct part of the apparatus, the channel entrance. Similarly, 
individuals poking with their finger into the curved channel may have gathered information on its 
length. Exploration can therefore be viewed as latent learning: it allows an animal to gather knowledge 
of the texture, the material, and the problem itself. Over time, then, individuals with a high HOI will 
gain more experience, which contributes to their focus on relevant aspects of the problem and hence 
problem-solving success. 
The effects of the HOI on problem-solving success may have been so strong that they masked 
the effects of other factors. Thus, we found no differences between the two orangutan species (P. abelii 
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and P. pygmaeus), even though these were found when orangutans with very similar backgrounds (all 
mother-reared zoo individuals) were compared on a range of cognitive tasks (Forss et al., 2016).  
This study documented strong effects of human orientation on problem-solving abilities, 
through its effects on response to novelty, motivation to explore, exploration persistence and 
ultimately experience. This finding suggests that it is just as impossible to design culture-free cognitive 
tests for primates as it is for humans. In this sense, tests of primate cognition are inevitably deeply 
anthropomorphic. However, once we have controlled for the subjects’ human-related histories and 
given that problem-solving ability is about dealing with unknown, novel problems the variation 
captured in these tests nonetheless reflects variation in intrinsic cognitive abilities and should be 
comparable within and across species. Therefore, we suggest the HOI may be a useful tool in 
standardizing comparisons across primates, especially studies concerning ape subjects with various 
background and human-related experiences. In future work, we will further disentangle the exact 
nature and causes of the HOI and address additional problem-solving domains.  
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Investigating the mechanisms underlying individual variation in cognitive performance is a 
crucial step towards understanding the structure and evolution of cognition. In this study, we 
investigated phenotypic plasticity of 61 Bornean, Pongo pygmaeus, and Sumatran, Pongo abelii, 
orang-utans to gain insight into how rearing history shapes problem-solving approaches. We 
first examined the determinants of an individual’s response-and-exploration style, which we 
assessed using five independent novelty response and exploration tasks. Our findings revealed 
that both previous care by humans and social housing with conspecifics elicited a curious 
response-and-exploration style (characterized by a positive response to novelty and a high 
motivation to explore). Second, we investigated how the response-and-exploration style and 
previous experiences affected an individual’s problem-solving performance in a variety of tasks 
aimed at assessing physical cognition, including reversal learning, inhibitory control, causal 
reasoning and tool use. We found curiosity to be the sole predictor of problem-solving 
performance. However, curiosity is strikingly rare in wild orang-utans, being mainly induced by 
contact with humans and living in a safe and stimulating physical and social environment. We 
therefore suggest that curiosity in orang-utans is an artefact of captivity, a potential only 
expressed under special conditions. The origin of curiosity in our own lineage may have been an 
important contributor to the rapid rise in the complexity of our ancestors’ material culture.  
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Introduction 
 
Individuals of a given species tend to vary in cognitive performance, as expressed for 
instance in problem-solving ability (Griffin & Guez, 2014; Herrmann & Call, 2012; Neisser et al., 
1996; Nisbett et al., 2012; Thornton & Lukas, 2012). Numerous experiments have shown that 
adult cognitive performance in animals is affected by environmental conditions during early 
development, be they enriched physical environments (Cooper & Zubek, 1958), enhanced 
nutrition (Arnold, Ramsay, Donaldson, & Adam, 2007), enculturation (Call & Tomasello, 1996; 
Tomasello & Call, 2004) or extreme social deprivation (Brent, Bloomsmith, & Fisher, 1995; 
Mason, 1968; Schrijver, Pallier, Brown, & Würbel, 2004; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). However, 
the actual psychological mechanisms, such as exploration and social learning plus their 
feedbacks, through which these developmental effects are produced, are still only partially 
documented. Nevertheless, identifying them is vital for understanding the development of 
cognition as well as its evolution (Rowe & Healy, 2014; Thornton & Lukas, 2012). 
Among humans, curiosity is often seen as an important contributor to creativity (Day & 
Langevin, 1969), decision making (Hirschman, 1980) and innovation (Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 
2016). Curiosity is defined as a motivation towards the acquisition of novel information (novelty 
seeking) and thus an attraction towards learning and experiencing something new (Berlyne, 
1950, 1960; Collins, Litman, & Spielberger, 2004; Litman, 2005; Loewenstein, 1994). 
Accordingly, curiosity is reflected in approaching and exploring novel stimuli (Berlyne, 1960; 
Loewenstein, 1994), which makes it a potentially important ingredient of innovation and 
problem solving (Kummer & Goodall, 1985), for example through trial and error. Therefore, one 
major factor for the evolution of intelligence and culture in humans may be our curiosity, which 
makes us seek and explore novelty. 
Curiously, although studies of animal problem solving and innovation consider a variety 
of mechanisms (Griffin & Guez, 2014; Tebbich, Griffin, Peschl, & Sterelny, 2016; van Schaik et al., 
2016), curiosity is rarely mentioned (see Kaufman & Kaufman, 2015; but see Benson-Amram et 
al. 2013). This rarity may reflect the fact that in their natural environment individuals must be 
vigilant for predators and rivals and are preoccupied with planning their daily routines 
(Greenberg, 2003), and thus cannot afford to respond to novelty and engage in time-intensive 
exploration (with rare exceptions: e.g. Diamond & Bond, 1999). In wild orang-utans, Pongo spp., 
for instance, exploration overwhelmingly occurs when initiated by the observation of trusted 
experts (Schuppli et al., 2016; van Schaik et al., 2016). This preference for social learning may 
reflect the risks attached to exploration, such as injury or poisoning, especially when the items 
are novel, which they inevitably are for infants. Interestingly, whereas wild orang-utans avoid 
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novelty, orang-utans in zoos seek novel stimuli (Damerius et al., 2017; Forss, Schuppli, Haiden, 
Zweifel, & Van Schaik, 2015). The captivity effect (reviewed in Haslam, 2013) partly reflects this 
difference in novelty response. 
This unexpected juxtaposition of strong conservatism and seeming curiosity within the 
same species in different conditions raises the question of how curiosity is elicited. One 
possibility is that captivity offers a safe and stable environment, which includes a reduced need 
to find and process food and thus increased free time, reduced need to be vigilant for predators 
and plan travel routes and thus reduced cognitive load, and permanent gregariousness and thus 
more frequent opportunities for social learning. These circumstances allow individuals to 
approach and explore novel items and situations (Forss et al., 2015; van Schaik et al., 2016), 
which, over time, results in larger skill repertoires (Haslam, 2013). In addition, the ability to 
attend to humans and their actions may increase an individual’s knowledge of affordances or 
stimulate different cognitive processes (Fredman & Whiten, 2008) and might therefore 
indirectly stimulate innovation propensity. This idea is supported by recent findings in orang-
utans (Damerius et al., 2017) showing that human contact during ontogeny led to changes in the 
orang-utan’s attention structure that positively affected individual’s problem-solving success. 
Thus, it appears that captivity may unleash curiosity in animals that are decidedly uncurious in 
the wild.  
The goal of the present study was to examine how important curiosity was in problem 
solving by linking individual variation in problem-solving ability to response-and-exploration 
styles in a large sample of orang-utans from widely varying backgrounds. In this work, we 
wanted to complement earlier studies that suggested enhanced curiosity in captivity (Benson-
Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013; Damerius et al., 2017; Forss et al., 2015) in three ways. 
First, previous studies generally focused on the effect of single variables, either the absence of 
neophobia or aspects of exploration, on problem solving. However, response to novelty and 
exploration styles may have distinct underlying psychological substrates (Carr et al., 2016; 
Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001; Mettke-Hofmann, 2014). We therefore used a 
multidimensional approach that includes a variety of measures to disentangle the various 
possible contributing factors. Second, most results relating curiosity to cognitive problem 
solving were only based on a single task (Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Damerius et al., 2017). 
However, given possible variability in performance across different tasks (Griffin & Guez, 2014; 
Herrmann & Call, 2012; Herrmann, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2010), one ideally includes an array 
of problem-solving tasks that may recruit different cognitive abilities. Third, previous studies 
tended to have small sample sizes and therefore lacked explanatory power and resolution (Cole, 
Cram, & Quinn, 2011; Thornton & Lukas, 2012). We therefore tested a sample of 61 Bornean, 
Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii, and Sumatran, Pongo abelii, orang-utans. 
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The present study was structured as follows. First, we combined a measure of the orang-
utans’ attentiveness towards humans with various independent assays of response to novelty 
and exploration to gain broader insight into the nature and causes of interest in the social and 
physical environment. Second, because we included individuals housed in four Indonesian 
rehabilitation stations with various rearing histories, we could investigate the effects of 
individual experiences on their response-and-exploration styles. Third, we examined whether 
individual rearing histories or the response-and-exploration style most strongly affected their 
physical problem-solving abilities. We did so using a battery of tasks encompassing different 
domains of cognition: associative and reversal learning, flexibility, inhibitory control, causal 
reasoning and tool use. 
 
Methods 
Study Subjects and Species 
We studied 61 orang-utans housed at rehabilitation stations in the Republic of 
Indonesia: 45 individuals in Central Kalimantan, Borneo and 16 near Medan and Jambi, both on 
Sumatra (Supplementary Table S1). Most were born in the wild but captured as young infants 
and kept as pets before being confiscated by the police and brought to the rehabilitation 
stations. Other adolescent or adult orang-utans came directly from the wild after being rescued 
when their habitat was lost to deforestation and conversion to plantations. We classified 
individuals into four different background groups (Wild, Station and Human, as well as 
Unknown; see Table 1), based on their age at arrival at the station and previous exposure to 
humans. Importantly, individuals in the Human category had lived a minimum of 6 months as 
pets. The ages of the subjects ranged from 3.5 to ca. 25 years. In the wild, age at weaning is 
around 6–7 years and age at first reproduction, for females, around 13–15 (Wich et al., 2004). 
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Table 1: Categories of subjects and their background histories 
Background 
Human 
exposure 
Age 
(years) 
Years in 
captivity 
Qualitative description N 
Wild Minimal 10-25 0-7 
Entered the rehabilitation station directly 
from their natural habitat, often as 
adolescents or adults 
5 
Station 
Mainly 
station-raised 
5-11 4-10 
Arrived at station as dependent offspring 
at the age of 1.5 years or younger. Hence, 
spent minimally 80% of life in rehabilitation 
station 
8 
Human 
Minimum 6 
months as 
pets with 
humans  
3.5-14 0-9 
Older than 1.5 years upon arrival. 
Background history includes a minimum of 
6 months of human contact as pet 
16 
Unknown 
Unknown 
before arrival 
at station 
3-17 0.5-14 
No background information, but not 
reported to be wild. Arrived at station at 
ages 2-7 and therefore spent a large part of 
the developmental phase in captivity 
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Study Facilities and Housing 
Data collection occurred between June 2012 and June 2014 by L.D., Zaida Kosonen (Z.K.) 
and a trained assistant (Andreas Wendl) in four facilities of three organizations across Sumatra 
and Central Kalimantan, Borneo.  
Eleven Sumatran orang-utans (four females, seven males) were studied at a quarantine 
station in Batu M'Belin (QBM), Medan, North Sumatra, which is run by the Sumatran Orangutan 
Conservation Program (SOCP). Their ages ranged from 5 to 10 years and we tested them in their 
home enclosures, as they were housed alone. We also studied  one solitarily subject (male) and 
four socially housed subjects (females) aged between 3 and 6 years at Danau Alo, Bukit 
Tigapuluh, Jambi, Sumatra (SOCP).  
 Of the Bornean orang-utans in our study, 28 (11 females and 17 males) were at the 
Orangutan Care Center and Quarantine (OCCQ) in Pasir Panjang, Central Kalimantan. This 
facility is managed by the Orangutan Foundation International (OFI). The subjects' ages ranged 
from 8 to 14.5 years. Testing occurred in external test cages, since all individuals were socially 
housed in same-sex peer groups of two to six individuals. We also studied 17 subjects (seven 
females, 10 males) at Nyaru Menteng Rescue Center, Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan. This 
rehabilitation station is managed by the Bornean Orangutan Survival Foundation (BOSF). The 
subjects were 6–17 years old and were tested in their home enclosures. 
To prepare orang-utans for release, contact with humans at all stations was limited, 
apart from routine check-ups by veterinarians and cage cleaning and feeding by caretakers 
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several times a day. In the Bornean facilities, individuals that arrived as dependent offspring 
were placed in the stations’ nursery, where human caretakers served as temporary surrogate 
mothers. All infants received close physical care and supervision. All enclosures contained 
simple enrichment devices, such as tyres, ropes and platforms. All stations offered food-related 
enrichment several times a week and depending on the age and stage of rehabilitation most 
individuals went for regular forest walks. 
 
Assessment of the Response-and-Exploration Style 
The orang-utans’ response-and-exploration style was assessed using five independent 
tasks, in which we recorded their behaviour towards (1) a novel human, (2) a novel object, (3) a 
novel food item, (4) a familiar food item and (5) a snake model (Fig. 1). This resulted in 13 
different measurements that contributed to assessing the response-and-exploration style (Table 
2).  
 
Figure 1: Pictures of the response and exploration 
tasks: (a) novel human, (b) novel object, (c) novel 
food, (d) familiar food, (e) plastic snake. 
 
The novel-human task is an extended version of the human orientation index (HOI), 
which captures an individual’s attentiveness towards humans (Damerius et al., 2017). The 
reactions and proximity to a male human stranger during four conditions were measured (Table 
2). Detailed descriptions on how to calculate the HOI for each condition are given in the 
Supplementary Material. The reaction towards the snake predator model was rated from -2 
(negative: retreat, signs of stress such as vocalizing), -1 (avoidance), 0 (neutral reaction) and +1 
(approach or trying to scare away the snake model) to +2 (positive: approach, making effort to 
directly contact the predator, e.g. reaching for the model). 
Each task was presented from the outside of the enclosure and lasted 2 min. The order 
was randomized and the tasks performed on different days, with a maximum of two tasks per 
day.  
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Table 2: Detailed description of the response and exploration tasks   
Type of 
experiment 
Experiment Resources Measures Task procedure 
Novelty 
response 
Novel 
human 
(HOI) 
Local male 
human (Fig. 1a) 
 
We measured the 
duration an individual 
spent close to the novel 
human (≤1 m proximity to 
enclosure front). Further, 
the first reaction’s 
intensity and position of 
the orang-utan per 
condition were recorded, 
allowing us to calculate 
the HOI. For more details, 
see the Supplementary 
Material and Damerius et 
al. (2017) 
The task duration was 2 min, with 
four conditions (each 30 s). (1) 
The man positioned himself 1.5 m 
in front of enclosure. His body 
was oriented perpendicularly to 
the subject. (2) The man turned 
to face subject and tried to 
establish eye contact. (3) The 
man held preferred food 
(peanuts) out of the individual’s 
reach. (4) The man offered and 
presented the food to the orang-
utan, without actually giving it 
Exploration 
and novelty 
response  
Novel 
object  
Wooden board 
with six 
rotatable, 
coloured tennis 
balls (Fig. 1b) 
We measured the 
duration of gentle 
exploration, the duration 
of rough exploration, the 
variety of exploration 
actions, the percentage of 
rough exploration actions, 
the latency of an 
individual’s first approach 
to within 1 m, and the 
latency until the individual 
touched the apparatus 
(after approach to 1 m) 
 
The novel object task was 
presented on the presentation 
table for 2 min 
Novelty 
response 
Novel food Purple rice or 
purple potato 
mash (coloured 
with food dye) 
with pieces of 
olive (Fig. 1c) 
We measured the latency 
until the orang-utan 
touched the novel food, 
and the latency from 
touching until eating the 
novel food 
The novel food task was 
presented on the presentation 
table for 2 min 
Novelty 
response  
Familiar 
food 
Familiar food 
item, selection 
depended on 
availability at 
the station (Fig. 
1d) 
We measured the latency 
until the orang-utan 
touched the familiar food, 
and the latency from 
touching until eating the 
familiar food 
The familiar food task was 
presented on the presentation 
table for 2 min 
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Predator 
model 
Snake Plastic snake, 
moved by 
pulling an 
attached fishing 
line (Fig. 1e) 
We measured the 
individual’s position and 
intensity of its reaction to 
the predator model, 
allowing us to calculate a 
snake reaction index 
 
The task duration was 2 min with 
four conditions, each lasting 30 s. 
(1) The snake rested 1 m in front 
of the enclosure on the 
presentation table. (2) The line 
was pulled, moving the snake. (3) 
The snake was not pulled and did 
not move. (4) The line was pulled 
to move the snake 
HOI: human orientation index. 
Physical cognitive test battery and procedure 
To test different domains of cognitive performance, we exposed the 61 individuals to five 
different experimental tasks, which yielded six tests: Detour Reaching, Reversal Learning, Box 
Task, Honey Tool Task (two tests on same task) and Tube Trap Task. The experiments required 
no pretraining and, except for tasks requiring multiple sessions, were presented just once, in 
random order, on consecutive days and on a specially designed table (Supplementary Fig. S1). 
We used the same experimental tasks and procedures for each facility, but customized the size 
and fixation of the presentation table. Subjects were able to interact freely with the apparatus 
right outside their enclosure by reaching through the bars. So as not to bias the tests in favour of 
orang-utans familiar with humans, no human was present during testing, and the apparatuses 
were set up by a familiar caretaker whenever possible. 
The following experiments were part of the cognitive test battery.  
 
(1) Detour Reaching 
The Detour Reaching experiment is a classical inhibitory control task and serves as a key 
predictive measure of problem-solving skills in human and nonhuman animals (Amici, Barney, 
Johnson, Call, & Aureli, 2012; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2010). A 
transparent Makrolon box that had two openings at the front, one small hole on the right and a 
large one on the left, was presented for 5 min (Supplementary Fig. S2). A preferred 
fruit/enrichment object that was too big to fit through the small hole was placed directly behind 
the small hole in the right half of the box. The subject could only get the reward by reaching 
through the large opening and making the detour, and thus had to inhibit the urge to select the 
putative direct solution. The criterion for success was retrieving the reward. 
 
(2) Reversal Learning. 
In a widely used paradigm (reviewed in Izquierdo, Brigman, Radke, Rudebeck, & Holmes, 
2016), subjects at ﬁrst learn that certain items (location, colour) are linked to a reward whereas 
the other items are not. Once the individual has learned the causal link, the rewarding of the 
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items is reversed. In the current study, the subjects were presented with a board with square 
black and round white doors on either side of it (Supplementary Fig. S3). The doors could be 
swung open by turning them to the right or to the left and gave way to a space filled with a 
peanut. A randomly determined side was baited. Therefore, when the subject opened a baited 
door, it was rewarded. The task for the subject was to learn the association between the hidden 
food and the respective location, which was enhanced by the different colours and shapes of the 
doors. As soon as the location of food was accurately associated, the location of the reward was 
switched. If at least five of the first six opened doors were of the correct location for two 
consecutive trials, the criterion for learning/reversal learning was fulfilled. The board was 
presented for 4 min per trial, with three to four consecutive trials per day (in total up to 16 
min/day). The reversal learning board was presented to the individual for a maximum of 4 days. 
The criterion for success was the individual’s ability to learn the new association (reversal 
learning). 
 
(3) Box Task 
This experiment allowed us to assess flexibility. It consisted of two consecutive 
presentations of ﬁve identical wooden boxes, each with a lid and a sliding door (Supplementary 
Fig. S4). In the learning phase (4 min), the lid of all five boxes could only be opened by ﬂipping it. 
Individuals learned that they could flip open the box to receive the reward, a peanut. When four 
of five boxes were flipped open the learning criterion was fulfilled and the second condition was 
presented, which constituted the actual test for flexibility (7 min). The lids were locked, and the 
previously learned solution had therefore become nonfunctional. Now, the sliding doors were 
unlocked and the boxes baited again out of view of the subject. The criterion for success was 
successfully passing the learning phase and opening five boxes in the flexibility phase. 
 
(4) Honey Tool Task 
This task assessed physical cognition, specifically the abilities to use tools and engage in 
causal reasoning to select the correct tool for two test locations. The subject was presented for 
10 min with the opportunity to ﬁsh honey out of two channels. The apparatus consisted of a 
wooden box with two embedded tubes (a straight channel and a curved L-shaped channel) 
behind a Makrolon plate to ensure the honey in the tubes was visible (Supplementary Fig. S5). 
The subject was offered two different tools: three long sticks (40 cm), one of which was already 
inserted in the straight channel, and three ropes (20 cm). The sticks could be used to extract 
honey from the straight channel, but not from the curved channel. The rope was too short for the 
straight channel, but fitted the curved L-shaped channel. Both channels were too long for an 
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orang-utan’s ﬁnger to reach the honey. The criteria for successful performance were (1) 
inserting the stick in the straight channel and (2) inserting the rope in the L-shaped channel. 
 
(5) Tube Trap Task 
Causal reasoning and learning ability were needed to successfully solve this task. It 
consisted of six horizontally placed tubes with open tube ends but an opaque trap left or right 
from the centre. The tubes were ﬁxed on the vertical board (Supplementary Fig. S6). The front 
sides were transparent and contained a slit wide enough for an orang-utan ﬁnger to slide food 
inside the tube, allowing the subjects to slide the food reward to the left or right tube opening. 
However, if the food was moved in the direction of the trap, the food fell into it and was lost 
(Supplementary Fig. S6a). The task for the subjects was to learn to slide the food in the correct 
direction. The board with the tubes was presented to the subjects on three consecutive trials of 4 
min each. In total the subjects were given the opportunity to explore 18 randomly distributed 
tubes to learn to avoid the trap. The criterion for success was solving a minimum of 12 of 18 
(67%) tubes. 
 
Data extraction and statistical analyses 
All experiments were videotaped with two Sony camcorders (HDR-CX200 high definition 
handycam 5.3 MP), yielding ca. 250 h of video footage, which we imported into Interact, version 
9.7.5.0 (Mangold International GmbH, Arnstorf, Germany), for coding of exploration, cognitive 
performance, latencies and durations. L.D. coded most experiments, but Z.K. coded the Box Task 
in the stations OCCQ and SOCP. The tasks for the measurements of the response-and-exploration 
style were partly coded by a trained assistant (Anna Schöpfer). We performed interobserver 
reliability tests for these tests. All reached substantial agreement. L.D. and Z.K. doubly coded 
35% of the Box Tasks videos (Cohen’s Kappa= 0.79, P<0.001), L.D. and A.S. overlapped for 21% 
of the coded videos of the response and exploration tasks (Cohen’s Kappa= 0.70, P<0.001). 
All statistical analyses were performed in R version 2.1 and 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016) 
using the ‘psych’ (Revelle, 2017), ‘lme4’ (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) and ‘lmerTest’ 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen 2016) packages.  
First, we applied an unrotated principal component analysis (PCA) on the 13 measures 
of the response-and-exploration style (Table 2) using the ‘psych’ package. We chose not to rotate 
the components, because we were interested in capturing as much of the total variance as 
possible in the raw data. With the fa.parallel function from the ‘psych’ package we tested our 
observed data against 1000 randomly simulated data sets with equal n and k. Randomly 
simulated data sets were generated by resampling and generating random normal data. This 
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analysis showed that the first three components with an eigenvalue of 4.19, 1.78 and 1.62 
exceeded the 95th percentile of the eigenvalues obtained from randomly generated data 
(Supplementary Fig. S7), and are thus significant at the 95% level. Therefore, we repeated the 
PCA with only three components. We used the first principal component (‘curiosity’) as response 
variable in a univariate linear mixed-effects models (LMM) with sex, age, age of arrival at the 
station and background as fixed effects, to assess the influences on the response-and-exploration 
style. The LMMs controlled for nonindependence within the different stations by using 
rehabilitation station as a random effect. Marginal R2 values (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013) 
were computed to test the strength of influence of age of arrival at the station, background and 
number of cage partners on the first component (Fig. 2).  
We used a generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) with a binomial link function 
to model the six individual scores (each coded as pass/fail) on the five tasks. The model 
controlled for the repeated observations of each rehabilitation station and individual as a nested 
random effect, and incorporated each individual’s sex, age at testing, age of arrival at the station 
(to control for possible sensitive periods), number of cage partners during the test period, 
health, background, facility, the response-and-exploration style principal components and the 
different tasks of cognitive performance as fixed factors. The contrasts for the categorical 
predictor variables Facilities, Background and Task were specified a priori to compare (1) 
Sumatran to Bornean facilities and further within Bornean facilities; (2) wild individuals versus 
all others, individuals with ‘Unknown’ background versus the ‘Station’ and ‘Human’ 
backgrounds, and ‘Station’ versus ‘Human’ backgrounds; (3) wooden tasks versus tasks 
containing artificial material, e.g. transparent plastic, and Detour Reaching Task (completely 
made out of transparent plastic) compared to all other tasks to identify whether the type of 
material used had an influence on the problem-solving performance. The other task contrasts 
were specified to control for independence between the tasks: the Box Task versus the Reversal 
Learning Task both presented on the presentation table, the Tube Task versus both Honey Tool 
Tasks presented with the vertical board, and, lastly, between the Honey Tool Tasks.  
 
Ethical note 
All experiments fully complied with the ethical guidelines of each study facility, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology (RISTEK) and were approved by the Animal 
Welfare officer of the University of Zurich. We confirm that according to the Swiss Animal 
Welfare legislation our animal experiments carry the severity grade 0 (no harm).  
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Results 
Response-and-Exploration Style  
The responses towards novel food, a novel object, a novel human, a predator, familiar 
food and the exploration of the novel object, were measured in various ways to capture each 
individual’s personal response-and-exploration style. An unrotated principal component 
analysis (PCA) on the 13 task measures yielded three components (Table 3). The Kaiser–Mayer–
Oklin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the PCA (KMO = 0.71), which is ‘good’ 
according to Field (2013). Table 3 shows the factor loadings of each variable on the different 
principal components.  
 
Table 3: Principal component analysis of the response-and-exploration style 
Variable 
 
 
% Variance 
Eigenvalues 
Factor loadings 
Curiosity (PC 1) (PC 2) (PC 3)  
h
2
 
 
32.26 13.73 12.48 
4.19 1.78 1.62 
Latency to touch novel food -0.80  0.23 -0.20 0.74 
Latency from touching to eating novel food -0.80  0.24 -0.22 0.75 
Human orientation index (HOI)  0.70 0.06 -0.28 0.57 
Latency to touch novel object -0.69  0.34 -0.01 0.59 
HOI duration close to human  0.67  0.06 -0.28 0.53 
Duration of gentle exploration of novel object  0.59 -0.21  0.16 0.42 
Variety of exploration of novel object  0.59 -0.22 -0.42 0.58 
Latency to touch familiar food -0.58 -0.56 -0.44 0.84 
Latency to approach novel object -0.19 -0.73 -0.12 0.58 
Latency from touching to eating familiar food -0.53 -0.53 -0.33 0.67 
Snake reaction index (SRI)  0.11 -0.50  0.41 0.43 
% Rough exploration of novel object  0.35  0.17 -0.71 0.66 
Duration of rough exploration of novel object  0.12  0.25 -0.43 0.26 
N = 61, rotation = none. Factor loadings greater than or equal to |0.4| appear in bold. 
 
The first component (PC 1) gathered characteristics that represent a positive novelty 
response towards novel humans, objects and food, along with a high duration and variety of 
exploratory actions. It accounted for almost a third of the total variance in our sample. 
Therefore, PC 1 can be characterized as ‘curiosity’: individuals with a high score were actively 
seeking the unfamiliar, interested in their environment and exploration-prone. However, orang-
utans scoring high on PC 1 were not obvious risk-takers, given their low score on rough 
exploration (such as hitting the apparatus) and neutral reactions towards the snake. High-
scoring individuals in PC 2 had short latencies to touch and consume the familiar food, but not 
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the novel food. They approached unfamiliar objects up to 1 m, but did not necessarily touch the 
object faster, or explore it. They also expressed cautiousness towards the snake model. 
Individuals scoring high on PC 3 were especially unlikely to explore the novel object in a rough 
manner. Because the components were not rotated, PC 2 and PC 3 did not have unambiguous 
interpretations and low eigenvalues, so we do not consider them further. 
 
What shapes an individual’s curiosity? 
A test of the effects on PC 1 of the response-and-exploration style clearly showed that 
‘wild’ individuals were significantly (and very much) less curious (Table 4, Supplementary Fig. 
S8). We could not detect a significant effect of sex, age at testing or number of cage partners 
during the period of study. However, individuals that were older at the time of arrival at the 
station (and thus on average had been in contact with humans longer) tended to be more 
curious. 
  
 
Because individuals classified as ‘wild’ had recently arrived at the station and were 
estimated to be much older on average when first captured than the others (mean ± SE: 15 ± 6.5 
years), the strong effect of being wild might have masked any other possible effects on curiosity.  
We therefore repeated the analysis with the ‘wild’ individuals removed. The analysis of the 
remaining 56 individuals showed that the age of an individual when arriving at the station and 
the number of cage partners had significantly positive effects on curiosity (Table 5). Because 
individuals are predominantly captured at a young age, this result could suggest that time spent 
with humans strongly increases curiosity (Fig. 3a). We confirmed this assumption by repeating 
the analysis with the subsample of individuals (N=16), for whom we knew with certainty that 
Table 4: Parameter estimates and associated standard errors, obtained from a linear mixed-effects 
model of PC 1 ‘curiosity’ over all 61 individuals 
 
Estimate SE df t P 
Intercept -0.516 0.536 7.32 -0.963 0.366 
Sex (male)  0.094 0.192 52.67  0.489 0.627 
Age  -0.059 0.041 33.02 -1.438 0.160 
Age on arrival at station  0.099 0.055 47.19  1.800 0.078 
Current no. of. cage partners  0.154 0.094 40.60  1.643 0.108 
Background      
     Wild vs Others (Station/Human/Unknown) -0.785 0.124 51.19 -6.360 <0.001 
  Station/Human vs Unknown -0.093 0.070 51.26 -1.333 0.189 
     Station vs Human -0.045 0.155 51.38 -0.293 0.771 
The model controls for repeated observations on each rehabilitation station (random effect). Nobservations = 61, 
Nstations = 3, χ
2
= 53.768, P< 0.001. Significant P value is in bold. 
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they had been with humans for at least half a year before being confiscated (Supplementary 
Table S2, Fig. 3b). Because of the limited sample size in this subset, we included only age at 
arrival at the station as a predictor. However, separately including potential confounding 
variables, such as sex or number of cage partners, did not change our results (not shown). Thus, 
because we also could not find an influence of sex or age when testing curiosity (Table 5), we 
conclude that individuals that had spent more time with humans before arriving at the 
rehabilitation station were more curious. 
Table 5: Parameter estimates and associated standard errors, obtained from a linear 
mixed-effects model of PC 1 ‘curiosity’ over 56 ‘nonwild’ individuals  
  Estimate SE df t P 
(Intercept) -0.365 0.498   6.50  -0.73 0.489 
Sex (male) -0.011 0.144 48.13  -0.07 0.939 
Age   0.001 0.034 37.70   0.03 0.970 
Age on arrival at station  0.136 0.048 47.91   2.80 0.007 
Current no. of cage partners  0.186 0.069 47.31   2.68 0.010 
Background      
     Station/Human vs Unknown -0.032 0.052 47.25  -0.63 0.529 
     Station vs Human  0.047 0.115 47.25   0.40 0.684 
The model controls for repeated observations on each rehabilitation station (random effect). 
Nobservations = 56, Nstations =  3, χ
2
= 13.84, P= 0.031. Significant P values are in bold. 
 
The current number of cage mates also affected curiosity. Since the individuals were 
mainly placed in groups based on space considerations, this probably reflects a direct effect of 
sociability on responses to the outside world. 
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Figure 2: Determinants and consequences of curiosity suggested by the present study. The percentages of 
variation in curiosity explained by each predictor are shown. The model computed marginal R2 values obtained 
from LMMs, controlling for repeated observations at different stations. The effects of the predictor variables 
are not exclusive and may overlap.  
 
  
Figure 3: The relation between the individual’s age at arrival at the station in years (and thus estimated time 
with humans) and the PC 1 ‘curiosity’ for (a) the total sample of nonwild individuals (N=56; the fitted line is 
based on the LMM; see Table 5), and (b) the subsample of 16 individuals certain to have had human contact for 
at least 6 months (the fitted line is based on the LMM; see Supplementary Table S2). 
 
Determinants of cognitive performance  
We next asked to what extent individual characteristics such as age, sex and health, 
background and response-and-exploration style predicted cognitive performance. Table 6 shows 
the results of a binomial GLMM of the overall performance including the five different tasks, 
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predicting the probability of solving the tasks, while controlling for repeated observations in 
each facility and on each individual. Curiosity was the only significant predictor of cognitive 
performance (Table 6). The other response-and-exploration style factors (PC 2 and PC 3) had no 
effect on problem-solving performance. However, the type of task also showed significant effects 
on performance (Table 6), illustrating that some tasks were more difficult to solve than others, 
for example the Tube Task (Fig. 4). The Box Task and the Reversal Learning Task exclusively 
involved natural materials, such as wood, and had a higher probability of being solved when we 
controlled for other factors including curiosity than tasks that contained artificial materials, such 
as transparent plastic and metal. This difference suggests that familiarity with materials and 
their affordances played a role. The Detour Reaching Task, even though including artificial 
material, was significantly easier to solve than all other remaining tasks (Table 6, Fig. 4). Finally, 
inserting the stick in the straight channel of the Honey Tool Task was easier than inserting the 
rope in the curved channel. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of the influence of curiosity on the probability of solving each of the five different tasks 
with six solutions. The rugs along the horizontal axis, below and above, each represents a single data point. 
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The effect of curiosity on the probability of solving a problem varied significantly (Fig. 4). 
However, none of the other potential predictors were significant. Thus, the probability of solving 
the tasks did not depend on a subject’s sex, age at testing or its age at arrival, nor on the 
presence of signs of stereotypies and disabilities or the number of cage partners at the period of 
the study (Table 6). Neither were there independent effects of island of origin (Sumatran versus 
Bornean orang-utans), the rehabilitation stations (despite variation in their procedures) or the 
individuals’ background history (Table 6).  
 
 
 
  
Table 6:  Parameter estimates and associated standard errors from a binomial GLMM, predicting 
the probability of an individual solving the task 
 B SE Lower 
95% CI 
Odds 
ratio 
Upper 
95% CI 
Intercept -0.598 1.04 0.069 0.550 4.521 
Sex (male) -0.037 0.35 0.477 0.964 1.951 
Age -0.015 0.09 0.820 0.985 1.182 
Age on arrival at facility -0.122 0.12 0.687 0.885 1.118 
Health characteristic (Yes) -0.198 0.56 0.252 0.820 2.451 
Current no. of cage partners -0.046 0.20 0.635 0.955 1.440 
Facilities      
     Sumatra vs Borneo -0.045 0.27 0.554 0.956 1.644 
     OCCQ vs NyMen -0.050 0.40 0.419 0.951 2.094 
Background      
     Wild vs Others (Station, Human, Unknown)  0.335 0.35 0.696 1.398 2.833 
     Station/Human vs Unknown  0.055 0.13 0.809 1.056 1.380 
     Station vs Human  0.124 0.28 0.644 1.132 1.990 
Style factor      
      Curiosity  0.850 0.34 1.242 2.339 4.825 
      PC 2 scores -0.200 0.17 0.577 0.819 1.166 
      PC 3 scores  0.169 0.19 0.809 1.184 1.745 
Task      
     Wood vs artificial material  0.606 0.13 1.448 1.834 2.411 
     Detour vs other tasks  0.430 0.07 1.344 1.537 1.789 
     Box vs Reversal Learning -0.283 0.21 0.499 0.753 1.125 
     Tube vs Honey Tool (IL) -0.481 0.26 0.329 0.618 0.973 
     Honey Tool I vs Honey Tool L  0.755 0.31 1.213 2.128 4.144 
The model controls for repeated observations at each rehabilitation station and for each individual (nested 
random effect). The performance in each task was measured in binary fashion, including five tasks with six 
solutions: Box Task, Detour Reaching, Honey Tool Task stick in the straight channel (I), Honey Tool Task rope 
in the L-shaped channel (L), Reversal Learning and Tube Trap Task. N subjects = 61, N observations = 358, χ
2
= 78.09, 
P< 0.001. CI: confidence interval. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to disentangle the determinants of variation in cognitive 
performance in orang-utans from rehabilitation stations with widely varying backgrounds, so as 
to identify the experiences that shape the developmental construction of an individual’s 
problem-solving ability. We found that (1) variation in response-and-exploration styles largely 
reflected the subjects’ curiosity, (2) individuals that had experienced long-term social contact 
with humans (and social housing conditions) were more curious, and (3) more curious 
individuals were far better at solving novel problems aimed at assessing physical cognition.  
 
What is curiosity? 
We assessed the response-and-exploration style through various independent 
behavioural assays, which revealed that orientation towards humans, a positive response to 
novelty and a high exploration tendency all share the same underlying latent variable, which we 
called ‘curiosity’. Curiosity explained about a third of the variation observed in the various 
response and exploration tests. Because two tasks, the HOI and the response to novel food, 
loaded highly on PC1, they can serve as a quick and reliable estimate of general curiosity in 
orang-utans. The other PCs did not have any significant effect on problem-solving ability and 
therefore will not be discussed further. 
Our results suggest that curiosity mainly consists of two components: a positive 
response to novelty and a high exploration tendency. More curious individuals quickly engaged 
with the novel object/food and showed positive reactions towards a novel human (response 
style), but they also extensively explored the novel object, doing so gently and with a great 
variety of actions (exploration style). Therefore, in line with previous definitions in human 
studies, curiosity reflects the combination of an intrinsic motivation for novelty seeking and a 
motivation to engage in a diverse array of exploratory behaviours.  
 
What leads to high levels of curiosity? 
Humans are likely to exhibit curiosity in an environment with enough resources and free 
time (Gruber & Davis, 1988; Shalley & Gilson, 2004), leading to the question whether the same 
circumstances are important for an orang-utan to become curious. Our results (Table 4) 
confirmed an earlier finding that individuals that had contact with humans early in life showed 
significantly stronger curiosity than individuals that spent this period in the wild (Forss et al., 
2015). Owing to high risks of interacting with unknown environments/objects, wild orang-utans 
are highly neophobic, but are nevertheless highly motivated to explore once they have overcome 
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their neophobia, primarily through social information (Schuppli et al., 2016). This reflects the 
fact that the proximate mechanisms regulating neophobia and exploration are distinct 
(reviewed in Mettke-Hofmann, 2014), even though in captive animals they end up being highly 
correlated and thus seemingly part of the same motivational system. Hence, it is not surprising 
that increased curiosity, so conspicuously lacking in wild orang-utans (Forss et al. 2015, van 
Schaik et al. 2016), is found among their captive counterparts. As a result numerous innovations 
can arise in the safe and stable environment of zoos and rehabilitation stations (Lehner, Burkart, 
& van Schaik, 2010).  
The results also suggest that it is not the intensity and nature of human contact per se 
that is the key factor, but rather the length of stay with humans and especially the age at which 
this contact occurred, as well as the number of conspecifics the tested individuals were currently 
housed with (Table 5, Fig. 3). We now examine these effects in turn.  
First, the age-on-arrival effect suggests the presence of a sensitive period for the 
influence of friendly contact with humans on curiosity. Among the ‘nonwild’ individuals that had 
contact with humans in the stations or lived with humans before, those that were older when 
they arrived at the stations were more curious than individuals arriving at a younger age, 
independent of their age at testing. Because hunters deliberately target young orang-utans 
because they are more easily handled and more attractive as pets, virtually all individuals 
confiscated at an older age had had longer exposure to human social-cultural influences. 
Additionally, none of the individuals arriving at the station were reported as being fearful or 
aggressive when handled, and therefore had experienced positive contact with humans. Findings 
on the wild individuals, brought into the stations as adolescents or adults directly after being 
captured in the wild, support this conclusion of a sensitive period (see also Damerius et al. 
2017). They never became curious, even after more time in captivity than the immatures that 
did become curious. The risk-free environment during a sensitive period in ontogeny and the 
daily observation of a very broad range of sociocultural interactions with humans and with the 
artefacts in captivity therefore shaped an individual’s response-and-exploration style. Since 
humans can serve as role models to captive orang-utans this contact might induce loss of both 
neophobia and the triggering of exploration by social stimuli only.  
Second, social learning and social facilitation from conspecifics might have positive 
effects on curiosity-induced experience. An immediate neophobia-reducing effect of social 
facilitation is frequently reported among other primate species (Addessi, Galloway, Visalberghi, 
& Birch, 2005; Forss, Koski, & Van Schaik, 2017; Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000). However, because 
we tested the subjects individually without conspecifics present, no direct social facilitation was 
possible during the test. Still, the more conspecifics an individual currently shared its enclosure 
with the more curious it was. Thus, social contacts during a sensitive period in development can 
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positively affect the individual’s subsequent curiosity, which is then also applied in nonsocial 
contexts. In chimpanzees, individuals that have spent more time with conspecifics during 
infancy were more extraverted than individuals that had spent less time with conspecifics 
(Freeman, Weiss, & Ross, 2016). Recent results from wild orang-utans also suggest that 
opportunities for social contact during infancy increase subsequent exploration rates (Schuppli 
et al. 2016). 
These findings also help to explain the captivity effect. The safe and protected 
environment in captivity is likely to quickly erode the strong neophobia found in wild orang-
utans. It may also strengthen exploration tendencies, because exploration of novel items usually 
leads to some reward. Indeed, Damerius et al. (2017) also found that individuals living in zoos 
and rehabilitation stations were more curious than ‘wild’ orang-utans, assessed via the HOI, 
which can serve as a quick measure of curiosity.  
We conclude from the comparison between wild and zoo orang-utans that curiosity is 
elicited by captivity and thus is a major underlying cause of the captivity effect. Similar effects of 
captivity have also been recognized in other species that can develop curiosity (Benson-Amram 
et al., 2013; Kronenberger & Medioni, 1985; Tanaś & Pisula, 2011). 
 
Consequences of curiosity 
The effects of social interactions, environmental stimulation and experiences during 
ontogeny on problem-solving success were all indirect: they affected the individual’s curiosity, 
which in turn affects an individual’s problem-solving ability. Numerous studies have 
documented the influences of rearing history and other aspects of biography on social 
competence and cognition (reviewed in Bjorklund, 2006; Call & Tomasello, 1996; Freeman & 
Ross, 2014; Freeman et al., 2016; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003; Tomasello & Call, 2004), but 
the present results suggest that these cognitive effects may have been largely mediated through 
a change in curiosity. 
Across all tasks, the probability of solving a task increased with higher levels of curiosity, 
but the effect of curiosity depended on the type of task. Curiosity was especially effective when 
solving problems for which trial and error can lead to a solution (e.g. detour reaching). However, 
highly curious and motivated individuals were not much better than average at solving 
cognitively demanding problems, which can only be solved after individuals understand the 
causal structure (such as the tube trap task). Nevertheless, curious individuals may generally be 
more likely to hit upon the insight needed to solve such problems because they engage more 
with the problem. In the long run, therefore, the two may interact: although the current level of 
curiosity and learning ability or insight are independent variables, the accumulated experience 
due to a long history of curiosity can improve learning ability. 
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Figure 2 summarizes this idea, by suggesting the following causal links as revealed by 
the present study. Individuals that are more curious and more open to social interactions with 
humans and conspecifics garner more opportunities for social learning. First, by seeing human 
caretakers as trusted role models, immature orang-utans broaden the range of explorable items 
and contexts. Initially, they probably need direct exposure to human actions, comparable to the 
triggering of exploration by observing conspecific experts in the wild (Schuppli et al., 2016; van 
Schaik et al., 2016). Over time, with the lack of negative consequences of being curious, the 
individuals may come to assume that the mere presence of novel items implies the social 
approval of the human role model and they might simply respond to all items and contexts they 
associate with humans. Second, direct social facilitation can also stimulate exploration (Caldwell 
& Whiten, 2004; Huber, Rechberger, & Taborsky, 2001). Third, individuals are able to gather 
experience with objects and materials, which is a cumulative process, leading to greater 
knowledge of affordances and a gradual increase in causal understanding (Byrne, 2016; 
Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001). This latent learning process may further shape the 
individual’s learning ability and curiosity, and the accumulating knowledge can contribute to the 
acquisition of larger skill repertoires and improved problem-solving ability (van Schaik & 
Burkart, 2011) and large innovation repertoires, far exceeding those found in the wild (Lehner 
et al., 2010; van Schaik et al., 2016). 
Enculturated apes reflect the maximum extent of these consequences: they were raised 
in human households with human artefacts and show unusually high social and cognitive skills 
(Call & Tomasello, 1996). The underlying process may again be their enhanced curiosity. A safe 
and stable environment when being raised by humans allows them to become highly 
explorative. 
 
Curiosity and Human Evolution 
These results have implications for our understanding of the evolution of intelligence. 
Humans and orang-utans share the same fundamental phenomena as both are characterized by 
a slow life history and the presence of tolerant role models during development, which allows 
for maintaining high neophobia. The unleashing of latent cognitive potential in species that are 
highly conservative in the wild shows that we should take seriously the possibility that the 
origin of curiosity may have served as an important contributor to the elaboration of intelligence 
and culture in modern humans (van Schaik, Forss, & Damerius, 2017). Whereas classic 
approaches have stressed the importance of brain size and thus individual cognitive capacity, 
recent approaches have emphasized the role of demographic factors (Henrich et al., 2016) or of 
improved effectiveness of social transmission (e.g. Pradhan, Tennie, & van Schaik, 2012). The 
results of this study, however, suggest that curiosity is an additional, potentially important, 
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nondemographic factor favouring creative innovations and the invasion of novel habitats. Thus, 
it is possible that a steep rise in innovations had to wait until our ancestors underwent the 
equivalent of the captivity effect and could afford to become curious explorers in safe conditions 
and enhanced by social facilitation.  
In sum, the results of this study show curiosity to be an important contributor to 
problem-solving abilities in orang-utans and suggest that curiosity may be an underestimated 
factor for creative innovations in humans. We should therefore look for indicators of such 
conditions during hominin evolution. Further work is needed to develop these indicators.  
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For over a century, theories of human intelligence have concentrated on a single general factor, the 
psychometric g, which is used to estimate reasoning ability and cognitive flexibility, i.e. general 
intelligence. To better understand the mechanisms that favor the evolution of general intelligence, it is 
important to identify the presence of a psychometric g in nonhuman animals, especially in primates, 
and to further disentangle the influences affecting its development. We therefore investigated the 
cognitive abilities of 53 Bornean and Sumatran orangutans living in rehabilitation stations, to assess 
the presence of a psychometric g in orangutans, and to explore possible influences on its expression. 
We did so using a set of carefully selected physical cognition tasks addressing abilities of inhibitory 
control, behavioral flexibility, causal reasoning, tool use, and associative- and reversal learning in the 
absence of human experimenters. A principal component analysis of the individuals’ performances 
revealed a first component that accounted for 31% of the individual variation in task performance. 
Next, we could rule out that this result was an artifact of non-cognitive factors such as health status, 
island of origin, or rearing background. Finally, we showed that an individual’s curiosity positively 
influenced its g score, consistent with the notion that accumulating experience affects the 
developmental construction of g. We conclude that there is evidence for general intelligence in 
orangutans comparable to humans, and thus suggest evolutionary continuity in this trait. 
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Introduction  
General intelligence in humans can be broadly defined as the ability to show behavioral 
flexibility, to think abstractly, and comprehend complex ideas; it is thought to be based on reasoning, 
problem-solving, planning, and learning from experience (Gottfredson 1997). For over a century, 
theories of general intelligence concentrated on the role of the single general factor, the psychometric 
g, that emerges from factor analysis of the performances across different tasks and domains 
(Spearman 1904, 1927, Carroll 1993, Jensen and Weng 1994, Jensen 1998).  
Although the existence of g as a measurable phenomenon of across-domain correlations 
between diverse mental tests is widely accepted, there is still active debate about what exactly it 
represents, e.g. whether it is representing a latent variable or rather some emerging property (cf. 
Burkart et al. 2017), and how g is related and contributing to cognitive processes (Conway and Kovacs 
2015). Carroll (2003), Geary (2005), Horn and McArdle (2007) argue in favor of either some domain-
general ability or a bundle of interacting abilities, which must be highly functionally integrated to be 
effective (Deary et al. 2016, Burkart et al. 2017). The latter position is consistent with effects of 
inbreeding or health (Penke et al. 2007, Hagenaars et al. 2016). Regardless of the outcome of these 
debates, the predictable presence of g in broad psychometric studies suggests some system-level 
property affecting overall cognitive performance across a broad array of tasks.  
Some other issues also remain debated. First, there is still some debate about the extent to 
which socio-cognitive abilities are also correlated with psychometric intelligence; some studies 
suggest a positive correlation between the two (Baker et al. 2014), whereas others even see socio-
cognitive abilities as foundational for intelligence (Estes and Bartsch in press). Second, executive 
functions, such as inhibitory control, working memory and selective attention, exert top-down control 
of human adaptive behavior (review: Jurado and Rosselli 2007). There is debate about whether 
executive functions merely strongly contribute to the shaping of higher cognitive abilities, such as 
reasoning, problem solving, and planning (Collins and Koechlin 2012, Lunt et al. 2012, reviewed in 
Diamond 2013), actually coincide with general intelligence (Barbey et al. 2012) or rather be 
indistinguishable (Royall and Palmer 2014).  
Because cognitive abilities are developmentally constructed (Vygotsky 1978), it is often argued 
that intelligence reflects socio-cultural influences (Neisser et al. 1996, Nisbett 2009, Nisbett et al. 
2012, Flynn 2016) and that specific experiences during development may bias the outcome of 
performance (Reyes-García et al. 2016). These experience effects could also explain the positive 
relation between motivation, including curiosity and persistence, and general cognitive performance 
suggested by Gottfried (1990). Depending on how an individual approaches its surroundings, e.g. with 
high curiosity or great social interest, different learning opportunities unfold. The accumulation of 
these gained experiences can influence an individual’s knowledge and was suggested for the effect of 
88  PhD Dissertation, Laura A. Damerius, 2017  
 
early novelty seeking in human infants on subsequent IQ (Bornstein and Sigman 1986, Vietze and 
Coates 1986). 
It has traditionally been assumed, mostly implicitly, that general intelligence is unique to 
humans. However, there is a rapidly expanding literature investigating domain-general abilities in 
nonhuman animals (reviewed in Burkart et al. 2017). In nonhuman animals intelligence can be defined 
as the ability to acquire and utilize knowledge to organize effective behavior in both familiar and novel 
contexts, and thus to behave flexibly (Byrne 1994, Yoerg 2001, Rumbaugh and Washburn 2003). 
One major source of evidence in favor of domain-general abilities in nonhuman animals is 
provided by interspecific patterns, where species differences in cognitive performance on a wide 
variety of tests are captured by a single variable (Deaner et al. 2006, Reader et al. 2011), to which we 
refer here as G to distinguish it from the intraspecific g. Additionally, an increasing number of studies 
addresses the existence of a psychometric g in a variety of different taxa (reviews: Chabris 2007, 
Matzel et al. 2011, Burkart et al. 2017), including dogs (Arden and Adams 2016), mice (favorite mouse 
psychometric test Galsworthy et al. 2002, Locurto et al. 2003, Matzel et al. 2003, Matzel et al. 2011, 
Wass et al. 2012, Matzel et al. 2017) , rats (Anderson 1993), bowerbirds (Keagy et al. 2011), New 
Zealand Robins (Shaw et al. 2015), cotton-top tamarins (Banerjee et al. 2009), rhesus macaques 
(Herndon et al. 1997), and chimpanzees (Herrmann et al. 2010b, Hopkins et al. 2014, Woodley of 
Menie et al. 2015).  
Despite the abundance of psychometric studies in nonhuman animals, most have 
methodological limitations that need to be dealt with before concluding that there is evidence of g. 
There is a serious risk of a false positive result, e.g. because a test-battery is applied where multiple 
tests all measure similar problem-solving abilities, or because studies do not control for health, 
motivation and habituation of the individuals (Burkart et al. 2017). Alternatively, the existence of g 
can be masked, e.g. through small sample sizes, or if many tasks are included that are automatized 
during ontogeny (experience-dependent), and thus form so-called secondary modules (Burkart et al. 
2017). Furthermore, as in human studies, we expect the correlations among the performance scores 
on various tests to be modest, meaning that all animal studies are underpowered (it took massive 
meta-analyses to convince critics of human intelligence studies: Carroll 1993). Psychometrically 
identifying g in an animal test battery does therefore not per se guarantee that this g corresponds to 
general intelligence. Rather, additional validation tests are necessary of the various other correlates of 
g, as done for humans, and to some extent mice (e.g. Matzel et al. 2006, Matzel et al. 2011). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the presence of domain-general cognitive abilities in 
orangutans and to link it to biological, social and developmental features. Orangutans are good 
candidates for such a study. They are Asian great apes known for advanced cognitive abilities, such as 
flexible tool use (van Schaik 2004), planning (van Schaik et al. 2013) and large innovation repertoires 
in the wild (van Schaik et al. 2006), as well as problem-solving abilities in zoological gardens 
(Lethmate 1977, Lehner et al. 2011). Orangutans also show extended development and a long phase of 
socially mediated learning (Schuppli et al. 2016a) to acquire their geographically variable skill 
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repertoires (van Schaik et al. 1996, van Schaik et al. 2003, Jaeggi et al. 2010, Schuppli et al. 2016b), 
consistent with the possibility that intelligence is developmentally constructed under the influence of 
a variety of inputs and experiences.  
The first aim of this study was to explore the possible presence of a psychometric g in a large 
sample of orangutans, by investigating a broad array of problem solving-abilities from a test battery of 
five different physical cognition tasks. It is important assess this in orangutans, because results are 
mixed for the only other great ape species for which psychometric g studies have been conducted, the 
chimpanzees. Hermann et al. (2010) did not find a g in chimpanzees within a sample of 106 
individuals over multiple social and non-social tasks. Their factor model described two distinct areas: 
the spatial and the physical-social area. Hopkins et al. (2014), in contrast, derived a factor 
representing g using a broad intelligence battery based on similar methods (Herrmann et al. 2007) 
with 99 individuals. Woodly of Menie et al. (2015) reanalyzed the same dataset and confirmed the 
presence of g in chimpanzees. Given the fact that chimpanzees are our closest living relatives, these 
mixed results call the presence of g in great apes into question, and studies investigating g in another 
great ape species, such as the orangutans, are crucial.  
The tasks in this study were very carefully selected to minimize overlap in their domains, to 
exclude confounding motivational influences, and to represent abilities that are similar in humans. 
These tasks also included tests of inhibitory control to assess the correlation between domain-general 
cognitive abilities and executive functions found in humans. Importantly, to prevent any bias in favor 
of individuals familiar with humans (see also Schubiger et al. 2015), unlike in previous studies with 
primates, no experimenter was present during testing. 
Because of the risk of false positive, finding a structure indicating a single component with 
significantly shared variance across the tasks is necessary for showing the presence of general 
intelligence, but not sufficient. We therefore conducted a series of additional validation tests to 
evaluate this preliminary conclusion. First, we asked whether the potential orangutan g could be an 
artifact of alternative non-cognitive factors possibly generating false positive results, such as health, 
sex, rearing background, and island of origin of the individuals. Second, because general intelligence is 
highly responsive to early conditions, we looked for effects of experience, assessed through an 
individual’s curiosity and social interest. If a curious problem-solving approach and high social 
interest lead to greater knowledge and experience when sustained throughout life, we expect curiosity 
and social interest to be positively linked to a possible g. A positive relation between individuals’ 
curiosity and their physical problem-solving abilities was recently shown in orangutans (Damerius et 
al. in review), suggesting that curiosity might indeed channel the prospecting of novel social and 
physical challenges that can lead to quantitatively and qualitatively different learning opportunities 
over lifetime (Byrne 2016, Damerius et al. in review). Finally, we asked whether social interest 
predicted performance on the test battery. 
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Methods 
Study Subjects and Species 
The study included 40 Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii) and 13 Sumatran (Pongo abelii) 
orangutans housed at rehabilitation stations in Indonesia, of which 23 were females and 30 males (see 
Supplementary Table S1, category Data Set: conservative). In order to be able to disentangle the actual 
cognitive abilities from motivationally driven performance, we only included subjects who passed the 
criterion of having touched all tasks at least once. This resulted in a conservative sample size of 53 
individuals with no missing data point over all five tasks. (In the Supplementary Material we present 
an analysis of the extended data set of 57 individuals, which also includes the four individuals that 
participated in only four out of the five tasks [Table S1, category Data Set: extended], and show that 
the results are very similar). 
The individuals varied in background, although all were wild-born (see Supplementary Table 
S1). We distinguished four categories of individuals. The first category (‘human’) included individuals, 
who had stayed with humans for at least six month and were subsequently brought to the 
rehabilitation station. The second category (‘station’) included those who had arrived at very young 
ages (<1.5 years old) and essentially grew up in the rehabilitation station. The third category (‘wild’) 
where those who were rescued when their habitat was lost to conversion and brought directly to the 
station; these individuals were already older at arrival. Finally, we also had individuals whose the 
background was unknown (‘unknown’). Further information on the classification can be found in 
Damerius et al. (in review). This heterogeneity of background experiences of the individuals allows us 
to examine experiential influences on g.  
The subjects’ ages at testing ranged from 3.5-17 years (Supplementary Table S1). Their ages 
had been estimated upon arrival by the staff of each facility based on dental eruption patterns. 
 
Study Facilities and Housing 
LD, a colleague (Zaida Kosonen), and a trained assistant (Andreas Wendl) collected the 
data between June 2012 and June 2014 in four facilities of three organizations across Sumatra 
and Central Kalimantan, Borneo. We used the same experimental tasks and procedures in 
every facility with minor modifications of the presentation table that had to be adjusted to fit 
the conditions of each facility. 
Sumatran Orangutans (Pongo abelii) 1. Quarantine station in Batu M'Belin (QBM), Medan, 
North-Sumatra of the Sumatran Orangutan Conservation Program (SOCP): 8 subjects were 
part of our study (2 females, 6 males). Their ages ranged from 5 to 10 years and we tested 
them in their home enclosures, as they were housed alone. 2. Release Site Danau Alo, Bukit 
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Tigapuluh, Jambi, Sumatra. The release site belongs to SOCP. Five solitarily and social housed 
subjects (4 females, 1 male) with ages between 3 – 6 years were part of our study. 
Bornean Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) 3. Orangutan Care Center and Quarantine (OCCQ) in Pasir 
Panjang, Central Kalimantan: This facility is managed by the Orangutan Foundation International 
(OFI). The 26 subjects' ages ranged from 8 to 14.5 years, with 10 females and 16 males. Testing 
occurred in external test cages, since all individuals were socially housed in peer-groups of equal sex 
ranging from 2-6 individuals. 4. Nyaru Menteng Rescue Center, Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan: 
This rehabilitation station is managed by the Borneo Orangutan Foundation International (BOSF). We 
tested 14 subjects (7 female, 7 males) in their home enclosure with an equal number of both sexes and 
between the ages of 6 to 17 years. 
In order to prepare the orangutans for release, the stations limit contact with humans apart 
from routine check-ups by veterinarians and cage cleaning and feeding by caretakers several times a 
day. In the Bornean facilities, individuals that arrived as very young dependent immatures were 
placed in the station’s nursery, where human caretakers served as replacement mothers. The infants 
received close physical care and supervision together with other infants of their age. In Sumatra, 
arriving dependent infants are introduced to peer groups after quarantine. All individuals on both 
islands had simple enrichment devices installed in their enclosures, such as tires, ropes and platforms. 
All stations offered food-related enrichment several times a week and depending on the age and stage 
of rehabilitation most individuals received regular forest walks. 
 
Physical cognitive test battery and procedure 
A test battery of five different physical cognition tasks was developed for measuring problem-
solving abilities: the Box Task, Detour Reaching, Tube Trap Task, Honey Tool Task and Reversal 
Learning. These five tasks were meant to cover distinct cognitive abilities, namely flexibility response, 
inhibition, causal reasoning, tool use, and reversal learning, including associative learning and 
memory. We focused on performance measures that best reflected possible components of domain-
general cognitive processes, and thus avoided measures that might reflect success based on trial-and-
error exploration. We aimed at applying various tasks of different cognitive domains, to minimize the 
risk of re-sampling the same cognitive domain repeatedly, which would result in a first PC that 
represents this specific domain, instead of being consistent with domain-general abilities. 
The experiments required no pre-training and, with the exception of the Tube Trap Task and 
Reversal Learning requiring multiple sessions, were presented only once, in a random order, on 
consecutive days and on a specially designed presentation table (Supplementary Fig. S1). The 
individuals were able to interact on a voluntarily basis with the apparatus since it was presented from 
the outside of the enclosure. This way, the individuals were able to reach through the mesh or bars to 
freely explore the apparatus. To prevent a bias in favor of orangutans familiar with humans, no human 
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was present during testing. Whenever possible, a familiar caretaker helped to prepare the set-up of 
the apparatuses outside the view of the enclosures. The caretaker and the experimenter left the testing 
area once the apparatus, the presentation table and the cameras had been prepared.  
The following experiments were part of the cognitive test battery:  
1) Box Task: Flexibility  
The experiment allowed us to assess the cognitive skills of associative learning and flexibility. 
The task consisted of two consecutive presentations of ﬁve identical wooden boxes, each with 
a lid and a sliding door (Supplementary Fig. S2). Learning phase (4min): During the ﬁrst 
presentation the lid of all five boxes could only be opened by ﬂipping. Individuals learned that 
they could flip open the box in order to receive the bait, a peanut. When four out of five boxes 
were flipped open the criterion for learning had been fulfilled and the second condition of the 
task was presented. All individuals included in this sample passed the Learning phase. 
Flexibility phase during second presentation (7min): Immediately after passing the Learning 
phase, the lids were locked, the sliding doors were unlocked and the boxes baited again out of 
view of the subject. The previously learned solution had thus become non-functional and the 
subjects needed to explore to find the exclusive solution of opening the sliding door to gain 
access to the peanuts in the boxes. The performance measure was the number of opened boxes 
in the flexibility phase.  
 
2) Detour Reaching: Inhibitory control 
The Detour Reaching experiment is a classical inhibitory control task and serves as a key 
predictive measure of problem-solving skills in human and nonhuman animals (Carlson and 
Moses 2001, Vlamings et al. 2010, Amici et al. 2012). A transparent Makrolon box that had two 
openings at the front, a small one on the right-hand side and a large one on the left-hand side, 
was presented to the individuals for five minutes (Supplementary Fig. S3). A preferred 
fruit/enrichment object that was too big to fit through the small opening was placed in the box 
directly behind the small opening. The subject could not reach for the object directly through 
the small opening, but could reach for it through the large opening. Therefore, the individual 
had to inhibit grasping for the putative direct solution and reach around (making the detour) 
to retrieve the reward. The performance measure was the latency from first touching the 
apparatus (the moment the individual began to engage with the test) until exploring the box 
side of the large hole for the first time.  
 
3) Tube Trap Task: Causal reasoning and Learning 
Causal reasoning and learning ability were needed to successfully solve the Tube Trap Task, 
which was inspired by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994). It consisted of six horizontally 
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placed tubes with open tube ends but an opaque trap situated either left or right from the 
center. The tubes were mounted on a vertical board (Supplementary Fig. S4). The front of the 
tubes was transparent and contained a slit wide enough for an orangutan ﬁnger to slide food 
inside the tube. This slit extended along the entire length of the tube so that the subjects could 
slide the food reward to the left or right tube opening. However, if the food was moved in the 
direction of the trap, the food fell through a hole into the opaque trap, and could no longer be 
retrieved (Supplementary Fig. S4,a). The task for the subjects was to learn this causal relation 
and to slide the food in the correct direction (Supplementary Fig. S4,b). The board with the 
tubes was presented to the subjects three consecutive times for 4 min each. The subjects were 
given the possibility to explore a total of 18 randomly distributed tubes to learn to avoid the 
trap. The performance measure was the number of rewards retrieved over all three trials. 
 
4) Honey Tool Task: Goal directed tool use 
This task assessed physical cognition and the ability to use tools, as well as the ability of causal 
reasoning to select the correct tool. The subject was presented with the opportunity to ﬁsh for 
honey out of two channels; therefore the task had two possible solutions. The apparatus 
consisted of a wooden box with two embedded transparent Makrolon tubes: a straight channel 
and a curved L-shaped channel. The front was covered with a Makrolon plate to ensure 
stability and a good visibility into the tubes that were baited with honey (Supplementary Fig. 
S5). The subject was offered two different types of tools to use for honey fishing: three long 
sticks (40 cm), one of which was already inserted in the straight channel, and three ropes (20 
cm). With the help of the sticks, honey could be reached in the straight channel, but the stick 
could not be bent in the curved channel. Whereas the rope was too short for the straight 
channel, it flexibly fitted into the curved L-shaped channel. Both channels were too long for an 
orangutan’s ﬁnger to reach the honey.  
We could use an ordinal scale to measure performance, because the data fitted a Guttman 
scale, which showed a reproducibility coefficient close to one (0.92), with 71% individuals 
completely fitting the applied Guttman scale (listed from simplest to most complex). The 
following scores were used: 1) inserting finger in either of the channel, 2) tracing the honey in 
channel from outside (revealing their understanding that there is honey insight), 3) inserting 
tools in either of the channels, 4) goal-directed tool use outside (directly aiming for the honey 
with the correct tool), 5) successfully dipping and feeding on honey with stick in straight 
channel, and 6) successfully dipping and feeding on honey with rope in curved channel.  
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5) Reversal Learning: Associative and reversal learning  
Reversal learning is a widely used paradigm for determining cognitive flexibility (reviewed in 
Izquierdo et al. 2016). It assesses associative learning and reversal learning abilities. At ﬁrst 
the subjects learn that one possible combination of two stimuli (location, color) is linked to a 
reward whereas the second one is not. Once the individual has associated the first stimulus 
with the reward the contingency is reversed and the first stimulus no longer indicates the 
reward, but now the second one does. In the current study the subjects were presented a 
board with square black and round white doors on either side of the presentation board 
(Supplementary Fig. S6). The doors could be swung open by turning them to the right or to the 
left and gave way to a hollow space. A randomly determined side was baited behind each door 
in the depository space with a preferred food item, e.g. a peanut. Therefore, when the subject 
opened a baited door, it was rewarded. The task for the subject was to learn the association 
between food and location, which was enhanced by the different colors and shapes of the 
doors. If the subject opened at least five out of the first six doors at the correct location on two 
consecutive trials, it had fulfilled the criteria for learning. After the location of food was 
accurately associated, we tested the stability of the result by applying a reminder test the next 
day. Subsequently, the location of the reward was switched to the other location in order to 
test for reversed learning, where the same criterion of at least 5 out of 6 correct choices was 
used. The board was presented for 4 min per trial, with three to four consecutive trials per day 
(in total up to 16 min/day). The Reversal Learning board was presented to the individual for a 
maximum of 4 days.  
We constructed an ordinal scale to measure performance on the three consecutive 
components: learning, memory and reversal learning. Individuals that did not achieve learning 
received a performance score of 0, individuals that were able to learn but failed subsequent 
tests a 1, individuals that were able to learn and remember a 2, and individuals that were able 
to learn, remember and learn the reversal a 3. 
 
Measurements of experiential effects 
 In addition to the cognitive tasks, we carried out independent tests to assess individual 
variation in experience, such as curiosity and social interest. Each individual’s level of curiosity was 
assessed through five different tasks, including a novel object test, human orientation tasks, reactions 
toward a snake predator model and reactions to both familiar and novel food. Each task lasted two 
minutes and was presented separately from the outside of the enclosure without any experimenter 
present. A principal component analysis of these measures yielded an individual’s curiosity score. 
Damerius et al. (in review) provide a detailed description of the tasks to estimate curiosity and the 
PCA analysis. 
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One station had the logistics for testing the subjects’ social orientation toward conspecifics (n= 
26 subjects) in external testing cages. The social orientation task lasted for 15 min. When an individual 
arrived in the test cage, it could choose between two compartments: a social one, with visual access to 
a neighboring compartment with familiar same-sex conspecifics, and an asocial compartment. We 
measured the proportion of time individuals spent in the compartment with visual social access, as a 
measure of the individual’s social interest. 
 
Data extraction and statistical analyses 
All experiments were videotaped with two Sony camcorders (HDR-CX200 high definition 
handycam 5.3 MP). The video footage was imported into the program Interact, version 9.7.5.0 (© 
Mangold International GmbH) for transformation and coding of the cognitive performance by LD. Data 
on exploration and novelty responses were also coded by LD, apart from social interest and some 
tasks used to generate the curiosity score, which were coded by a trained assistant (Anna Schöpfer). 
LD and the assistant independently coded 21% of the videos and came to a good inter-rater agreement 
(Cohen’s Kappa: 0.701; N responses= 185, P <0.001). 
First, we used descriptive statistics (means with standard deviation or medians with minimum 
and maximum values) on the five task-specific cognitive performance scores to explore the 
distribution of the variance in performance (Table 1). The signs of latencies of the Detour Reaching 
Task were reversed for the model to represent the ability of inhibitory control. 
Second, we calculated Spearman-Rho correlations to estimate the relationships between the 
different five measures of cognitive performance from the five different tasks. We applied Bonferroni 
corrections on the level of 0.01 (α/N=.05/5).  
Third, in order to investigate the psychometric structure we applied an unrotated principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the five performance measures (Table 1), for both, the conservative and 
extended data set (see Supplementary Table S1). The PCAs were conducted in IBM SPSS Statistics, 
version 22.0.0.0 (© IBM Cooperation and other(s), 1989, 2013). This PCA method was chosen to 
answer the primary question, i.e. whether there are across-domain correlations, shared variance, 
between the diverse performance measures and to how many components the cognitive domains can 
be reduced.  
Additionally, to assess whether the performance variable’s distribution affected the outcome of 
a psychometric structure of g, we ranked each subject’s performance within any given task and 
performed an additional PCA (presented in the Supplementary Material). Subjects with the best 
performance received the value ‘1’ whereas subjects with the lowest performance the rank of ‘53’. 
Tied performances were given equal scores, such that the median value was returned (overview of 
measurements see Supplementary Table S2). For additional investigations if the factorial method used 
showed an effect, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in JMP, version 12.1.0 (© 2015 
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SAS Institute Inc.) using maximum likelihood estimation (ML) on the five performance measures 
(Table 1).  
The following statistical analyses were performed in R version 2.1 (R Core Team 2016) using 
the ‘lme4’(Bates et al. 2014) and ‘multcomp’ packages (Hothorn et al. 2016). 
Fourth, we used Linear Models (LM) to investigate whether variation in the first principal 
component (PC1), can be explained by non-cognitive factors such as health characteristics, species 
(island of origin), background, sex or age. The contrasts for the categorical predictor variables 
Background was specified a priori to explicitly compare wild individuals toward all others, individuals 
with ‘unknown’ background toward the ‘station’ and ‘human’ backgrounds, and the direct comparison 
between ‘Station’ and ‘Human’ backgrounds. Further possible experiential effects, such as an 
individual’s social-interest were investigated with a LM in a subsample of 26 individuals. 
Finally, to assess additional experiential influences on the PC1, we used univariate Linear 
Mixed-Effects Models (LMM) with age and curiosity as fixed effects, the different rehabilitation 
stations and backgrounds as random effects, and the first principal component as a response. The 
LMMs were first performed on the complete data set (N=52) and secondly on a reduced data set of 
only non-wild individuals N=50. 
 
Ethical note 
The experimental protocols were in full compliance with the Swiss Animal Welfare legislation 
and were approved by the Indonesian ministry of research and technology, RISTEK. They also fully 
complied with ethical guidelines of each facility and followed the International Primatological Society’s 
Ethical Standards for Research on Nonhuman Primates.   
 
Results 
Variation in cognitive performance 
Table 1 shows the overall level of task performance in the five tasks of the test battery. There 
was high variance within all of the task performances and importantly neither floor nor ceiling effects 
were present.  
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Table 1: Description of tasks and measurements 
Cognitive ability 
tested 
Task 
administered 
Performance 
measurement 
Measurement 
description 
Mean (SD) or 
Median (min/max) N 
Flexibility Box Task Quantity  
Number of boxes opened 
(max: 5) 
3.02 (1.67) 53 
Inhibitory 
Control 
Detour 
Reaching 
Latency Latency to exploration of 
the non-food side (max: 
300 sec.); since short 
latencies represent 
better task performance, 
latencies were reversed 
for the model to 
represent the ability of 
inhibitory control 
70.86 (91.95) 53 
Tool use Honey Tool 
Trap 
Levels of solving Guttman scale of goal 
directed tool use (max: 6) 
3 (0/5) 53 
Learning 
Remembering 
Reversal 
Learning 
Reversal  
Learning 
Levels of  
solving 
Level of achievement on   
learning, remembering, 
and reversal learning 
tasks (max: 3) 
2 (0/3) 53 
Causal Reasoning Tube Trap Task Quantity Number of rewards 
retrieved in all three 
trials (max: 18) 
6.698 (3.30) 53 
 
Relationships between the different tasks  
Consistent with findings of previous human studies (Carroll 1993), the majority of individual 
task performances were positively correlated in a pairwise comparison over all tasks (Supplementary 
Table S3). The ability of Learning, Remembering, Reversal Learning was weakly correlated with the 
ability of Causal Reasoning (Spearman-Rho, r= .333, P=.015, N=53) and Flexibility (Spearman-Rho, r= 
.247, P<.074, N=53). After Bonferroni correction (at a significance level of p< .01 [α/N=.05/5]), none of 
the correlations remained significant. There was one, very weak, negative correlation between Tool 
Use and Learning/Remembering/Reversal Learning (Spearman-Rho, r= -.028, P=.932, N=53), 
indicating little cognitive overlap between these abilities. 
 
Principal Component Analysis 
Across the five different cognitive tasks, the potential overlap of the cognitive performances 
was assessed using an unrotated Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We found that 52.35% of the 
variation in orangutan performance is regulated by two components that were extracted with 
significant eigenvalues greater than 1 (Table 2). Item loadings greater .50 were considered salient. The 
first component accounted for 31.28% of the variance in task performance over all 53 individuals. 
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All tasks loaded positively on the first component. Especially the three domains of Reversal 
Learning Task (Learning, Memory and Reversal Learning), Causal Reasoning, and Flexibility attained 
high scores on the first component, followed by the ability of Inhibitory Control. This domain-
generality of the first component is one of the most important criterion for detecting g (Carroll 1993), 
but further validation is necessary to for fully identifying the presence of g. We therefore for now refer 
to this component as the potential g.  
The second component, which explained 21.07% of the variance, had strong loadings from 
Tool use and Inhibition and we refer to it as Tool Use Ability. 
Similar results were obtained when performing a PCA with the extended data set of 57 
individuals (Supplementary Table S4), which included four imputed data points (Supplementary Table 
S1, category Data Set: extended). In addition, in order to investigate whether the variable distribution 
or the factorial method chosen affected the outcome of the g analysis, we performed two parallel 
analyses on the conservative dataset: an unrotated PCA with ranks applied, and an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA). In both analyses, the results of the first component or factor are very similar in their 
magnitude and orientation of the item loadings (see Supplementary Tables S5 and S6). The main 
difference was that the percentage of shared variance for g was slightly lower in the EFA; this 
difference between EFA and PCA is not surprising considering their different communality estimates, 
the low number of variables (respectively for statistical methods), and low communalities (<0.4) of the 
sample (but see Stevens 2002, Field 2013 p. 638). 
 
Table 2: Principal Component Matrix with Component 
Scores and Item Loadings of the five problem-solving 
domains 
Item 
 
 Item Loadings 
  
g 
(PC1) 
Ability of 
Tool use 
(PC2) 
% of variance 31.28 21.07 
Eigenvalues 1.56 1.05 
Learning & Remembering 
& Reversal Learning 
.755 -.360 
Causal Reasoning .665 -.118 
Flexibility  .513 -.198 
Inhibitory Control .451 .485 
Tool use .292 .797 
Note: N = 53, Rotation = none. PC=Principal Component 
Component loadings > .50 appear in bold 
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PC1 scores and non-cognitive factors 
We next tested whether alternative non-cognitive factors possibly explain the PC1 scores, the 
potential g. Table 3 shows the results of a Linear Model of the PC1. Because the sample size did not 
allow us to include all independent variables of interest, such as health deficits, such as loss of hair or 
stereotypical behavior patterns, we repeated the analysis with health deficits included, instead of age 
(Supplementary Table S7). All analysis and other combinations of replaced variables (not reported 
here) showed similar robust results. First, there was no significant effect of age. Second, individuals 
with visible health deficits did not score significantly lower on the PC1. Likewise, we found no 
influence of background conditions (wild, time with humans as pets, grown up in station, unknown), 
no differences between the sexes, or between the two different islands. However, we did find 
differences between the rehabilitation stations (Fig. 1; Estimate ± SE= -0.451±0.18, P=0.016), 
specifically between the Bornean stations (for reasons of confidentiality we refer to them as Bornean 1 
and 2). Overall, we found no effects of age, sex, health, island, or rearing background on performance 
on the cognitive tasks, but noticed that current management regimes did affect PC1 scores. 
 
Table 3: Linear Model of PC1 (g), N=53 
  Estimate Std. Error P value 
(Intercept) -0.105 0.65 0.874 
Age 0.023 0.06 0.706 
Sex (male) -0.034 0.27 0.902 
Background 
      Wild vs. Others -0.059 0.18 0.740 
      Others vs. Unknown -0.032 0.10 0.762 
      Station vs. Human 0.103 0.23 0.655 
Rehabilitation Station 
      Sumatra vs. Borneo 0.238 0.16 0.153 
      Borneo 1 vs. Borneo 2 -0.451 0.18 0.016 * 
Note: F-statistic: 2.263 on 7 and 45 DF,  P<.05 
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Figure 1: Individual’s the potential g (PC1) scores differed 
significantly between the two Bornean rehabilitation stations (-
0.451±0.18, P=0.016) 
 
Experiential effects on PC1 scores 
We aimed to investigate whether experiential effects have an influence on the development of 
the possible domain-general ability captured by PC1. In particular we were interested whether an 
individual’s approach toward conspecifics and novelty, possibly resulting in different individual 
experiences when maintained during ontogeny, affects the potential g. Therefore, we first tested over 
52 orangutans (one individual had no curiosity score) the influence of curiosity on PC1, when 
controlling the linear mixed effect model for other potential experiential effects such as age, 
background history and different rehabilitation station (the two latter are included as random effects). 
Curiosity did not predict PC1 scores (Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
Because wild individuals were in general far lower on curiosity (Damerius et al. in review) and 
one wild individual produced a highly significant outlier (with a curiosity score of -3, see 
Supplementary Fig. S7), we repeated the analysis for non-wild individuals. Within the sample of the 
remaining 50 non-wild individuals, an individual’s curiosity positively influenced PC1 scores (the 
Table 4: Parameter estimates and associated standard errors, obtained from a Linear 
Mixed-Effects Model of PC1 (g) over all 52 individuals  
 
Estimate SE df t value  p value 
(Intercept) 0.028 0.64 7.83 0.04 0.966 
Age 0.007 0.05 18.85 0.13 0.896 
Curiosity 0.193 0.18 48.50 1.07 0.292 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each rehabilitation station and 
background (random effects). N observations = 52, N stations = 3,  N background = 4 
* 
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potential g) in orangutans (Estimate ± SE= 0.541±0.26, P=0.0467, Table 5, Fig. 2). Therefore, non-wild 
individuals that were currently novelty-seeking and highly explorative showed significant higher PC1 
scores than individuals that were not (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: The relation between curiosity and the potential g 
(PC1) plotted with a fitted line based on the LMM (see 
Table 5) within all non-wild individuals (N=50). 
 
Secondly, we examined in a subsample of 26 Bornean orangutans whether an individual’s 
social interest affects their PC1 scores, presuming that a higher social interest leads to more 
opportunities of social learning and consequently influences cognition development. The Linear 
Model, controlling for sex and age, showed no experiential effect of social interest on PC1 scores, the 
potential g (Table 6). The experiences gained from current social interest in conspecifics might 
therefore not directly contribute in shaping the potential g. 
 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates and associated standard errors, obtained from a Linear 
Mixed-Effects Model of PC1 (g) over 50  non-wild individuals 
 
Estimate SE df t value  p value 
(Intercept) -0.153 0.60 5.27 -0.26 0.807 
Age 0.012 0.05 9.32 0.22 0.829 
Curiosity 0.541 0.26 44.57 2.05 0.0467 * 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each rehabilitation station 
(random effect). N observations = 50, N stations = 3,  N background = 3 
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *P< 0.05 
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Table 6:  Linear Model of PC1 (g), N=26 (Bornean orangutans) 
 
Estimate SE P value 
(Intercept) -0.135 1.794 0.941 
Social Interest 0.001 0.001 0.280 
Sex (male) -0.078 0.493 0.876 
Age -0.066 0.151 0.669 
Note: F-statistic: 0.4804 on 3 and 22 DF, p> 0.5 
 
Discussion 
 
We investigated the cognitive abilities of 53 Bornean and Sumatran orangutans by comparing 
their performance over multiple physical cognition tasks addressing abilities of inhibitory control, 
behavioral flexibility, causal reasoning, tool use, and reversal learning, including associative learning 
and memory. Individual performance on these tasks was generally positively correlated across these 
tasks, and an unrotated principal component analysis indicated that the first component accounted for 
31% of the individual variation in task performance of orangutans. Our findings of this specific 
psychometric structure are generally in line with previous findings in nonhuman animals (e.g. 
Herndon et al. 1997, Matzel et al. 2006, Hopkins et al. 2014). 
Although the five physical tasks of the test-battery were designed to measure independent 
abilities and minimize the transfer of experience between the tasks, one first component explained a 
third of the variance in individual performance. The responses toward associative learning, memory, 
reversal learning, causal reasoning, and behavior flexibility all loaded positively on the potential g 
(Table 2). Successful individuals must have been therefore capable of learning, but also open to novel 
information and to flexibly reuse this information to relearn new associations. 
In humans the abilities of flexibility and inhibitory control are considered an expression of 
executive functions, which importantly contribute to shaping higher cognitive abilities, such as 
reasoning and problem solving. Our findings show that they both abilities also load positively on the 
first component, i.e. share variance with g.  
Overall, the structure of cognitive abilities in orangutans is therefore comparable to that found 
in humans. This conclusion is based on a small number of tests. However, we focused on highly 
conservative measures to minimize possible statistical dependencies. For instance, the reversal-
learning test contains three phases, which have nearly independent components and provides 
additional information about performance. Thus, if we include associative learning as a separate 
measure into the principal component analysis to additionally consider the quality of learning and not 
only whether they learned or not, we find that the loadings remain quite similar (Supplementary Table 
S8). This result, taken together with the facts that a PCA based on ranked data and the EFA yielded 
highly similar results (Supplementary Tables S5 and S6), thus shows that the PCA results are robust. 
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The ability to effectively use tools loaded highly on a second principal component (Table 2). 
This is consistent with the fact that tool-use abilities are prone to be automatized during ontogeny, 
representing so-called secondary modules that are experience-dependent (Burkart et al. 2017). 
Because finding the positive manifold merely constitutes a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition, for demonstrating the presence of g in orangutans, we also investigated whether the 
present structure of performance was due to confounding artifacts. We did not find that possible non-
cognitive variables, such as sex, health, background and origin, affected the PC1 and therefore exclude 
an artificial rise of a psychometric structure consistence with g due to these variables. The one 
exception was an effect of the different management regimes at the stations, which we believe is of 
different origin, as discussed below.  
Because all these analyses are consistent with the interpretation of PC1 as reflecting domain-
general abilities, we conclude it is justified to refer to it as g. In what follows, we focus on the role of 
experiential factors, such as curiosity, for the construction of g during development and the possibility 
of an evolutionary continuity of domain-general processes. 
  
Experience Effect and developmental influences on g 
Previous studies suggested that curiosity underlies problem-solving performance in 
orangutans, especially in tasks where trial-and-error exploration, rather than causal comprehension, 
facilitates finding a solution (Damerius et al. in review). The results of this study show that curiosity is 
also positively linked to g (Table 5; Figure 2), consistent with the presence of domain-general 
cognitive abilities. 
The mechanism underlying this relation warrants discussion since curiosity merely consists of 
a positive response to novelty and a high exploration tendency (Damerius et al. in review), and a 
curious problem-solving approach will therefore not necessarily make an orangutan instantly 
cleverer. Only when this approach is maintained during life time resulting in different opportunities 
for learning, this cumulative experience effect can in the long run affect an orangutan’s general 
abilities and vice versa. Discrepancies of the g scores between the Bornean stations (which hosted the 
same sub-specie Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii) in all likelihood reflected these differences in 
opportunities for learning (Fig. 1).  
Interestingly, in the tested subsample of 26 Bornean orangutans, we did not find a direct 
relation of social interest and g, even if an individual’s social interest should play an important role for 
the opportunities of social learning and the construction of cognitive abilities (van Schaik and Burkart 
2011). The small sample size and much uncontrolled variation in individual experiences during 
ontogeny possibly influencing g (each individual had its own history before arriving at the station) 
make it difficult to disentangle the pure influence of social interest. This cumulative experience effect 
might also explain why we did not find differences between the two species, although intrinsic 
differences in the ability of cognitive performance between Sumatran and Bornean orangutans at 
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zoological gardens (kept under virtually identical social and physical conditions) have been reported 
(Forss et al. 2016). Since individuals living in rehabilitation stations vary greatly in their background 
and previous experiences, including possible traumata, far more so than any captive zoo orangutan, it 
is possible that the intrinsic island differences were masked by different experiences and 
circumstances during ontogeny. However, it is also likely that the expression of orangutan cognitive 
abilities, represented by g, itself is independent of genetic prepositions between the species, but might 
reflect the inherited differences of an individual’s curiosity. If so, the Sumatran orangutans’ curiosity 
toward their environment would have a genetic component favored by selection over time due to 
separation with possibly different socio-ecological conditions (forest productivity: van Schaik et al. 
2009). A similar effect of intrinsic predisposition for interest in objects was suggested for immature 
chimpanzees compared to the closely related bonobos (Koops et al. 2015). Further research is needed 
to investigate these theories and disentangle the different influences. 
 
Is there a homologue to general intelligence in orangutans? 
The psychometric findings of g in orangutans captured the positive correlations among test 
scores of important problem solving components, such as the abilities of memorizing, associative 
learning, spatial flexibility and causal reasoning. The core definition of general intelligence captures 
exactly these logical problem-solving functions, reasoning- and learning abilities. In addition, the link 
of g and curiosity emphasizes the developmental construction of general-cognitive abilities. The 
experiences during development biased the outcome of across task performance in orangutans, as it is 
expected for general intelligence in humans. Thus, g in orangutans is in general consistent with the 
content of general intelligence. However, as in humans, it has to be further investigated what the 
emergent property of g exactly represents.  
We conclude that the content and structure of orangutan cognitive abilities are comparable to 
those of humans. The evidence for g in orangutans allows us to assume an evolutionary continuity in 
domain-general processes shared between humans and great apes. Similar processes, including 
socially induced curiosity  (Schuppli et al. unpublished data) may have shaped general cognitive 
abilities and intelligence in primates over millions of years. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
In this thesis, I made use of the phenotypic plasticity in a large sample of Bornean and 
Sumatran orangutans, our close relatives, to gain novel insights into the factors shaping the 
development of cognitive abilities and therefore the selective pressures favoring the evolution of 
intelligence. The results presented in this PhD thesis highlight an unidentified contributor that shapes 
intelligence in orangutans. Curiosity, which in the wild is largely absent and only elicited by social 
inputs, can be elicited due to special captive living conditions during youth. It significantly determined 
both the ability to solve novel problems and the development of domain-general cognitive abilities in 
orangutans. A curious response-and-exploration style presumably changes an individual’s approach to 
its environment and therefore the quality and quantity of experiences that accumulate during 
development. I will first outline the main findings of all three chapters and subsequently discuss the 
implications of these findings. 
The influences of rearing background and human contact during development on the outcome 
of cognitive performance were investigated in the first chapter. Orangutans that experienced contact 
to humans during infancy had a different orientation toward humans and expressed fundamental 
psychological changes concerning their problem-solving approach. The change specifically increased 
their motivation to explore, as represented in reduced neophobia, increased duration of exploration 
and a change in the nature, and thus the variety, of their exploration. As a result of their orientation 
toward humans, they explored the relevant parts of the apparatus more than non-curious individuals, 
which consequently affected their understanding of the problem-solving task, and therefore their 
success in solving it. It was suggested that the early exposure to humans and human artifacts in 
captivity produces a broader range of opportunities for learning and exploration, resulting in 
increased interest and innovativeness in captive apes compared to their wild conspecifics.  
In my second chapter, I wanted to disentangle the causes and consequences of the 
phenomenon of human orientation and curiosity in orangutans to gain a better understanding of how 
previous individual experiences affect the developmental construction of an individual’s problem-
solving ability. For this purpose, I examined an individual’s response-and-exploration style, its 
developmental construction and effects on the outcome of cognitive performance on various physical 
cognitive problem-solving tasks. First of all, the results show that the measurement of orientation 
toward humans represents a good measurement of general current curiosity in orangutans. Secondly, 
this curiosity was characterized by a positive response to novelty and a high motivation to explore, 
which, thirdly, was especially developed when individuals had experienced stable and safe living 
conditions, previous care by humans or social housing with conspecifics. This striking effect of 
curiosity was quite unexpected because orangutans are decidedly uncurious under natural conditions. 
Fourthly, an individual’s curiosity predicted problem-solving performance very well in a variety of 
physical cognitive tasks, especially those in which trial-and-error facilitates finding a solution.  
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The third chapter investigated the underlying general abilities and its possible determinants, 
including curiosity and experience. Specifically, I investigated the possibility of homologues to domain-
general intelligence in orangutans as has been amply demonstrated in humans through the general 
factor g. The results of this chapter indicate that my studies provide the first empirical evidence for g 
in orangutans, which is comparable to the general intelligence found in humans. The results of this 
study further show that curiosity is positively linked to g, and thus the domain-general cognitive 
abilities. Therefore, curiosity and the effect of experience play a crucial role in the development of 
higher cognitive abilities, including the domain-general processes underlying intelligence. 
 
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
When observing nonhuman animals in captive settings it is very easy to gain the impression 
that clever species, such as great apes, are in general very curious, inventive and prone to develop 
higher skills, such as tool use. This thesis clearly shows that stable captive living conditions during 
development, including contact with humans, significantly improved the cognitive abilities and 
approach to problem solving in orangutans and turned them into intelligent problem-solvers. The 
impression that captive nonhuman animals, especially nonhuman primates, can be notably clever and 
innovative is therefore not fundamentally false, but is biased and incomplete as there is plenty of 
evidence that under natural conditions orangutans are very neophobic and that the skill pool, critical 
for survival, is acquired through very different strategies, based on social learning. Therefore, 
orangutan intelligence did not evolve because individuals were adventurous explorers. My PhD thesis 
strongly emphasizes the importance of social-cultural opportunities for learning and the role of 
experience for the development of cognitive abilities. The innate potential for curiosity and its 
emancipation from social triggering in captivity tells us more about the selection pressures and 
mechanisms that determine intelligence in the species of orangutans and may also have important 
implications for how we explain the dramatic increase of intelligence in our own lineage.  
 
Although higher cognitive abilities are costly (because they require relatively large brains), the 
ability to be intelligent can still be adaptively significant, as explained by the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis. In the wild social learning is more efficient and safer than asocial learning. Therefore, once 
a role model is present individuals should prefer social learning. A review by Forss et al. (in review) 
shows this is the preference for various species, including orangutans. What is the nearly exclusive 
way for orangutans to gain knowledge in the wild is complemented in captivity by overall curiosity 
that does not need social cues to be elicited, due to lower risks and different social circumstances. 
Curiosity thus reflects the presence of unusual socio-cultural impact early in life and can explain why 
captive primates appear to be so much more intelligent than their wild counterparts (the captivity 
effect).  
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There is a dormant inherited potential of curiosity within an individual, which supports 
learning by increasing individual exploration once the novelty approach can be overcome through 
social approval. Considering the importance of social knowledge transfer in the wild these 
mechanisms might have evolved to ensure quick and intensive exploration once opportunities for 
learning are given. Therefore, general curiosity (i.e. curiosity that does not require social triggers and 
is directed at all aspects of the environment, including novel ones) is a by-product and its unleashing is 
an artifact of captivity that, once released, enables the individual to make use of its leisure in captive 
conditions to creatively explore, invent and become a flexible problem-solver. This is possible because 
the emancipation of curiosity from social triggering enables individuals in captivity to also learn in 
asocial situations and therefore have extended opportunities for learning. What normally is only 
possible in social context can now amplify on its own and bestow double opportunities for learning 
and gaining experience in captivity. Since social and asocial learning share similar underlying 
cognitive mechanisms this experience effect can quickly accumulate. As predicted by the Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis and supported by the findings of this thesis, through increased experiences an 
individual will develop larger skill repertoires and minds capable of better cognitive performance on a 
developmental, but also on an evolutionary level.  
 
Overall, although the actual mechanisms responsible for the construction of intelligence in 
orangutans are of course identical in captive and wild settings (experience effect through 
opportunities for learning), determinants of cognitive performance and ability underlie different 
constraints during development in captivity than in the wild. Stable and human-enriched 
environments in captivity somehow catapult orangutans into becoming ‘curious super-brains’ with 
behavioral and cognitive performance highly atypical for their species under natural conditions. 
Consequently, the minds of the captive and wild orangutans are significantly different from each other. 
This difference has the following implications.  
First, there may be implications for translocation and reintroduction of captive individuals into 
the wild (see paragraph Implications for orangutan rehabilitation below). Second, there is no such 
thing as culture-free testing of cognitive abilities, given the essential presence of social-cultural 
experiences on cognition during ontogeny. Previous experiences and preferences will always bias 
experimental testing, as already suggested by Rowe and Healy (2014). Third, to test for underlying 
evolutionary mechanism and selective pressures on cognition and intelligence researchers have to be 
aware of these differences and possibly distinguish between the two conditions. For cognitive 
investigations, the distinction between wild and captive orangutans is crucial. Although the possibility 
of unleashing the innate potential of curiosity in orangutans provides insight in the driving factors for 
the construction of intelligence, studies in the wild remain essential to investigate the conditions that 
shape the development of intelligence, and have shaped it over evolutionary time. 
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Implications for orangutan rehabilitation 
The curiosity findings of this PhD thesis might have important implications for future 
orangutan rehabilitation and release into the wild. The individual’s response-and-exploration style 
that can easily be measured through the novelty response toward unfamiliar food reveals an 
individual’s character to deal with a novel environment. The assessment of an individual’s curiosity 
could therefore serve to evaluate each individual’s chances of successful reintroduction before it is 
being released.  
On the one hand, individuals that are curious might be the better and more flexible learners. 
They theoretically should benefit from a broad pool of knowledge and inner motivation of novelty 
seeking that enables them to adapt more quickly to a change in environment and demands. After all, it 
takes a minimum of curiosity to engage with a complete new environment. Strictly non-curious or 
even neophobic individuals might not adapt well to a complete change in environmental conditions, as 
illustrated by the case of wild individuals coming to the rehabilitation stations and remaining 
behaviorally wild.  
On the other hand, highly curious individuals, which are interested in unfamiliar humans, 
objects and food, might not necessarily be the ones that are best qualified for release. As I reviewed 
above, curiosity in the wild might have lethal consequences. There is evidence for a deadly incident of 
one individual that participated in my study and was released the same year. This individual had a 
high curious response and exploration style (within the top quartile over all measured individuals) 
and did not survive the first year of being free in the wild, because she was bitten by a snake. The full 
circumstances of this incident are not known, but it cannot be excluded that high levels of curiosity 
played a role in the outcome. Furthermore, a recent summary by the BOS Foundation about release 
success in Batikap reported that individuals that were older than 6 years of age when they arrived at 
the station, and thus had had more contact with humans during the sensitive period of infancy, have a 
higher risk of death and their success rates of release dropped by more than a half  (BOS Foundation 
Report 2017, Table 5, p.20). This is generally in line with explanations of curiosity as shown by my 
study.  
An additional problem is that highly curious individuals, mostly ex-pet orangutans, generally 
have lost their fear of humans and may enter houses after being released, thus causing trouble. 
Reports indicate that this scenario is very likely and a major reason why certain individuals are re-
confiscated and returned to the station. It was also reported that certain individuals approach 
unfamiliar humans in the forest, which can also result in death. 
Therefore, although it still has to be evaluated where the threshold lies for being curious 
enough for a successful release in a novel environment, it is highly likely that an individual’s response-
and-exploration style strongly affects survival in the wild upon release.  
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Evolution of general intelligence 
This thesis has important implications for our understanding of the developmental influences 
that might have shaped the evolution of intelligence in primates. My results suggest evolutionary 
continuity of general intelligence in primates by showing the presence of domain-general cognitive 
abilities in orangutans, similar to the ones of humans. This supports the idea that general intelligence 
is a phylogenetically old phenomenon among primates. This continuity was already suggested by 
Deaner et al. (2006), Reader et al. (2011) and (Burkart et al. 2017). Therefore, primate ‘cleverness’ 
does not simply reflect domain-specific cognitive adaptations. As brain tissue for intelligence can be 
very costly, the presence of domain-general abilities in primates therefore reveals its evolutionary 
success. Results of this thesis confirm the predictions of the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis (van 
Schaik and Burkart 2011), which describes the benefits of opportunities for social learning in 
overcoming environmental unpredictability and the development of bigger brains with higher 
intelligence in primates. Alone among primates, humans have evolved special features, such as 
teaching, that together with the adoption of a cooperative breeding system tremendously favored the 
qualitative and quantitative increase in social learning opportunities (Burkart and van Schaik 2010, 
van Schaik and Burkart 2011, Burkart et al. 2017). Consequently humans have evolved outstanding 
intelligence, which enables flexible thinking and the accumulation of great skill repertoires, including 
cultural repertoires. 
 
Implications for Human Evolution  
Orangutans and humans are closely related and share the same fundamental phenomena, as 
both are characterized by a slow life history and the presence of tolerant role models during 
development, which allows for maintaining high neophobia (reviewed in Forss et al. in review). The 
consequences of curiosity not only explain the increase of intelligence in captive great apes, but may 
also have important implications for how we explain the dramatic increase of intelligence and 
evolution of cumulative culture in our own lineage.  
The conditions that facilitated the evolution of cumulative culture in hominids are the subject 
of intensive debate. Most commonly discussed are an increase in brain size and demographic effects, 
such as larger populations or more connected social networks (e.g. Henrich et al. 2016). One 
additional explanation for a rise in innovations is that increased curiosity due to pre-existing 
circumstances turned hominins into curious explorers (van Schaik et al. 2016). Modern humans are 
very curious, eager to seek knowledge, and show high intelligence, innovation skills and large cultural 
repertoires. Curiosity may serve as a link to innovation and problem-solving strategies, as it makes us 
seek novelty and be highly explorative, and thus not only underlies our creativity, but directly 
contributes to knowledge acquisition. For nonhuman animals, I have suggested that curiosity is in 
most cases an artifact of captivity, an environment providing for basic needs. The present findings in 
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orangutans therefore suggest that a major rise in innovations had to wait until our ancestors 
underwent the equivalent of the captivity effect and could afford to become curious explorers. The 
development of curiosity is especially possible in protected and safe conditions enhanced by social 
facilitation.  
We should therefore look for indicators of such conditions during hominid evolution. One 
possibility is the establishment of safe home bases, protected against predators. Another is the 
acquisition of effective distance weapons, which turned humans into the top predator, no longer at 
risk from natural predators. These circumstances may have become prevalent during the Upper 
Paleolithic in Europe, when modern humans had become top predators, had rich food resources 
available as prey was easily hunted and therefore had additional time for practicing skills and 
experimenting with materials (van Schaik 2016). During this period cultural elements of art appeared 
and inventions in the field of tool manufacturing and hunting were made. In short, curiosity may have 
given a major, so far unappreciated boost to our ancestors’ material culture that cannot be explained 
by brain size and demography. The rise of curiosity may therefore have strongly contributed to 
making humans behaviorally modern well after we became so morphologically. 
Future work is needed to test this novel idea. Nonetheless, I hope this dramatic unleashing of 
latent cognitive potential in species that are highly conservative in the wild, shows that we should take 
seriously the possibility that the origin of curiosity may have served as an important non-demographic 
contributor to the elaboration of intelligence and culture in modern humans. I therefore conclude that 
curiosity might have unleashed creativity in the material culture of our ancestors. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: CHAPTER 1 
Orientation toward humans predicts cognitive performance in orangutans 
 
Supplementary Table S1: Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an 
animal solving the task when excluding independent variables for the novelty response tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task. 
  B SE Z p value 
 
Human Orientation Index 0.243 0.09 2.679 0.007 ** 
Age -0.018 0.03 -0.582 0.561 
SEX (male) -0.619 0.53 -1.158 0.247 
Species (Sumatra) 0.295 0.60 0.484 0.628 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.212 0.24 -0.890 0.373 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.131 0.30 -0.436 0.663 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.160 0.22 0.730 0.466 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.489 0.52 -0.933 0.351 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.383 0.52 0.573 0.465 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 1.211 0.87 1.395 0.163 
   Quadratic 1.209 0.97 1.249 0.212 
   Cubic 0.099 0.97 0.103 0.918 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -5.046 0.72 -6.981 <0.001*** 
   Quadratic 1.512 0.42 3.567 <0.001*** 
   Cubic -0.149 0.33 -0.457 0.648 
Note: Analysis included 94 individuals in 10 different zoos/rehab stations, totaling 376 observations,  
χ2ML= 220.60, P< 0.001 
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Supplementary Table S2: Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an 
animal solving the task. Analysis without the HOI. 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S3: Detailed list of all different exploration actions coded as relevant and irrelevant 
exploration during the time an individual engaged with the honey tool-task. 
Relevant Exploration Actions Irrelevant Exploration Actions 
Insert stick into L-shaped channel Hit (with any body parts) test apparatus or board 
Insert finger into L-shaped channel Hit (with any body parts) table on which apparatus is 
presented 
Insert finger into I-shaped channel Pull/ Push test apparatus, plexiglas, screws  
Insert rope into I-shaped channel Pull/ Push table or board on which apparatus is presented 
Trace/ Poke finger outside glass of either I- or L-shaped 
channel 
Touch test apparatus, plexiglas, screws (elsewhere but 
channels) 
Trace/ Poke stick outside glass of either I- or L-shaped 
channel 
Touch table or board on which apparatus is presented 
Tool modification/ manufacture Poke stick at apparatus, plexiglas, screws (elsewhere but 
channels) 
Insert any other tool than stick or rope into L-shaped 
channel 
Poke stick at board/table on which apparatus is presented 
Insert any other tool than stick or rope into I-shaped 
channel 
Touch sticks on the floor or besides test apparatus 
Poke or push stick at opening of L-shaped channel Touch ropes on the floor or besides test apparatus 
Poke or push stick at opening of I-shaped channel  
Poke or push finger at opening of L-shaped channel 
Poke or push finger at opening of I-shaped channel 
General Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the 
task. 
  B SE Z p value 
(Intercept) -0.609 0.91 -0.670 0.503 
Age 0.001 0.03 0.023 0.981 
SEX (male) -0.638 0.51 -1.252 0.210 
Species (Sumatra) 0.186 0.56 0.332 0.740 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.360 0.22 -1.604 0.109 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.115 0.26 -0.447 0.655 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.221 0.21 1.041 0.298 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.613 0.51 -1.201 0.230 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.157 0.41 0.381 0.704 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 0.910 0.81 1.118 0.263 
   Quadratic 1.499 0.83 1.803 0.071 . 
   Cubic 0.120 0.82 0.146 0.884 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -4.905 0.66 -7.478 <0.001 *** 
   Quadratic 1.509 0.39 3.830 <0.001 *** 
   Cubic 0.036 0.31 0.118 0.906 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility and individual. The 
performance in the honey tool-task was binary measured. The Analysis included 103 individuals in 12 
different zoos/rehab stations, totaling 412 observations,  χ2=  236.43, P< 0.001 
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Supplementary Table S4: Linear Mixed-Effects Model of relevant exploration variety controlling for 
repeated observations on each facility. 
 
 
Supplementary Table S5: Pairwise comparisons of the Human Orientation Index (HOI) between the 
different background and rearing categories. 
 B SE df t value p value 
(Intercept)  1.209 1.41 48.66  0.857 0.396 
HOI  0.221 0.05 80.07  4.049 <0.001 *** 
Age  0.014 0.03 80.84  0.414 0.680 
SEX (male) -0.059 0.55 79.52 -0.106 0.916 
Species (Sumatra)  0.946 0.87 6.31  1.084 0.318 
Background      
   Wild vs. Rest  0.162 0.25 75.37  0.652 0.517 
   Rehab vs. Zoo  0.356 0.33 42.06  1.063 0.294 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest  0.408 0.23 80.76  1.746 0.085 . 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation 
station) -0.257 0.53 79.81 -0.483 0.630 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo)  0.314 0.58 65.78  0.544 0.589 
Accessibility (trend analysis)      
   Linear  0.316 1.11 12.64  0.285 0.780 
   Quadratic  0.467 1.13 23.52  0.411 0.685 
   Cubic  1.540 1.04 77.21  1.486 0.141 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility. The analysis was totaling 94 
observations in 10 different zoos/rehab stations,  χ2= 30.91, p< .0005  
Pairwise comparisons of HOI between different background categories, controlling for age, sex, island 
and repeated observations from each zoo and rehabilitation station. 
  B SE Z p value 
 
Hand-reared zoo - Station        1.649      2.03    0.814     0.960 
Human - Station          -1.452 1.35   -1.078     0.877 
Mother-reared zoo - Station    -0.605 1.62 -0.372 0.999 
Unknown - Station -0.279 1.28 -0.217 1.000 
Wild - Station -3.568 2.46 -1.450 0.670 
Human – Hand-reared zoo          -3.102 1.82 -1.707 0.497 
Mother-reared zoo – Hand-reared zoo -2.254 1.50 -1.499 0.637 
Unknown – Hand-reared zoo -1.928 1.74 -1.106 0.864 
Wild – Hand-reared zoo -5.217 2.70 -1.931 0.354 
Mother-reared zoo - Human  0.847 1.35 0.626 0.987 
Unknown - Human    1.174 0.94 1.249 0.792 
Wild - Human -2.116 2.25 -0.941 0.927 
Unknown – Mother-reared zoo 0.326 1.25 0.260 1.000 
Wild – Mother-reared zoo      -2.963 2.41 -1.227 0.805 
Wild - Unknown  -3.289 2.41 -1.468 0.658 
P-values corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey. 
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Supplementary Table S6 study subjects. 
Individual Age in 
years at 
testing 
years in 
captivity 
species current housing Category 
Amin 
Amos 
Andalas 
Anette 
Ari 
Ayu 
Bahruni 
Bambang 
Batu 
Bella 
Binti 
Budi 
Cane 
Cantik 
Ceky Chan 
Cherie 
Cici 
Dagu 
Dana 
Dandim 
Dewa 
Djamuna 
Dokana 
Dora 
Duanne 
Edwin 
Embrie 
Franky 
Friend 
Gagak 
Galih 
Gambira 
Gina 
Gober 
Harry 
Hulu 
Imas 
Inou 
Ito 
Jack2 
Jacky 
Janu 
Jarot 
Jarwo 
Jaya 
Jill 
Jose 
Julius 
Karan 
Karen 
6 
13 
3 
30 
10 
6 
10 
10.5 
14 
14.5 
13 
8 
10 
10 
6 
18 
15 
28 
25 
12 
12 
13 
25 
3.5 
10 
11.5 
10 
7 
5.5 
9.5 
10 
18 
49 
25 
8.5 
14 
9.5 
17 
6 
9 
5 
6 
5 
15 
9 
8 
21 
5 
10 
15 
0.5 
13.0 
0.5 
30.0 
8.0 
0.5 
0.5 
5.0 
14.0 
10.0 
13.0 
8.0 
0.0 
8.0 
0.0 
18.0 
10.0 
28.0 
25.0 
7.0 
10.0 
13.0 
25.0 
2.0 
8.0 
7.0 
8.0 
0.5 
3.5 
8.0 
7.0 
18.0 
45.0 
5.0 
7.0 
8.0 
8.0 
15.0 
6.0 
6.0 
1.0 
4.0 
4.0 
10.0 
9.0 
7.0 
21.0 
2.0 
8.0 
9.0 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
unknown background 
wild/ translocated 
Background with humans 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
Human hand reared 
Mother reared 
wild/ translocated 
unknown background 
Background with humans 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
unknown background 
unknown background 
unknown background 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Reha-Station reared  
Background with humans 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
wild/ translocated 
Reha-Station reared  
Background with humans 
Background with humans 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
Background with humans 
unknown background 
Reha-Station reared  
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Reha-Station reared  
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
unknown background 
unknown background 
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Kasmin 
Kevin 
Kibriah 
Kila 
King 
Kraba 
Lanang 
Mali 
Mandi 
Mawoto 
Maya 
MercedeS 
Natalia 
Natalie 
Niken 
Nonja 
Oracle 
Otong 
Padana 
Pilar 
Pini 
Pongo 
Radja 
Raja 
Ramon 
Roma 
Rowland 
Runtu 
Sabin 
Sandakan 
Sari 
Sarimin 
Silvia 
Sony 
Suaq 
Sule 
Summer 
Suri 
Tanah 
Tao 
Temmy 
Toba 
Trio 
Ulin 
Vendel 
Victor 
Victoria 
Walter 
Wattana 
Willy 
Winda 
Yogi 
Zatarra 
10.5 
32 
36 
13 
17 
12 
11 
20 
14 
17 
5 
12 
18 
11 
16 
36 
8.5 
13 
16 
11 
25 
15 
52 
13 
18 
17 
10 
13 
9.5 
32 
43 
11 
49 
16 
5 
7 
13 
5 
5 
8 
31 
18 
16 
14 
13 
10.5 
31 
23 
18 
6 
12 
8 
10 
9.0 
32.0 
36.0 
13.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
20.0 
14.0 
13.0 
5.0 
10.0 
0.0 
9.0 
14.0 
36.0 
7.0 
11.0 
16.0 
9.0 
25.0 
15.0 
51.0 
13.0 
18.0 
13.0 
8.0 
8.0 
9.0 
32.0 
43.0 
9.0 
48.0 
12.0 
5.0 
4.0 
13.0 
3.0 
5.0 
8.0 
31.0 
18.0 
13.0 
11.0 
13.0 
9.0 
31.0 
23.0 
18.0 
3.0 
7.0 
8.0 
8.0 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo abelii 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Pongo pygmaeus 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Zoo 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Reha-Station 
Background with humans 
Human hand reared 
Human hand reared 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Reha-Station reared  
Mother reared 
Human hand reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
wild/ translocated 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Human hand reared 
Reha-Station reared  
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
Human hand reared 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Background with humans 
Reha-Station reared  
Mother reared 
Human hand reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
Mother reared 
Mother reared 
Human hand reared 
Mother reared 
unknown background 
unknown background 
Mother reared 
Background with humans 
Human hand reared 
Mother reared 
Human hand reared 
Background with humans 
wild/ translocated 
Reha-Station reared  
unknown background 
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Figure S1: Novelty response across individuals of different background categories. (a) Latency to touch novel food 
and (b) Latency to touch a novel object.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: CHAPTER 2 
Curiosity boosts orangutan problem-solving ability 
 
The human orientation index (HOI) 
The human orientation test was composed of four consecutive conditions (30 s each) and lasted for 2 
min. In the first condition the unfamiliar man approached the enclosure and positioned himself in 
front (1 m to the bars/mesh) where the subject was located. For the first 30 s, he stood still with his 
body oriented sideways (laterally) to the subject. In the second condition the man turned around to 
directly face the orang-utan. Then he tried to establish eye contact with the individual. In the third 
condition the man took some familiar food (peanuts) out of his pocket and held it in his hand in front 
of his body, well visible but out of reach to the orang-utan. In the fourth condition the man offered the 
food out of reach to the orang-utan. 
Importantly, no other human was present during testing and the test was recorded on video. 
From the video the first reaction of the orang-utan and its proximity to the man for the first 2 s of first 
sight were coded for each condition. We scored the first behavioural reaction of the orang-utan as 
follows: 0= a negative reaction, such as retreat, stress vocalization, piloerection, nervous swinging or 
turning away from the human; 1= a neutral reaction, defined as resting, moving calmly or play 
behaviour; 2= a positive reaction, if the orang-utan approached the human; and 3= an actively positive 
reaction, if the orang-utan begged (either by using lips or hands), tried in any other active way to 
contact the human or attempted to trade objects from the enclosure for food. 
In addition, we scored the orang-utan’s proximity to the man in the following way: 0= the 
orang-utan positioned itself as far as possible from the human; 1= the orang-utan was further than 1 m 
from the human; 2= the orang-utan was within 1 m from the human; and 3= the orang-utan was 
directly at the bars/mesh and positioned itself as close as possible to the human. 
To ensure we recorded any possible substantial interest in humans when the surprise had waned, we 
also scored whether any active contact behaviour occurred during the 30 s of each condition. Thus, in 
total the HOI consisted of the summed first reactions of an individual towards an unfamiliar man, in 
addition to the proximity to him, with the eventual score ranging from zero to 28. 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S1: Presentation table (140 x 100 cm and 110–160 cm high; the table was adjustable in height) 
for elevated enclosures. (a) The presentation table with an additional board (180 x 120 cm and 3 cm deep) for 
experiments that required a vertical position. (b) The table presented during the Box Task. The individual reached 
through the bars to get access to the apparatus. 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S2: Detour Reaching. (a) A schematic view including technical measurements of the apparatus 
used for Detour Reaching. The box (100 x 30 cm and 40 cm high) had a small hole (diameter 2 cm) on the front on the 
right and a large hole (29 cm and 19 cm high) on the left. (b) The Detour Reaching box was screwed onto the 
presentation table and could be presented from the outside of the cage. (c) Sumatran orang-utan solving the task by 
reaching for the bait, a banana, through the big hole on the left. 
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Supplementary Figure S3: Reversal Learning with 12 doors (13 × 10 cm, 15 cm apart). (a) Schematic view of the 
learning phase of the Reversal Learning. The subject learned the association of food and location (here: right). The 
association with location was enhanced with colours (here: white). (b) Schematic view of the Reversal Phase. The old 
association (right, white) no longer held and the association ‘left, black’ had to be learned. (c) The Reversal Learning 
board as it was presented to the individual. (d) Sumatran subject conducting the Reversal Learning task by reaching 
through the bars and turning the doors. 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S4: Box Task with five wooden boxes (20 x 15 cm and 8 cm high). (a) Sumatran orang-utan 
conducting the box task, here using the sliding doors during its second presentation. (b) First presentation of the 
apparatus. The lid could be ﬂipped open. (c) Second presentation of the apparatus. Doors could be slid open to 
retrieve the food reward. 
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Supplementary Figure S5: Visible Honey Tool Trap. (a) Bornean individual using the stick on the Honey Tool apparatus. 
(b) Wooden box (80 x 50 cm and 7 cm deep) with two embedded transparent Makrolon tubes: a straight channel (30 x 
5 cm and 5 cm deep) and a curved L-shaped channel [15 cm long (10 cm with an additional 5 cm bend), 5 cm wide and 
5 cm deep]. (c) Stick inserted in the straight channel to obtain honey (correct solution). (d) Rope inserted in the curved 
channel to obtain honey (correct solution). 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S6: Tube Task with six tubes (37 x 6 cm and 7.5 cm high). Subjects could use their ﬁngers to 
reach through the slot and to slide the bait along the tube. (a) Wrong direction to slide the bait. Bait falls into the 
opaque trap. (b) Correct direction to slide the bait. Bait can be retrieved out of the tube. (c) Single tube, made of 
metal with a transparent Makrolon plate so the subject could see the bait and run a finger through the slot. (d) 
Complete test design: six tubes on a vertical board. 
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Supplementary Figure S7: Box plots of the curiosity scores over the different background categories. The box 
represents observations inside the 25–75 percentile range, whiskers indicate the minimum to the maximum datum 
within 1.5 times the interquartile range, the internal box line is the median and circles with numbers of individuals 
represent outlying data points. 
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Supplementary Tables 
 
Supplementary Table S1: Overview of study subjects 
Individual Age 
(years)  
Sex Species Background  
Amin 6 Male Pongo abelii Unknown 
Andalas 3 Female Pongo abelii Unknown 
Ari 10 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Ayu 6 Female Pongo abelii Unknown 
Bahruni 10 Male Pongo abelii Wild 
Bambang 10.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Bella 14.5 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Cane 10 Male Pongo abelii Wild 
Cantik 10 Female  Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Ceky Chan 6 Male Pongo abelii Human 
Cici 15 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Dandim 12 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Dewa 12 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Dora 3.5 Female Pongo abelii Human 
Duanne 10 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Edwin 11.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Embrie 10 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Franky 7 Male Pongo abelii Unknown 
Friend 5.5 Male Pongo abelii Unknown 
Gagak 9.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Galih 10 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Gober 25 Female Pongo abelii Wild 
Harry 8.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Hulu 14 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Imas 9.5 Female Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Inou 17 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Jack2 9 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Jacky 5 Female Pongo abelii Human 
Jarot 5 Male Pongo abelii Station 
Jarwo 15 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Jill 8 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Julius 5 Male Pongo abelii Human 
Karan 10 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Karen 15 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Kasmin 10.5 Female Pongo pygmaeus Human 
King 17 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Kraba 12 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Lanang 11 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
 137 
 
Mawoto 17 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
MercedeS 12 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Natalia 18 Female Pongo abelii Wild 
Natalie 11 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Niken 16 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Oracle 8.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Otong 13 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Pilar 11 Female Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Roma 17 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Rowland 10 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Runtu 13 Female Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Sabin 9.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Sarimin 11 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Sony 16 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Sule 7 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Suri 5 Female Pongo abelii Human 
Trio 16 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Ulin 14 Female Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
Victor 10.5 Male Pongo pygmaeus Human 
Willy 6 Female Pongo abelii Human 
Winda 12 Female Pongo pygmaeus Wild 
Yogi 8 Male Pongo pygmaeus Station 
Zatarra 10 Male Pongo pygmaeus Unknown 
 
Supplementary Table S2: Parameter estimates and associated standard errors, 
obtained from a linear mixed-effects model of PC 1 ‘curiosity’ over 16 ‘Human’ 
background individuals  
 Estimate SE df t P 
(Intercept) -0.477 0.279 5.30 -1.711 0.145 
Age on arrival at station 0.224 0.062 13.96 3.633 0.003 
The model controls for repeated observations at each rehabilitation station (random effect). 
Nobservations = 16, Nstations = 3, χ
2
= 10.70, P= 0.001. Significant P value is shown in bold. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: CHAPTER 3 
General Cognitive Abilities in Orangutans (Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus) 
 
Supplementary Figures please see p. 134 
Supplementary Tables 
 
Supplementary Table S1: study subjects 
Individual Sex 
Age 
(years)  
Species 
Background 
Category 
Data set 
Amin male 6 Pongo abelii unknown conservative 
Andalas female 3 Pongo abelii unknown conservative 
Ari male 10 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Ayu female 6 Pongo abelii unknown conservative 
Bahruni male 10 Pongo abelii wild conservative 
Bambang male 10.5 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Bella female 14.5 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Cantik female 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Ceky Chan male 6 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Cici female 15 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Dewa male 12 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Dora female 3.5 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Duanne male 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Edwin male 11.5 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Embrie female 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Franky male 7 Pongo abelii unknown conservative 
Friend male 5.5 Pongo abelii unknown conservative 
Galih male 10 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Harry male 8.5 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
Hulu male 14 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Imas female 9.5 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Jack2 male 9 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Jacky female 5 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Janu male 6 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Jarot male 5 Pongo abelii station conservative 
Jill male 8 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
Julius male 5 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Karan female 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Karen female 15 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
King male 17 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Kraba female 12 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Lanang male 11 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
Mawoto male 17 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Mercedes female 12 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Natalie female 11 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Niken female 16 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Oracle male 8.5 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
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Otong male 13 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Pilar female 11 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Roma female 17 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Rowland male 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Runtu female 13 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Sabin male 9.5 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
Sarimin male 11 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Sule female 7 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Suri female 5 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Trio male 16 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Ulin female 14 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Victor male 10.5 Pongo pygmaeus human conservative 
Willy female 6 Pongo abelii human conservative 
Winda female 12 Pongo pygmaeus wild conservative 
Yogi male 8 Pongo pygmaeus station conservative 
Zatarra male 10 Pongo pygmaeus unknown conservative 
Gagak male 9.5 Pongo pygmaeus station extended 
(imputed Box Task) 
Kasmin female 10.5 Pongo pygmaeus human extended 
(imputed Box Task) 
Natalia female 18 Pongo abelii wild extended  
(imputed Box Task) 
Inou male 17 Pongo pygmaeus unknown extended 
(imputed Detour Reaching) 
 
Ranked dataset with 53 individuals 
Supplementary Table S2: Description of tasks and measurements with ranks applied 
Cognitive ability Task Measurement 
Median 
(min/max) N 
Rank  
Flexibility 
Box Task 
Number of boxes opened; largest rank 
describes best performance (5 boxes) and 
smallest worst performance (0 boxes) 
27.5 
(2.5/45.5) 
53 
Rank  
Inhibitory Control 
Detour Reaching 
Latency to first explore non-food side 
(show inhibit behaviour); largest rank 
describes best performance (small 
latency) and smallest worst performance 
(no inhibition)  
27 (3/51) 53 
Rank  
Tool use 
Honey Tool Trap 
Guttman scale of goal directed tool use; 
largest rank describes best performance 
(successfully fishing honey) and smallest 
worst performance (random exploration) 
30 
(3.5/48.5) 
53 
Rank  
Learning 
Remembering 
Reversal Learning 
Reversal Learning 
Scale of learned, remembered, reversal 
learned; largest rank describes best 
performance (successfully reversal learn-
ing) and smallest worst performance (no 
learning, therefor no memory and no 
reversal learning) 
25 
(4/42.5) 
53 
Rank  
Causal Reasoning 
Tube Trap Task 
Number rewards retrieved in all three 
trials; largest rank describes best 
performance (highest number of rewards) 
and smallest worst performance (no 
reward obtained) 
27.5 
(1.5/52.5) 
53 
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Conservative data set with 53 individuals 
Supplementary Table S3: 
Spearman-Rho correlation matrix of the five cognitive domains of the problem-solving tasks (N=53) 
 
Flexibility 
Inhibitory 
Control 
Tool use 
Learning 
Remembering 
Reversal Learning 
Causal Reasoning 
Flexibility 
- .027 .099 .247 .060 
Inhibitory Control 
 - .080 .116 .076 
Tool use 
  - -.028 .114 
Learning 
Remembering 
Reversal Learning 
   - .333 
Note: Bonferroni niveau of significance p< .01 (α/N=.05/5)
 
 
Extended data set with 57 individuals 
Supplementary Table S4: Principal Component Matrix of the five 
problem-solving domains, N=57 (imputed data set) 
Item 
 
 Loadings 
 
g 
Ability of 
Tool use 
% of variance 32.12 22.58 
Eigenvalues 1.61 1.13 
Learning & Remembering & 
Reversal Learning 
.743 -.412 
Causal Reasoning .679 -.201 
Flexibility  .500 -.069 
Inhibitory Control .525 .505 
Tool use .261 .812 
Note: N = 53, Rotation = none. 
Loadings > .50 appear in bold 
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Ranked dataset with 53 individuals 
Supplementary Table S5: Principal Component Matrix of the five 
problem-solving domains on the ranked dataset 
Item 
 
 Item Loadings 
 
g 
Ability of 
Tool use 
% of variance 30.14 20.73 
Eigenvalues 1.51 1.04 
Rank Learning & Remembering 
& Reversal Learning 
.765 -.376 
Rank Causal Reasoning .676 -.065 
Rank Flexibility  .524 -.079 
Rank Inhibitory Control .346 .438 
Rank Tool use .267 .832 
Note: N = 53, Rotation = none. 
Loadings > .50 and <-.50 appear in bold 
 
Explorative Factor Analysis with 53 individuals 
Supplementary Table S6 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(Maximum-Likelihood) of the five problem-solving 
domains 
Item 
 
 Factor Loadings 
 g 
% of variance 22.51 
Eigenvalues 1.12 
Learning & Remembering & 
Reversal Learning 
.687 
Causal Reasoning .584 
Flexibility  .407 
Inhibitory Control .333 
Tool use .191 
Note: N = 53, Rotation = none. 
Factor loadings > .50 appear in bold 
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Conservative data set with 53 individuals 
Supplementary Table S7 (Health instead of Age): Linear Model of variable g (N=53) 
  Estimate Std. Error Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.124 0.27 0.645 
Health (yes) -0.029 0.42 0.946 
Sex (male) -0.033 0.27 0.904 
Background 
      Wild vs. others -0.046 0.17 0.790 
      others vs. Unknown -0.045 0.10 0.663 
      Station vs. Human 0.088 0.23 0.706 
Rehabilitation Station 
      Sumatra vs. Borneo 0.191 0.10 0.074 
      Borneo 1 vs. Borneo 2 -0.476 0.17 0.007** 
Note: F-statistic: 2.236 on 7 and 45 DF,  p-value <.05 
 
Dataset with 53 individuals and LEARNING as a separate variable 
Supplementary Table S8: Principal Component Matrix of the five 
problem-solving domains with Learning included as a separate 
variable 
Item 
 
 Loadings 
 
g 
Ability of 
Tool use 
% of variance 34.39 18.38 
Eigenvalues 2.06 1.10 
Learning & Remembering & 
Reversal Learning 
.872 -.226 
Learning .831 -.225 
Causal Reasoning .581 .062 
Flexibility  .409 .064 
Inhibitory Control .258 .654 
Tool use .203 .752 
Note: N = 53, Rotation = none. 
Loadings > .50 appear in bold 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. S1: Presentation table (L 140 cm x W 100 
cm x H 110 – 160 cm adjustable in height) for elevated 
enclosures. a) The presentation table with an additional 
board (L 180 cm x W 120 cm x D 3 cm) for experiments that 
require a vertical position. b) The table during testing of the 
Box Task. The individuals had access to the apparatus by 
reaching through the bars. 
 
  
Supplementary Fig. S2: Box-Task with five wooden boxes (L 20 cm x W 15 cm x H 8 cm). (a) Schematic view of 
1st presentation of the apparatus. Lid can be ﬂipped open. (b) 2nd presentation of the apparatus. Sliding doors 
can be opened in order to retrieve food reward. (c) Sumatran orangutan conducting the box task, here using 
the sliding doors during the 2nd presentation. 
 
a)                                   b) 
(c) (a) 
(b) 
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Supplementary Fig. S3: Detour Reaching. a) A schematic view including technical measurements of the 
apparatus used for Detour Reaching: Box (L 100 cm x W 30 cm x H 40 cm) that has two openings at the front 
side, one small hole ( 2 cm) at the right front and one large opening (L 29 cm x H 19 cm) at the left front of 
the box,. b) Detour Reaching Box is screwed on the presentation table and can be presented from outside of 
the cage. c) Sumatran orangutan solving the task by reaching for the bait, a banana, through the big hole on the 
left front of the box. 
 
146  PhD Dissertation, Laura A. Damerius, 2017  
 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. S4: Tube Task with six tubes (L 37 x H 7.5 x 
D 6 cm). Subjects can use their ﬁngers to reach trough the slot 
and to slide the bait along the tube. a) Wrong direction to 
slide the bait. Bait falls into the opaque trap. b) Correct 
direction to slide the bait. Bait can be retrieved out of the 
tube. c) Single tube, made out of metal with a transparent 
Makrolon plate to see the bait and run the finger in the slot. d) 
Complete test design, six tubes on a vertical board.  
 
  
Supplementary Fig. S5: Visible Honey Tool Trap. a) Schematic view of the apparatus. Wooden box (H 80 cm x W 50 cm 
x D 7 cm) with two embedded transparent Makrolon tubes: a straight channel (L 30 cm x H 5 cm x D 5 cm) and a 
curved L-shaped channel *L 15 cm (10 cm until it bends down 5 cm), W 5 cm, D 5 cm+. b) Honey Tool Trap in its ﬁnal 
version before use. c) Stick inserted in the curved channel to obtain honey (correct solution). d) Rope inserted in the 
curved channel in order to obtain honey (correct solution). e) Bornean individual using the stick on the apparatus. 
 
(e) 
What makes orangutans intelligent? 
 147 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. S6: Reversal Learning with 12 doors (L 13 cm, W 10 cm, distance to each other 15 cm). (a) Schematic 
view of the learning phase of the Reversal Learning. The subject learns the association of food and location (here right as 
an example). The association with location is enhanced with colors (here white). (b) Schematic view of Reversal Phase. The 
old association (right, white) does not hold any more. This time the reversed association (left, black) needs to be learned. 
c) Reversal learning board as it is presented to the individual. d) Sumatran subject conducting the reversal learning task by 
reaching through the bars and turning the doors. 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. S7: The relation between 
curiosity and the potential g (PC1) plotted with a 
fitted line based on the LMM (Table 4) over all 
individuals (n=52). The outlier on the left was a 
highly uncurious wild individual. 
 
(d) 
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The reluctant innovator: orangutans and the phylogeny of 
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Schuppli1 
 
1 Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Zürich, CH-8057 Zürich, Switzerland 
 
Published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society February 2016 
 
Young orangutans are highly neophobic, avoid independent exploration and show a preference for 
social learning. Accordingly, they acquire virtually all their learned skills through exploration that is 
socially induced. Adult exploration rates are also low. Comparisons strongly suggest that major 
innovations, i.e. behaviors that have originally been brought into the population through individual 
invention, are made where ecological opportunities to do so are propitious. Most populations 
nonetheless have large innovation repertoires, because innovations, once made, are retained well 
through social transmission. Wild orangutans are therefore not innovative. In striking contrast, zoo-
living orangutans actively seek novelty and are highly exploratory and innovative, probably 
because of positive reinforcement, active encouragement by human role models, increased 
sociality and an expectation of safety. The explanation for this contrast most relevant to hominin 
evolution is that captive apes generally have a highly reduced cognitive load, in particular owing to 
the absence of predation risk, which strongly reduces the costs of exploration. If the orangutan 
results generalize to other great apes, this suggests that our ancestors could have become more 
curious once they had achieved near-immunity to predation on the eve of the explosive increase in 
creativity characterizing the Upper Palaeolithic Revolution. 
 
 
 
Wild Orangutan Males Plan and Communicate Their Travel 
Direction One Day in Advance 
 
Carel P. van Schaik1, Laura Damerius1, Karin Isler1 
 
1 Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Zürich, CH-8057 Zürich, Switzerland 
 
Published in PLoS one September 2013 
 
 
The ability to plan for the future beyond immediate needs would be adaptive to many animal 
species, but is widely thought to be uniquely human. Although studies in captivity have shown that 
great apes are capable of planning for future needs, it is unknown whether and how they use this 
ability in the wild. Flanged male Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) emit long calls, which females 
use to maintain earshot associations with them. We tested whether long calls serve to 
communicate a male's ever-changing predominant travel direction to facilitate maintaining these 
associations. We found that the direction in which a flanged male emits his long calls predicts his 
subsequent travel direction for many hours, and that a new call indicates a change in his main 
travel direction. Long calls given at or near the night nest indicate travel direction better than 
random until late afternoon on the next day. These results show that male orangutans make their 
travel plans well in advance and announce them to conspecifics. We suggest that such a planning 
ability is likely to be adaptive for great apes, as well as in other taxa. 
